FOREIGN AFFAIRS

AN AMERICAN QVARTERLY REVIEW

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

Meet the competition

"Seizing the offensive is the only strategy that can work for U.S. business in the world market today. It must take the initiative internationally—in price, styling, innovation, marketing. A defensive position can only limit losses. We need gains."

So said Peter F. Drucker in The Harvard Business Review, and the 1963 export figures underscore the urgency of his remarks.

U.S. exports were an estimated $22.4 billion; European Common market exports, $35.8 billion; and European Free Trade Association exports, more than $21 billion. Estimated export figures for Canada, Japan, Australia indicate healthy gains.

Foreign companies have exploded into the world market, hungry for a larger and larger share. They are using—and expanding—modern manufacturing facilities, applied industrial technology and streamlined marketing techniques.

To compete effectively in the $200 billion world market predicted for the 1970's, U.S. companies must sell harder with more aggressive, up-to-date marketing and promotion programs. Your company's future may well depend on them.

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

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

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PERFECTIONIST

Assignment: Quality Control. He's a very special engineer at General Motors—a key man in a corporation which regards product dependability as a prime responsibility to its customers. He and a GM inspector are shown giving this transmission a final check. In addition to keeping an eagle eye on every phase of manufacturing, the quality control engineer is closely concerned with preliminary design and engineering. More than 13,000 individual parts go into a GM car, and every one must be as reliable as men and machines can make it. Raw materials, components, subassemblies—*all* get meticulous scrutiny. Tolerances to within *fifty millionths* of an inch are commonplace.

Among GM production employes, about *one of every twelve* devotes full time to quality control or inspection. Approximately 50,000 inspections are involved in the building of a single car. In addition, every machine operator has the responsibility for the quality of his work and performance of his machine. He can accept or reject any part he makes. His work is checked by the quality control engineer and the inspector, who analyze machine capabilities and predict machine inaccuracy *before* it occurs—not after.

They're mighty important people, these GM quality control engineers. They have an exacting job, and they take pride in doing it well. GM products bear witness to their effectiveness.

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

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There's adventure ahead for you in 1965
on Maupintour's odyssey through

The Cities Of Central Asia

Tamerlane's Samarkand



Uzbek cotton worker

Turn back time to the days when Golden Samarkand lay astride the silk trade route from China to the Mediterranean . . . when Ness was being constructed by Alexander the Great . . . when the Emir of Bukhara was relaxing in his Summer Palace . . . when the oriental bazaars of Tashkent were dazzling with their colorful vendors and wares . . . when the caravans wound their way through Kabul and Emperor Babur was conquering India . . . when poets were flourishing in Shiraz . . . when Darius the Great was at his zenith in the world's most powerful city, Persepolis . . . and when Isfahan, Tehran and Istanbul were centers of ancient Moslem cultures. ☐ All this is ancient history, but when you travel through these cities of antiquity you'll be amazed at how little changed the areas and their peoples are from times long past. Almost forgotten, these areas are still very much alive, and can be visited today via the convenience of modern jet travel, comfortable accommodations, and the services of an experienced, knowledgeable Maupintour host. ☐ Maupintour's Cities of Central Asia tour departs May 2 and July 4, 1965, and spends 50 days visiting the ancient East plus Moscow, Leningrad, Kiev, Sochi and Tbilisi. ☐ Write today for descriptive travel folder. Address your request to Mr. A. G. Moss, Jr., Maupintour, 711 West 23rd Street, Lawrence, Kansas 66044.

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

Up until now most satellites cost millions to produce.

This ITT-built satellite is an exception. It carries a price tag of well under $250 thousand.

The U.S. now has a relatively inexpensive space vehicle with many potential uses. It could be designed for communications, or any number of scientific experiments like the measuring of radiation in the atmosphere; it can be used for pinpointing locations on earth. In fact, that's what it is doing at this moment. All 40 pounds of it is circling the earth about every hour and 40 minutes at an altitude of 600 miles. It was successfully orbited early this year by the U.S. Air Force Space System Division as part of an overall program of geodetic measurement, managed by the U.S. Army.

Working in conjunction with four ground stations, the new satellite's job is to receive and retransmit radio signals which permit determination of accurate data on the exact positions of continents, islands and other landmarks. It will eventually help eliminate the margin of error that now exists in cartographic computations.

The uses of this new space vehicle are limited only by the imagination and inventiveness of its users. It has nowhere to go but up in this booming age of space technology. This is another of the advances made by ITT scientists and engineers who are active in virtually every area of U.S. Space and Defense programs—from microcircuit packaging to the management of missile ranges covering thousands of square miles.

ITT is the world's largest international supplier of electronic and telecommunication equipment. Facilities in 49 nations doing business in 115 countries and employing 179,000 people.

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

Now enjoy the big pure tone of FM outdoors—on America's first all-transistor portable FM/AM radio! Super-sensitive, drift free reception; powerful 7 x 5 inch speaker; clear, static-free FM tone! Plays up to 300 hours on low cost flashlight batteries. Three built-in antennas: FM dipole antenna (extends 3 ft.); concealed FM antenna; Zenith Wavemagnet AM antenna. Features pinpoint vernier tuning. The Zenith Trans-Symphony, Royal 2000, $149.95*†.

Powered to tune in the world—now Zenith adds FM to the famous 9-band Trans-Oceanic® short wave portable! Meet the new Royal 3000 Zenith Trans-Oceanic radio! It receives magnificent, crystal-clear FM! *Plus* short wave, long wave and standard broadcasts—including navigation signals and FAA weather reports. 9 super-sensitive wave bands. Black Permawear covering with chrome and Roman gold color trim. The Royal 3000, $275.00*†.

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

Landing strip for a supersonic fighter

Powered by the Bristol Siddeley BS 100 vectored thrust engine, the Hawker Siddeley P 1154 strike aircraft combines supersonic performance with vertical take-off and land ability. This aircraft is now being developed as a Hawker Hunter replacement for the Royal Air Force.

The choice of the BS 100 for the P 1154 follows on the successful performance of another Bristol Siddeley powered V/STOL aircraft —the Hawker Siddeley P 1127. The P 1127, powered by the Pegasus vectored thrust engine, has been flying for over three years and was the world's first V/STOL strike aircraft. A squadron of P 1127 aircraft is now being formed for joint evaluation by the air forces of the United Kingdom, United States and West Germany.

Bristol Siddeley supply the power for aircraft, helicopters, missiles, ships, hydrofoils, air cushion vehicles and turbo-generators.

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

Our captain, the Captain

Pictured here in sporting attire, Capt. K. R. Gazder, formidable batsman, distinguished pilot, and chief of AIR-INDIA's transatlantic operations.

Like all personnel who fly our New York-to-London runs, Capt. Gazder lives in London, where for the past 15 years he has nobly captained AIR-INDIA's own London cricket team.

"Of course, we don't play *serious* cricket," he says, "only club cricket. Mostly for the fun and spirit of the thing."

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

Picture of a satellite in orbit—as drawn by a computer

The domino-shaped box in the drawing above represents a communications satellite orbiting the earth. The various angles and positions of the box show the relative positions of the satellite during one orbit.

The drawing was made, not by a man, but by a computer at Bell Telephone Laboratories to help scientists visualize how the satellite would behave.

What the computer did is called *simulation*. Working from data given it, the computer calculated, or simulated, the satellite's position at various instants and produced the picture on microfilm. The picture told us what we needed to know.

Computers help us plan coast-to-coast transmission systems, new switching logic, and data systems. They also help us study problems relating to telephone usage at given times of the day or year.

Not all of our simulation is done on computers. Often we can simulate by other means.

We test new kinds of undersea telephone cables in buried, brine-filled steel pipes that duplicate the pressures and temperatures of the ocean's bottom at various depths.

Ingenious equipment in one of our laboratories sends test telephone pulses racing around an electronic ring that simulates a 6000-mile circuit containing 5300 repeaters to boost voice volume.

Many additional examples of simulation could be cited. Often they help us spend our time and money more efficiently in developing new services and improving present ones—in making sure that America enjoys the world's finest telephone service at the fairest possible prices.

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

A good pen gives your letters a personal touch



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

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(Harrison E. Salisbury, New York Times)

No problem of foreign policy is more important today than that of U.S. relations with the world of Communism. And no name commands greater respect in the study of that problem than that of George F. Kennan. In this book he offers a summary of his own thinking on the special difficulties currently facing our country as it confronts a rapidly changing Communist world. As a sure-footed guide to the world of Communism, Mr. Kennan has few equals. In this book he provides the reader with a wisely reasoned review of the choices which face American foreign policy at the present time, and what we can—and perhaps must—do about those choices. $3.00

Scientific progress, the result now of massive and planned efforts, is a crucial element in the national power of the major countries and offers great opportunities to speed up the development of the less advanced countries. This book assesses the prospects and implications of this scientific revolution in terms of technological change, social and political relationships and world politics. Dr. Haskins considers how the United States can best meet the problems posed by scientific change in relations with the new nations, Western Europe, and the Communist world. $3.50



This is a deeply perceptive examination of the U.S. foreign aid program. From a consideration of the motives and interests in both the aid-dispensing nations and the recipients it seeks out a rationale for foreign aid, and then probes the difficulties in reaching agreement on equitable sharing of the aid burden among the Western nations, given the compelling factor of mutual security in the over-all program. With the sharp insight of the advisor to governments and the objectivity of the scholar, Dr. Mason also analyzes the shortcomings and prospects of the Alliance for Progress. $3.50

The Elihu Root Lectures

Each of these books is based on Elihu Root lectures delivered by the authors. The lectures were established by the Council on Foreign Relations in 1957 to provide an opportunity for prominent individuals to speak to fellow members of the Council on topics of fundamental importance in American foreign relations. The lectures commemorate a great American statesman, who was a founder of the Council and Honorary President from 1921 to 1937.

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

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FOREIGN AFFAIRS

AN AMERICAN QUARTERLY REVIEW

JULY 1964

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FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Vol. 42 JULY 1964 No. 4

COALITION DIPLOMACY IN A NUCLEAR AGE

By Henry A. Kissinger

FOR several years now disputes have rent the Atlantic Alliance. They have focused on such issues as nuclear strategy and control, the organization of Europe and the nature of an Atlantic Community. However, the most fundamental issue in Atlantic relationships is raised by two questions not unlike those which each Western society has had to deal with in its domestic affairs: How much unity do we want? How much pluralism can we stand? Too formalistic a conception of unity risks destroying the political will of the members of the Community. Too absolute an insistence on national particularity must lead to a fragmentation of the common effort.

One does not have to agree with the methods or policies of President de Gaulle to recognize that he has posed an important question which the West has yet to answer. There is merit in his contention that before a political unit can mean something to others, it must first mean something to itself. Though de Gaulle has often acted as if he achieved identity by opposing our purposes, our definition of unity has occasionally carried overtones of tutelage.

There is no question that the abrupt tactics of the French President have severely strained the pattern of allied relationships which emerged after the war. But no one man could have disrupted the Alliance by himself. Fundamental changes have been taking place in the nature of alliances, in the character of strategy and in the relative weights of Europe and the United States. A new conception of allied relationships would have been necessary no matter who governed in Paris or in Washington.

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The impact of particular statesmen aside, a farsighted policy will gear itself to dealing with these underlying forces. It will inquire into the degree to which objectives are common and where they diverge. It will face frankly the fact that different national perspectives—and not necessarily ignorance—can produce differing strategic views. It will examine the scope and limits of consultation. If this is done in a new spirit on both sides of the Atlantic, a more vital relationship can take the place of the previous U. S. hegemony.

II. THE CHANGE IN THE NATURE OF ALLIANCES

Since the end of World War II an important change has taken place in the nature of alliances. In the past, alliances have been created for three basic reasons: (1) To provide an accretion of power. According to the doctrine of collective security, the wider the alliance, the greater its power to resist aggression. (2) To leave no doubt about the alignment of forces. It has often been argued that had Germany known at the beginning of both World Wars that the United States—or even England—would join the Allies, war would have been averted. (3) To provide an incentive for mutual assistance beyond that already supplied by an estimate of the national interest.

To be sure, even before the advent of nuclear weapons, there was some inconsistency among these requirements. The attempt to combine the maximum number of states for joint action occasionally conflicted with the desire to leave no doubt about the collective motivation. The wider the system of collective security, the more various were the motives animating it and the more difficult the task of obtaining common action proved to be. The more embracing the alliance, the more intense and direct must be the threat which would produce joint action.

This traditional difficulty has been compounded in the nuclear age. The requirements for tight command and control of nuclear weapons are to some degree inconsistent with a coalition of sovereign states. The enormous risks of nuclear warfare affect the credibility of traditional pledges of mutual assistance.

As a result, most of the theories of nuclear control now current within the Western Alliance have a tendency either to turn NATO into a unilateral U. S. guarantee or to call into question the utility of the Alliance altogether. American strategic thought

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verges on the first extreme; some French theorists have hinted at the second.

As for the United States, official spokesmen have consistently emphasized that the European contribution to the over-all nuclear strength of the Alliance is negligible. European nuclear forces have been described as "provocative," "prone to obsolescence" and "weak." For a considerable period after the advent of the Kennedy Administration, some high officials held the view that on nuclear matters the President might serve as the Executive Agent of the Alliance. Since then the United States has made various proposals for nuclear sharing, the common feature of which has been the retention of our veto over the nuclear weapons of the Alliance.

However sensible such schemes may appear from the point of view of the division of labor, they all would perpetuate our hegemony in nuclear matters within the Alliance. Allies are considered necessary not so much to add to over-all strength as to provide the possibility for applying power discriminately. In these terms, it is not surprising that some allies have considered their conventional contribution as actually weakening the over-all strength by raising doubts about the *nuclear* commitment of the United States.

According to the contrary view, alliances have lost their significance altogether. The French theorist, General Gallois, has argued, for example, that nuclear weapons have made alliances obsolete. Faced with the risk of total destruction, no nation will jeopardize its survival for another. Hence, he maintains, each country must have its own nuclear arsenal to defend itself against direct attack, while leaving all other countries to their fate.

This formula would mark the end of collective security and would be likely to lead to international chaos. Under conditions of growing nuclear power on both sides, it would be idle to deny that the threat of nuclear retaliation has lost some of its credibility. The Gallois theory would, however, transform a degree of uncertainty into a guarantee that the United States would *not* come to the assistance of its allies, thus greatly simplifying the aggressor's calculation. Moreover, in order to protect itself in this new situation, each country would need to develop not only a nuclear arsenal of its own but also foolproof procedures for assuring the Soviets that a given nuclear blow did not originate from its territory. If Gallois is right, and each country is unwill-

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ing to risk nuclear devastation for an ally, it will also want to prevent itself from being triggered into nuclear war by a neighbor. Thus each country will have a high incentive to devise methods to protect itself from a counterattack based on a misapprehension. The Gallois theory would lead to a multiplication of national nuclear forces side-by-side with the development of methods of surrender or guarantees of non-involvement.

When views such as these carry influence on both sides of the Atlantic, it is no accident that much of the debate on nuclear matters within NATO turns on the question of confidence. We tend to ask those of our allies possessing nuclear arsenals of their own: If you trust us, why do you require nuclear weapons? Our nuclear allies reply: If you trust us, why are you concerned about our possession of nuclear weapons? Since the answer must inevitably emphasize contingencies where either the goals or the strategy would be incompatible, the debate on nuclear control within NATO has been inherently divisive.

The concentration of nuclear power in the hands of one country poses one set of problems; the range of modern weapons raises another. In the past, a threatened country had the choice either of resisting or surrendering. If it resisted, it had to be prepared to accept the consequences in terms of physical damage or loss of life. A distant ally could be effective only if it was able to bring its strength to bear in the area of conflict.

Modern weapons have changed this. What each member country wants from the Alliance is the assurance that an attack on it will be considered a *casus belli.* It strives for deterrence by adding the strength of a distant ally to its own power. But, equally, each state has an incentive to reduce damage to itself to a minimum should deterrence fail. The range of modern weapons provides an opportunity in this respect for the first time. In 1914 Belgium could not base its defense on a strategy which transferred to Britain the primary risks of devastation. In the age of intercontinental rockets this technical possibility exists.

Part of the strategic dispute within the Alliance, therefore, involves jockeying to determine which geographic area will be the theater of war if deterrence fails (though this obviously cannot be made explicit). A conventional war confined to Europe may appear relatively tolerable to us. To Europeans, with their memory of conventional wars, this prospect is not particularly inviting. They may find a nuclear exchange which spares their

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territory a more attractive strategy and the threat of nuclear retaliation a more effective deterrent. The interests of the Alliance may be indivisible in an ultimate sense. But this does not guarantee the absence of sharp conflicts on methods to reach these objectives.

In short, the destructiveness and range of modern weapons have a tendency to produce both extreme nationalism and neutralism. A wise alliance policy must take care that in dealing with one of these dangers it does not produce the other.

The nature of alliances has changed in yet another way. In the past, one of the reasons for joining an alliance was to impose an additional obligation for assistance in time of need. Were each country's national interests completely unambiguous, it would know precisely on whom it could count; a formal commitment would be unnecessary. Both the aggressor and the defender would understand what they would confront and could act accordingly. Wars could not be caused by a misunderstanding of intentions. They would occur only if the protagonists calculated the existing power relationships differently.

Traditionally, however, the national interest has not been unambiguous. Often the aggressor did not know which countries would ultimately be lined up against it; Germany in 1914 was genuinely surprised by the British reaction to the invasion of Belgium. Occasionally the defenders could not be certain of the extent of their potential support—as was the case with the Allies in both wars regarding U. S. participation. Historically, the existence of an understanding on this point, tacit or explicit, has often been the determining factor in the decision to go to war. In the decade prior to World War I, the staff talks between Britain and France, which led to the transfer of the French fleet to the Mediterranean, were one of the key factors in Britain's decision to go to war in August 1914. (Thus the talks achieved one objective of traditional alliances: to commit Britain to the defense of France. They failed in another: to make the opposing alignment clear to the potential aggressor.)

One of the distinguishing features of the nuclear period is that the national interest of the major powers has become less ambiguous. In a bipolar world, a relative gain for one side represents an absolute weakening of the other. Neither of the major nuclear countries can permit a major advance by its opponent regardless of whether the area in which it occurs is formally protected by

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an alliance or not. Neutral India was no less assured of American assistance when the Chinese attacked than allied Pakistan would have been in similar circumstances. In these conditions, the distinction between allies and neutrals is likely to diminish. A country gains little from being allied and risks little by being neutral.

This inevitably results in the weakening of allied cohesion, producing what some have described as polycentrism. But polycentrism does not reflect so much the emergence of new centers of actual power as the attempt by allies to establish new centers of decision. Polycentrism is virulent not because the world has ceased to be bipolar, but because it essentially remains so. Far from doubting America's military commitment to Europe, President de Gaulle is so certain of it that he does not consider *political* independence a risk. He thus adds American power to his own in pursuit of his policies.

No matter how troublesome a major ally may be, it cannot be allowed to suffer defeat. France's policy is made possible by our nuclear umbrella—a fact which adds to the irony of the situation and the annoyance of some of our policy-makers. Our frequent insistence that in the nuclear age an isolated strategy is no longer possible misses the central point: for this precise reason allies have unprecedented scope for the pursuit of their own objectives. And the more the détente—real or imaginary—proceeds, the more momentum these tendencies will gather. We live in a curious world where neutrals enjoy most of the protection of allies and allies aspire to have the same freedom of action as do neutrals.

These conditions turn coalition diplomacy into an extraordinarily delicate undertaking. Appeals which were effective in the past either work no longer or turn counterproductive. Thus the warning that certain European actions might lead the United States to withdraw is bound to have consequences contrary to those intended. If believed at all, it demonstrates that there are at least *some* contingencies in which the United States might abandon its allies, thus magnifying pressures for European autonomy.

The scope for real Third Force policies is vastly overestimated. Realism forces close association between Europe and the United States whatever the vagaries of individual statesmen. But it has happened often enough in Western history that an underlying

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community of interests was submerged by subsidiary rivalries. Ancient Greece foundered on this discord. Western Europe nearly tore itself apart before it submerged its rivalries. And now the Atlantic area faces the challenge of how to combine common action with a respect for diverse approaches to the central problem.

III. THE ABSTRACTNESS AND NOVELTY OF MODERN POWER

The destructiveness of modern weapons gives the strategic debate unprecedented urgency. The speed with which they can be delivered complicates the problem of command and control in a way unimaginable even a decade and a half ago. Doctrinal and technical disputes occur within each government. It is not surprising, then, that they should rend the Alliance as well.

The novelty of modern weapons systems gives the disputes a metaphysical, almost theological, cast. Never before in history has so much depended on weapons so new, so untested, so "abstract." No nuclear weapons have been exploded in wartime except on Japan, which did not possess means of retaliation. No one knows how governments or people will react to a nuclear explosion under conditions where both sides possess vast arsenals.

Moreover, modern weapons systems are relatively untested. During the debate in this country over the nuclear test-ban treaty, a great deal of attention was focused on the adequacy of our warheads. In fact, the other components of our weapons systems contain many more factors of uncertainty. The estimated "hardness" of Minuteman silos depends entirely on theoretical studies. Of the thousands of missiles in our arsenal, relatively few of each category have been thoroughly tested. There is little experience with salvo firing. Air-defense systems are designed without any definite knowledge of the nature of the offense. A high proportion of the phenomena discovered in nuclear testing have been "unexpected."

The situation is further complicated by the fact that the purpose of modern weapons is deterrence: to prevent—by a particular threat—a certain course of action. But deterrence is primarily a psychological problem. It depends on the aggressor's assessment of risks, not the defender's. A threat meant as a bluff but taken seriously is more useful for purposes of deterrence than a "genuine" threat interpreted as a bluff. Moreover, if deterrence is successful, aggression does *not* take place. But it is

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impossible to demonstrate why something has not occurred. It can never be proved whether peace has been maintained because NATO pursues an optimum strategy or a marginally effective one. Finally, the longer deterrence lasts the more color will be lent to the argument that perhaps the Communists never intended to attack in the first place. An effective NATO deterrent strategy may thus have the paradoxical consequence of strengthening the arguments of the quasi-neutralists.

Even if there is agreement about the correct weapons system, there may be disagreement about how it can best be coupled with diplomacy to produce deterrence. How does one threaten with solid-fuel missiles? As these are always in an extreme state of readiness, how then does one demonstrate an increase in preparedness such as historically served as a warning? From a technical point of view it is highly probable that missiles can perform most of the functions heretofore assigned to airplanes. The shift to missiles and the elimination of airplanes envisaged by the former Deputy Secretary of Defense Roswell Gilpatric[1] makes a great deal of sense technically. But has adequate attention been given to the kind of diplomacy which results—particularly in crisis situations—when the retaliatory threat depends on solid-fuel missiles in underground silos? During the Cuban missile crisis, dispersing SAC planes to civilian airports proved an effective warning. What will be an equivalent move when our strategic forces are composed entirely of missiles?

These questions do not permit clear-cut answers. Yet they are at the heart of many of the disputes within NATO. The United States has held the view that deterrence was best achieved by posing a credible threat. And it has related credibility to whether the risks, if deterrence failed, were tolerable. The Europeans for a variety of reasons have generally been of a different opinion. They have maintained that deterrence depended on posing the most extreme risks. They have been prepared to sacrifice a measure of credibility in favor of enhancing the magnitude of the threat. This debate has been inconclusive because it ultimately depends on a psychological, not a technical, judgment.

The controversy originated in an attempt by the United States in 1961 to change the relative weight to be given to conventional and nuclear weapons in NATO doctrine. The method of effecting

[1] "Our Defense Needs: The Long View," *Foreign Affairs*, April 1964.

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this change was not new—though it was urged with new insistence. NATO had been presented many times before with American blueprints and had seen its consultative role limited to discussing the technical implementation of an American conception. What gave the dispute its particular urgency was that the advent of a new, highly analytical American Administration coincided with the growing strength and self-confidence of Europe and the deliberate policy of President de Gaulle to assert a more independent role.

In the process, many of the issues that had been obscured in the previous decade by the curious, somewhat one-sided nature of the transatlantic dialogue came for the first time into sharper focus. This highlighted a difference in perspective between the American and the European conception of NATO which had existed since its beginning.

When the Korean War raised the spectre of Soviet military aggression, both sides of the Atlantic made a serious effort to turn NATO into a more effective military instrument. However, given the enormous disparity in military and economic strength between the United States and Europe, the primary concern of the European countries was to commit the United States to their defense. They saw in NATO above all a means to obtain American protection, by which was meant American nuclear protection.

However, the Europeans had too much experience with the tenuousness of formal commitments not to strive for more tangible guarantees. This led to pressures for the stationing of American troops in Europe. European reasoning was similar to that ascribed to a French marshal in 1912 when he was asked how many British troops he wanted for the outbreak of a European war. He is reported to have replied: "We need only one, who we will make sure is killed on the first day of the war." In the nuclear age, the price of a guarantee has risen to something like five divisions.

With so many American troops permanently stationed in Europe, it was only sensible to try to give them some meaningful military mission. Even during the period of the doctrine of massive retaliation, NATO forces were larger than the prevailing strategic concept seemed to demand. Indeed, the number was somewhat inconsistent with it. Despite our commitment to a retaliatory strategy, we constantly pressed for a European con-

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tribution of ground forces. The Europeans, though they agreed to a succession of NATO force goals, never really believed in the doctrines used to rationalize them. Rather they saw in their military contribution a form of fee paid for United States nuclear protection. The Europeans agreed to our requests. But they tried to see to it that their actual contributions would be large enough to induce us to keep a substantial military establishment in Europe, yet not so high as to provide a real alternative to nuclear retaliation. They were opposed to giving the conventional forces a central military mission; but they also resisted any hint of American withdrawal.

This ambivalence was brought into the open by the shift in United States strategic doctrine in 1961. The American attempt to strengthen the forces for local defense had the paradoxical consequence of bringing to the fore the issue of nuclear control which for many Europeans had always been the crux of the matter. For the first time, U. S. strategic views were publicly challenged, at first hesitantly, then ever more explicitly. Europe had now gained sufficient strength and confidence so that the mere enunciation of an American policy no longer guaranteed its acceptance. The peremptory way in which the United States proceeded only sharpened the controversy. And France added fuel to the flames by giving European misgivings their most extreme formulation.

But if French policy has deliberately sharpened conflicts, the United States tendency to turn an essentially psychological issue into a technical one has unintentionally exacerbated disagreements beyond their intrinsic significance. Our spokesmen often leave the impression that disagreement is due to the ignorance of our allies, and that it is destined to yield ultimately before extensive briefings and insistent reiteration. Faced with opposition, we are less given to asking whether there may be some merit in the arguments of our allies than to overwhelming them with floods of emissaries preaching the latest version of our doctrine.

But the real problem is not that the Europeans fail to understand our quest for multiple options. They simply reject it for themselves. When the issue is Asia or Latin America, Europeans favor an even more flexible response than we do; with respect to the defense of Europe, their attitude is more rigid. As long as the United States retains ultimate control over nuclear weapons, the European incentive is bound to be exactly the opposite of

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ours. Rather than permit a "pause" for "appreciating the wider risks involved," Europeans prefer to force us to make our response as automatic as possible.

This problem has little to do with whether the United States could afford to give up Europe. It is rooted in the nature of sovereignty and made more acute by the destructiveness of nuclear weapons. Robert Bowie, one of the most eloquent spokesmen of the dominant school of U. S. thought, criticized British nuclear policy before the Assembly of the Western European Union as follows: "Britain has retained its national command structure and the right to withdraw them at its option. This means that they *certainly* could not be counted on by any of the others to be available in case of need."[2] [Italics supplied.] If this concern is real regarding British nuclear forces, which are, after all, assigned to NATO, it must be even stronger regarding U. S. strategic forces which remain under exclusive American control.

The problem can then be summed up as follows: Exclusive U. S. control of nuclear strategy is politically and psychologically incompatible with a strategy of multiple choices or flexible response. The European refusal to assign a meaningful military mission to conventional forces in Europe is incompatible with the indefinite retention of large U. S. forces there. If the United States prizes a conventional response sufficiently, it will have to concede Europe autonomy in nuclear control. If the Europeans want to insist on an automatic nuclear response, a reconsideration of our conventional deployment on the Continent will become inevitable. Refusal to face these facts will guarantee a perpetuation of present disputes and increasing disarray within NATO.

The United States-European dialogue on strategy is confused further by the nature of the intra-European debate. Many of those who applaud our views do so for reasons which may not prove very comforting in the long run. We must be careful not to take every agreement with us at face value. Acquiescence in our opinion can have two meanings: It can represent either a sincere commitment to Atlantic partnership or disguise a neutralist wish to abdicate responsibility. For the American nuclear umbrella, now sometimes exploited by President de Gaulle for his own purposes, can also be used—and more dangerously for the West

[2] Proceedings of Western European Union Assembly, Ninth Ordinary Session, December 3, 1963.

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—to support policies amounting to neutralism. In many countries it is the leaders and groups traditionally most committed to national defense who have developed views on strategy which challenge American concepts; while some of those most ready to accept U. S. strategic hegemony have in the past been the least interested in making a serious defense effort. We may therefore have to choose between our theories of nuclear control and Atlantic cohesion, between the technical and the political sides of Atlantic policy.

IV. DIFFERENCES IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

Some of the strains in Atlantic relationships have resulted from factors outside anybody's control. Many reflect the growth in Europe of the very strength and self-confidence which American policy has striven to promote since the end of World War II. Others have been caused by the tactics of President de Gaulle, whose style of diplomacy is not really compatible with the requirements of coalition. We share the responsibility through too much insistence on technical solutions and too little allowance for the intangibles of political judgment and will.

But perhaps the deepest cause of transatlantic misunderstandings is a difference in historical perspective. Americans live in an environment uniquely suited to an engineering approach to policy-making. As a result, our society has been characterized by a conviction that any problem will yield if subjected to a sufficient dose of expertise. With such an approach, problems tend to appear as discrete issues without any inner relationship. It is thought that they can be solved "on their merits" as they arise. It is rarely understood that a "solution" to a problem may mortgage the future—especially as there is sufficient optimism to assume that even should this prove to be the case, it will still be possible to deal with the new problem when it materializes.

But Europeans live on a continent covered with ruins testifying to the fallibility of human foresight. In European history, the recognition of a problem has often defined a dilemma rather than pointed to an answer. The margin of survival of European countries has been more precarious than ours. European reasoning is likely to be more complicated and less confident than ours. This explains some of the strains in Atlantic relationships. Americans tend to be impatient with what seems to them Europe's almost morbid obsession with the past, while Europeans sometimes

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complain about a lack of sensitivity and compassion on the part of Americans.

In the fall of 1963, our newspapers were filled with derisory comments about French manœuvres then taking place. The scenario of these manœuvres supposed that an aggressor force was attacking France through Germany. France's allies had surrendered. As the aggressor's armies were approaching her borders, France resorted to her nuclear weapons. It is, of course, easy to ridicule this scenario by contrasting the small size of the French bomber force with the magnitude of the disaster envisaged. But the crucial issue is not technical. It arises from the fact that France has undergone shattering historical experiences with which Americans find it difficult to identify. The scenario of the French manœuvres recalled importantly—perhaps too rigidly—France's traumatic experience of 1940, when foreign armies attacked all along the Western front and France's allies collapsed. The British Fighter Command remained in England; the fact that this critical decision was wise does not affect the basic psychological point. Moreover, the French disaster came at the end of two decades in which France almost single-handedly shouldered the responsibility for the defense of Europe while her erstwhile allies withdrew into isolation or offered strictures about France's obsession with security. The nightmare that some day France might again stand alone goes far deeper than the obstinate ill-will of a single individual.

A comparable problem exists in Germany. Washington has at times shown signs of impatience toward the German leaders and their constant need for reassurance. Secretary Rusk has been reported more than once to be restless with what he has called the "pledging sessions" which the Germans seem so often to demand. However, insecurity is endemic in the German situation. A divided country with frontiers that correspond to no historical experience, a society which has lived through two disastrous defeats and four domestic upheavals in 40 years, cannot know inward stability. The need to belong to something, to rescue some predictability out of chaos, is overwhelming. The memories of our allies should be factors as real in the discussions of our policy-makers as the analysis of weapons systems.

The importance of this difference in historical perspective is compounded by the continuing disparity in strength between the two sides of the Atlantic. While it has become fashionable

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to speak of Europe's new-found equality, it is important not to take it too literally. Europe *has* gained in strength over the past decade and a half. It can and should play an increasingly responsible role. But for the foreseeable future we are likely to be by far the stronger partner.

It is important to be clear about this because it requires us to show unusual tact and steadiness. Many of our allies have been guilty of unilateral actions far more flagrant than ours. But when we act unilaterally, disarray in the Alliance is almost inevitable. Drastic changes in U.S. strategic doctrine or action without adequate consultation—such as the removal of I.R.B.M.s from Italy and Turkey or the withdrawal of troops from Germany—create either a sense of European impotence or increase the pressure for more autonomy. Bilateral dealings with the Soviets, from which our allies are excluded, or about which they are informed only at the last moment, are bound to magnify Third Force tendencies. When our allies resist such U. S. policies and practices, it is not necessarily because they disagree with our view but because they are afraid of creating a precedent for unilateral changes in other policies. (Even statements of substantive disagreement may be a smoke-screen for deeper concerns.) Moreover, many allied leaders who have staked their prestige on certain U. S. policies can suffer serious domestic consequences if we change them drastically.

Thus the voice of Europe reaches us in extremely distorted form. President de Gaulle sharpens all disputes and even creates them in pursuit of his policy of independence. But some other leaders do not give full expression to their disquiet because they do not want to undermine further the solidarity on which their security is thought to depend. Whereas France exaggerates her disagreements, some other countries obscure theirs. Thus the dialogue with Europe is often conducted on false issues, while real issues—like the future of Germany, or arms control, or the role of tactical nuclear weapons—are swept under the rug in order not to magnify the existing discord.

We, in turn, are faced with the problem that technology and political conditions are changing so rapidly that no policy can be maintained over an indefinite period of time. How to shape policies that are responsive to change while maintaining the confidence of our allies? The future vitality of the Western Alliance depends on understanding the possibilities and limits of the consultative process.

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V. THE LIMITS AND PURPOSES OF CONSULTATION

The always difficult problem of coalition diplomacy is magnified by three factors:

(1) The fact that the two superpowers are committed to the existing balance provides their European allies with wide scope for purely national actions.

(2) The internal workings of modern government are so complex that they create a variety of obstacles to meaningful consultation. Nations sometimes find it so difficult to achieve a domestic consensus that they are reluctant to jeopardize it afterwards in international forums. The tendency of the United States to confine consultation to elaborating its own blueprint reflects less a quest for hegemony—as some of our European critics occasionally assert—than a desire to avoid complicating still further its own decision-making process.

(3) As governments have found in their domestic experience, access to the same technical data does not guarantee unanimity of understanding. In an alliance of states very unequal in size and strength, and with widely varying histories, differences are almost inevitable. And they are likely to be made all the more intractable by a technology of unprecedented destructiveness and novelty.

Thus consultation is far from being a magic cure-all. It will not necessarily remove real differences of geography, perspective or interest. Nevertheless, an improvement in the consultative process should be one of the chief concerns of the Alliance.

The dominant American view has been that consultation would be most effective if there were a division of labor within the Alliance according to which the United States retained control over nuclear weapons while Europe specialized in conventional forces. Similarly, it has been suggested in Great Britain that the independent British nuclear deterrent could be given up in return for a greater voice in American policy.[3] The proposed NATO Multilateral Force on which the United States increasingly stakes its prestige is basically a device to make its nuclear hegemony acceptable.[4]

In other words, the thrust of our policy is to create a structure

[3] See "The Labor Party's Defense and Foreign Policy," by Patrick Gordon Walker, *Foreign Affairs*, April 1964, p. 391–398.

[4] For the author's view on the NATO Multilateral Force see, "NATO's Nuclear Dilemma," *The Reporter*, March 28, 1963.

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which makes it physically impossible for any of the allies (except the United States) to act autonomously. This raises the following problems: (a) How effective will consultation based on such premises be? (b) Is such a system as useful for the long-term political vitality of the Alliance as it is for the conduct of a general nuclear war?

With regard to the first of these, any process of consultation must be responsive to the following three questions: Who has a right to be consulted? Whose voice carries weight? Who has enough competence?

These three levels are not necessarily identical. Many agencies in our own government have a right to express their views, but not all carry the same weight. When some of Britain's Labor leaders suggest that they want a greater voice in our decisions in return for giving up British nuclear weapons, the answer has to be: Like whose voice? Like that of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency? Or the Joint Chiefs of Staff? Or the State Department? Or the Commerce Department? In our interdepartmental disputes, clearly, the outcome often depends on the constituency which the agency or department represents. The weight given to advice is inevitably related to the competence that it reflects.

If the United States retains indefinitely an effective monopoly of nuclear power, we would probably find in time that Europe simply does not have sufficient technical competence for its views to carry weight. And this in turn is likely to breed irresponsibility on both sides of the Atlantic. A right of consultation without the ability to make a serious judgment may, in fact, be the worst possible system. Over a period of time it is bound to reduce Europe's voice in Washington; while in Europe it must produce a sense of impotence or extreme nationalism. Indeed, it may enable neutralists to focus all Europe's anti-nuclear sentiment against the United States. Some European autonomy on nuclear matters—preferably growing out of existing programs—seems therefore desirable.

The emphasis placed on a unitary strategic system for the Alliance has reversed the proper priorities. The real challenge to the consultative process is less in the field of strategy than in diplomacy. The ability to fight a centrally controlled general war is useful; but the ability to devise common policies in the

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face of a whole spectrum of eventualities is much more important.

If the Alliance cannot develop procedures for a common diplomacy—or at least an agreed range of divergence—it seems contradictory to insist on a system of unitary strategic control. When NATO has proved unable to develop even a common trade policy toward the Communist world, it is not surprising that countries are reluctant to entrust their survival to a NATO ally, however close. Policies on a whole range of issues such as Suez, the Congo, negotiating tactics over Berlin or the defense of Southern Arabia have been unilateral or divergent. The United States is now in the curious situation of staking a great deal of its prestige on establishing the NATO Multilateral Force and a system of unitary strategic control while East-West negotiations or the war in Southeast Asia or arms control are dealt with more or less unilaterally.

In re-assessing these priorities, it may be important to ask how unitary a system of control for strategy and diplomacy is in fact desirable. What kind of structure is more vital in the long run: An Atlantic system that automatically involves all partners? Or one that permits some autonomy? On many issues—particularly East-West relations—united action is essential. With respect to others, some degree of flexibility may be desirable. Over the next decades the United States is likely to find itself increasingly engaged in the Far East, in Southeast Asia and in Latin America. Our European allies will probably not consider their vital interests at stake in these areas. President de Gaulle's views on this subject are far from unique in Europe, even if his methods are.

If the Atlantic system is absolutely centralized, policy may be reduced to the lowest common denominator. The Soviets may use our involvements elsewhere to blackmail Europe. This, combined with the lack of interest among Europeans in the issues involved, may strain the Alliance beyond the breaking point. On the other hand, if Europe is accorded some capacity for autonomous action—military and political—its concern would be no greater, but the temptation for Soviet adventures might be reduced. Put positively, a structure which permits a variety of coördinated approaches toward the new nations could enhance the vigor of our policies, the self-confidence of our allies and the long-term vitality of the Alliance. Paradoxically, the unity of the

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Atlantic area may well be furthered by a structure which grants the possibility of autonomous action while reducing the desire for it.

VI. WHAT STRUCTURE FOR THE ATLANTIC AREA?

The most delicate problem faced by the United States in its Atlantic policy, then, is to promote cohesion without undermining the self-confidence and the political will of its allies. Formal structures can help in this effort. But when they become ends in themselves they may cause us to beg the key question by the very terms in which we state it.

Some of the current theories of Atlantic partnership run precisely this risk. According to the dominant U.S. view, shared by such wise Europeans as Jean Monnet, there is only *one* reliable concept of Atlantic partnership—that described by the image of "twin pillars" or a "dumbbell," composed of the United States and a united Europe organized on federal lines with supra-national institutions. This is, of course, one form of Atlantic partnership. But is it wise to stake everything on a single approach? History is rarely such a linear and simple process.

Every European state is the product of some process of integration at some time over the past four centuries; and Germany and Italy achieved unity less than one hundred years ago. European history suggests that there is more than one way to achieve integration. In Italy, it came by way of plebiscite and annexation abolishing the individual states. In Germany, unification occurred under the aegis of one state but as the act of sovereign governments which remained in existence after unity was achieved. The resulting structure clearly did not lack cohesiveness.

Moreover, how valid is a concept of European integration which is rejected by *both* France and Great Britain? In the outrage over Britain's exclusion from the Common Market, it has not always been noted that Britain's view (shared by both major parties) of the organization of Europe is almost identical with that of France. Both countries would find it difficult, if not impossible, to commit themselves now to a federal structure and a common parliament. It only adds to the irony of the situation that many of the most ardent advocates of Britain's entry into the Common Market both here and in Europe are also dedicated

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proponents of a federal Europe. How do they propose to reconcile these two objectives?

There may be various roads to European coöperation. The one traced by the Fouchet Plan—calling for institutionalized meetings of foreign ministers and sub-cabinet officials—is not the least plausible, and indeed it is the one most consistent with British participation. It has the advantage of producing some immediate progress without foreclosing the future. It would also permit a more flexible arrangement of Atlantic relations than the "twin pillar" concept now in vogue.

While the United States should welcome any European structure that reflects the desires of the Europeans, it would be unwise to stake everything on one particular formula. A very rigid conception of Atlantic partnership can easily fail to do justice to the richness and variety of relationships possible within the Atlantic context. Is it really possible or useful to lump the countries of Europe together on all issues? Are they always inherently closer to one another than any of them is to the United States? Do the Dutch inevitably feel a greater sense of identification with the French, or the British with the Germans, than either does with the United States? If we separate the question into political, military or economic components, is the answer always uniform and does it always point in the same direction? Would it not be wiser to retain some flexibility? There is a grave risk that too doctrinaire an approach will produce either a collapse of political will, or more likely, a new and virulent form of nationalism, perhaps even more intense than the nationalism of the *patries*. A Europe largely constructed on theoretical models might be forced into an anti-American mold because its only sense of identity will be what distinguishes it from America. Our bent for structural remedies sometimes blinds us to the fact that institutions produce their own momentum and that this cannot be foreseen from the proclamations of their founders.

In assessing our own Atlantic policy, we must cut through slogans to such questions as: Is it wise to insist that the only road to European unity is by institutions unacceptable to both France and Britain? Is the best way to solve the strategic problem by staking our prestige on a device—the Multilateral Force —which compels us to oppose the existing nuclear programs in Europe while bringing a host of presently non-nuclear countries (among them Germany, Italy, Greece and Turkey) into the

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nuclear business, occasionally with only their reluctant assent? Can it be in the interest of NATO, of the Federal Republic, or of the United States, to make Germany the senior European nuclear partner in the Multilateral Force and to create an institution which can rally all anti-U.S., anti-German and anti-nuclear sentiments against us?

European history teaches that stability is unattainable except through the coöperation of Britain, France and Germany. Care should be taken not to resurrect old national rivalries in the name of Atlanticism. The United States should not choose a special partner among its European allies. The attempt to woo one, or to force European countries to choose between us and France—a tendency which despite all disavowals is real—must magnify the European nationalism which French policy has already done so much to foster.

Our concern thus returns to the somewhat out-of-scale figure of President de Gaulle. A sense of frustration resulting from his policies, and even more from his style, has caused many to see him as individually responsible for the failure to realize many deeply felt objectives. This is not the place to attempt an assessment of his character. Conceivably he is as petty, as animated by remembered slights, as some of our commentators suggest. It is also possible that a man so conscious of his historic role has larger purposes. At any rate, we will not know until we have had a real dialogue with him. In a period of détente with Soviet Russia, is it impossible to conduct a serious conversation with a traditional ally? President de Gaulle has repeatedly expressed his willingness to coördinate strategy rather than to integrate it. We should make new efforts to explore what he means. His 1958 proposal of a Directory is not acceptable when confined to Britain, France and the United States. Do we know his attitude toward a wider forum?

Irritation with de Gaulle's tactics does not change the fact that in his proposals of 1958 for a Directory he put his finger on perhaps the key problem of NATO. In the absence of a common foreign policy—or at least an agreed range of divergence—the attempt to devise a common strategy is likely to prove futile. Lord Avon and Dean Acheson have come to the same conclusion. The time seems ripe to create a political body at the highest level —composed perhaps of the United States, the United Kingdom, France, the Federal Republic and Italy—for concerting the

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policies of the nations bordering the North Atlantic. Such a body should discuss how to implement common Atlantic purposes and define the scope of autonomous action where interests diverge. It should also be charged with developing a common strategic doctrine.

Conceivably this could end the sterile scholastic debate over the relative benefits of integration as against coördination. It might heal a rift which if continued is bound to hazard everything that has been painfully built up over 15 years. Both the United States and France are able to thwart each other's purposes. Neither can create an alternative structure—France even less than we. As in a Greek tragedy, each chief actor, following a course that seems quite reasonable, is producing consequences quite different from what he intends.

This should not happen. The problems will become insuperable only if technique is exalted above purpose and if interest is too narrowly conceived. The West does itself an injustice by comparing its disagreements to the rifts in the Communist bloc. In the Communist world, schisms are inevitable and unbridgeable. Western societies have been more fortunate. Their evolution has been richer; they have forged unity by drawing strength from diversity. Free from the shackles of a doctrine of historical inevitability, the nations of the West can render a great service by demonstrating that if history has a meaning it is up to us today to give it that meaning.

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THE FRENCH PEOPLE AND DE GAULLE

By Michel Gordey

WHAT is the reaction of the French people to the *politique de grandeur*—the policy which, in the name of France, General de Gaulle is projecting on a world scale? Before this question can be answered we must first ask: How is French policy shaped and decided? Next, how is it made known to parliament and public opinion? Third, do the broad masses of the people have access to adequate and objective information on which to base their judgment of this policy? Only then can we turn to the question: What is their judgment?

A statesman who has been familiar with General de Gaulle's working methods for over 20 years offered this confidential description of how French foreign policy is made today: "When he deals with foreign policy, the General goes into seclusion and plunges into prolonged meditation. He seldom consults experts or advisers, even those very close to him. For a long time he mulls over the questions that need to be resolved. Then, suddenly, often without even informing his ministers, he announces his decision. The Minister of Foreign Affairs, and certainly the Council of Ministers, are called upon only to execute and apply the decision which the General made entirely by himself. There is usually no real debate on diplomatic issues within the Government." The men of Quai d'Orsay by and large confirm, albeit reluctantly, this description of the method which reduces them to the role of mere executants of orders from on high.

Once a decision has been made in the Elysée, there follows a fairly short period of briefing the leading French diplomats, a process which takes place in absolute secrecy. A very few men are acquainted with the General's over-all strategy: the Prime Minister, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, a handful of high officials whose rockbound Gaullism is a pledge of their discretion, the Minister of Information and sometimes the French Ambassador to the country to which the decision applies. That is all. There are generally no leaks. When there are, they are deliberate, never fortuitous. In Paris, leaks are practically never indiscretions or trial balloons, as they are in other countries (the United States, Great Britain and the Federal Republic of Germany, for example). They are already part of the second stage—

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the stage of execution. It is often through these leaks—more or less detailed and confided with a fine show of reluctance—that the foreign embassies in Paris learn of the event soon to be announced. This is the rule for the major decisions, such as the recognition of Communist China.

Quite often, however, the General prefers a surprise effect to careful psychological preparation. In such cases, the ministers concerned and his closest confidants are equally ignorant of his decision; he explodes his bombshell all by himself. He took that line with the French veto of Great Britain's entry into the Common Market and the refusal to adhere to the Multilateral Nuclear Force in January 1963.

But assuming that his top ministers have been informed, there comes the moment when the General announces his decision to the public. This he usually does at one of his press conferences which he holds, on the average, twice a year. They should really be called "press convocations," since the press is merely summoned into the General's presence, and the unvarying procedure has nothing in common with the unrehearsed dialogue which marks this institution in other countries. In reply to questions prepared and submitted in advance, de Gaulle makes four or five speeches which he has learned by heart and which he delivers in a highly individual manner and with considerable vigor, secure in the knowledge that he will not be interrupted or asked embarrassing questions. These press convocations are given wide television and radio coverage. President de Gaulle sometimes chooses to announce his decisions in a special radio-television broadcast, advertised several days or weeks in advance and without a thousand assembled newspapermen for a backdrop. Speaking directly to his "Frenchwomen and Frenchmen," the General delivers an address also learned by heart, and shows himself to be a master of the technique of visual and auditory effects.

II

Once the great decision has been announced to the French people, one would normally expect it to be publicly debated. But for a variety of political and psychological reasons, since the birth of the Fifth Republic such debates have been unknown. They could take place in parliament, or in the press, or on radio and television. Yet as a rule the French public hears only the arguments "for," not those "against."

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The legislature, whose powers were reduced under the new 1958 Constitution, devotes a few plenary meetings two or three times a year to General de Gaulle's foreign policy. But owing to the scheduling of its sessions or the deliberate design of the government, these debates take place many months after a particular decision has been made and when it is already being implemented. Moreover, the French people hear little about these debates and care less. The Third and Fourth Republics have left an anti-parliamentary spirit in the country, based on memories of "useless palavers." In any event, as de Gaulle has commanded an absolute majority in the National Assembly since 1962, and as the Senate (where the majority of members, on the contrary, tend to be anti-Gaullist) has only limited advisory powers under the new Constitution, the government is always certain of obtaining the necessary approval of its foreign policy. The one and only time that such a debate worked to the disadvantage of the government was when the nuclear strike force was discussed in 1960; yet even then the majority, which opposed that tremendously costly program, did not—despite a negative vote—succeed in getting the government to resign. At that time, in the midst of the Algerian War, most of the deputies feared that the Assembly would be dissolved, with the result that the *Union pour la Nouvelle République,* General de Gaulle's party, would win an even more crushing victory than it subsequently did in 1962.

The lack of publicity given and weight attached to parliamentary debates is not due merely to the people's hostility, the General's contempt or the Constitution he pushed through in 1958 to confirm his absolute power. The fault lies also with the opposition, which is disunited, often timid and certainly short of political leaders of any stature or reputation. Pierre Mendès-France has lost his deputy's seat and no longer has either a newspaper or a political party with which to reach large audiences. The same is true of former Prime Minister Paul Reynaud. The few statesmen well acquainted with diplomatic issues—such as René Pleven, Guy Mollet and Maurice Faure—are still too closely identified with the Fourth Republic. Other more popular men, such as Antoine Pinay and Gaston Defferre, have until recently shown little interest in problems of foreign policy. In any event, the opposition generally refrains from attacking de Gaulle on his foreign policy and even indirectly supports some of his ideas which are challenged abroad—as for example his conception of

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France's independence vis-à-vis its allies, notably the United States.

Since parliament has virtually no hand in the molding of public opinion, what other means does the average Frenchman have of forming an intelligent concept of the policies of the President of the Fifth Republic? Basically, the press, radio and television. General de Gaulle is supposed to have said: "The newspapers are against me. I have television. I shall keep it."

What does the French reader find in the press? The General's alleged opinion that it is hostile to him is not entirely justified. Of course there are Communist and pro-Communist dailies in France which oppose him. There are also some opposition weeklies: *L'Express, France-Observateur, Le Canard Enchaîné* and *Témoignage Chrétien* of the non-Communist left, and *Carrefour, Rivarol* and others of the right and the pro-fascist and anti-Gaullist extreme right. But these reach only a limited public.

Among the mass-circulation dailies, two or three in Paris and several in the provinces have been making well-documented and well-founded reservations and criticisms, especially since de Gaulle's policy took its sharply anti-American and anti-British turn in 1963 and 1964. Such men as Raymond Aron, ex-Ambassador François Poncet, former Prime Minister Paul Reynaud, have openly protested against the General's intemperate language and peremptory decisions, particularly with reference to the recognition of Peking, the negative policy of France in NATO and the neutralist policy in Southeast Asia. In the provincial press, criticisms of de Gaulle's solitary decisions have been increasingly frequent. Moreover, large economic interests have been showing concern over the possible effects on them of France's isolation from her traditional European and overseas allies.

Nevertheless, de Gaulle has some unquestioningly faithful dailies and weeklies which sometimes fall into excessively militant and xenophobic Gaullism when dealing with matters of foreign policy. The mass-circulation newspapers which are read by the great majority of "average Frenchmen" devote relatively little space to reports on foreign policy and still less to comments on it. They record the General's decisions without taking sides and allow little room in their columns for accounts of the unfavorable reaction of world opinion to some of his more "shattering" edicts. Occasionally they highlight foreign opinions favorable to the General, allowing the reader to believe that these

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views are typical or official. Such peculiar "coverage" of foreign news is not the result of government censorship, which does not exist in France. It stems rather from an odd self-censorship practiced by the newspapermen because the General exercises the same fascination on them as he does on their readers.

Hence among West Europeans the French are probably the least well informed about foreign opinion of their own country and its policies. By judiciously selecting pro-de Gaulle press reports and speeches, such as are still to be found in England, Western Germany and the United States, and by ignoring—whether deliberately or not—the hostility and mistrust aroused by French policy, the great majority of French newspapers give their readers the illusion that France is highly respected and that its policies are widely approved of abroad. For example, a perusal of French newspapers would have given the reader no inkling of the anxiety and mistrust which the General's diplomatic decisions have been arousing in the United States, Great Britain, Western Germany, Belgium, Holland, Italy, the Scandinavian countries and the British Commonwealth.

The average Frenchman, although he is himself not free from prejudice and mistrust as regards his European neighbors and the United States, generally goes on thinking that France enjoys sympathy, respect and good will, not only in the Western world or within the Atlantic Alliance, but also on distant continents little known in France. It is true that the impact of General de Gaulle's "policy of independence" has recently won him both sympathy and an increasing popularity in some of the non-aligned countries. But in stressing this new good will, the French press all too often neglects to inform its readers of the unfavorable reaction in the West which offsets the gain in prestige elsewhere. The French thus receive a distorted picture of the image projected by their country, notably in the Western world.

The only public discussion of any magnitude on an international problem was provoked by a recent series of articles by the journalist Raymond Cartier. Their appearance in the mass-circulation illustrated weekly, *Paris-Match,* has really succeeded in shaking French opinion. Cartier attacks what he regards as France's excessive expenditures on aid to the French-speaking African countries. He criticizes the financial and economic effort which de Gaulle intends to make in Asia and Latin America. He preaches a kind of economic isolationism, feels that France is

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"wasting its money" and advocates a national withdrawal to French territory on the ground that France itself is underdeveloped when it comes to roads, schools and hospitals, housing construction, funds for education, etc. Many of his arguments resemble the past and present doctrines of American isolationists and neo-isolationists. Cartier's spirited campaign has been widely popular among the French middle and lower-middle class. His frontal attack—a most unusual event—has so troubled the government, and the General himself, that there have been official replies, explanations and justifications of the French policy of aid to underdeveloped countries. The public opinion polls have been showing for some time that the majority of Frenchmen favor a reduction in foreign aid and the application of these resources to France itself.

We mention the doctrine known as "Cartierism" and the attention it has provoked simply because it marks the first serious debate on foreign policy which seems to have aroused broad public interest. No such debate has as yet taken place on the other key points of the General's foreign policy, such as his "independence" vis-à-vis the United States, his opposition to Great Britain's drawing closer to the European Six, his recognition of Communist China, his autonomous policy in NATO and in Southeast Asia, and his propaganda offensive in Latin America. These vital issues, and even so crucial a question as the creation of the French nuclear *force de frappe,* do not much interest the French public—in so far as it is interested in foreign policy at all.

III

De Gaulle has an instrument which is wholly under his control and which he can use to make the French see foreign politics from his own personal viewpoint: television, which is the General's political *force de frappe;* and, in a secondary way, radio. We have already noted how, and with what skill, de Gaulle makes use of the television screen. There are now over 5,000,000 television sets in France, and the number of viewers, both for personal appearances of the President of the Republic and for the most popular programs, is estimated at 17,000,000 to 20,000,000. The *Radiodiffusion-Télévision Française* (R.T.F.) is a State agency directed by the government and immune from the pressure of private interests. Successive governments of the

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Fourth Republic also made use of it, often in a unilateral and authoritarian fashion, to promote their policies. But since de Gaulle's return to power in 1958, television has developed in France, as elsewhere in Europe, to such an extent that it has become a primary means of exercising political influence. The R.T.F.'s political programs are subject to strict control, which applies both to what is said and shown and to what must not appear. De Gaulle and his ministers—in particular Alain Peyrefitte, the Minister of Information, who is "boss" of the R.T.F.—are highly conscious of the impact of broadcasts, particularly telecasts, on French collective opinion. They are becoming increasingly skilled in the use of pictures, sounds and words—and also of enforced silence—to make the desired impression on a large part of the French population, especially the politically less sophisticated sector of it.

Hence it is most instructive to consider closely the presentation of news by the R.T.F.'s daily program, "Talking Newspaper," presented at 8 p.m., an hour when all of France is at dinner and which is therefore the best time to reach the whole family. The major news programs, including those with international coverage, also offer brief analyses patterned after Ed Murrow. The two best known—"Five-Column Spread" and "Seven Days Around the World"—give the French viewer some idea, at once political and visual, of the world of today, of its problems and of the part played in it by France. These programs, lasting one to two hours, are presented on Fridays at 8:30 p.m., immediately after the "Talking Newspaper"—again an hour and day when a considerable audience can be counted upon.

With the possible exception of "Five-Column Spread," a program produced by journalists whose professional life is outside the government's control, the news programs, if one watches them day after day, give the very clear impression that they present a picture of the world and of foreign policy which reflects the views and furthers the aims of Gaullist diplomacy.

As regards French foreign policy, General de Gaulle's principal ideas and decisions are always upheld by image and comment, almost always without any argument or contradiction—indeed, as uncontestable and uncontested verities. This is the case with the recognition of China, the French *force de frappe,* the Common Market and France's stand on Cyprus or South Viet Nam. The serious difficulties which arise at various times between

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Paris on the one hand and Washington, London or Bonn on the other, are passed over in silence or at the very least glossed over. Occasionally, however, these diplomatic clashes are presented as satisfying proof of France's "independence," particularly where Washington is concerned. In recent months, the programs relating to Communist China and the Soviet Union have been far from hostile, and might even be considered favorable. In the case of Moscow, in particular, there is a definite effort to indicate an economic and cultural, if not political, rapprochement.

As regards the United States, there has been a systematic attempt, repeated day after day and week after week, to emphasize the crises and setbacks of American diplomacy, whether it be in Viet Nam, Panama, the Caribbean, South America or Cyprus. The comments and interviews which accompany the pictures are not aggressively anti-American, but the presentation is nearly always unfavorable to the United States position in some corner of the world. The American point of view is either badly explained or inadequately stated, or simply made incomprehensible. The alleged desire of the United States for "disengagement" in Europe or elsewhere in the world is constantly stressed, often without any reason or in obvious bad faith; in this case the aim is crystal clear—to justify the costly build-up of the French nuclear *force de frappe* and to explain the French Government's increasing coldness toward NATO.

An even more insidious kind of propaganda relates to the internal situation in the United States. Picture and commentary present racial conflicts in an alarming manner. By contrast, the progress achieved in this sphere (despite undeniable setbacks) and the vigorous action against racism taken by the American Government are practically never mentioned. The same attitude is taken in the newsreels which are shown in all French movie theatres and which are also under government control.

The power of American gangsters, various manifestations of brutality, the "reign of violence" and occasional short sequences trying to prove indirectly that "Americans are intellectually backward" are shown again and again on French television screens. What is the purpose of this constant hammering on negative themes? The reply seems clear enough in the light of another example.

The assassination of President Kennedy, which aroused a tremendous wave of emotion and sympathy in France, as every-

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where else in the world, was exploited shortly thereafter in an entirely different sense. Again and again, French television has endeavored to arouse suspicion regarding the "plot" which allegedly led to the assassination and regarding the alleged systematic effort of the American authorities to cover up any inconvenient clues and to protect the real "plotters." Similarly, the Ruby trial was presented—as it also was in many French and European newspapers—as a symbol of the maladministration of American justice and the ineptitude of American police.

In short, by looking at the "idiot box" every day, the French viewer is induced to question the morality, the power and the integrity of the United States and of Americans. This is certainly not accidental. The question remains whether such brainwashing produces what is apparently the desired result. One thing is certain: If the France of General de Gaulle were presented in a similar manner in foreign television programs, the French would be informed at once and would be deeply indignant.

As for the State radio news bulletins, the results of public opinion polls published by the R.T.F. itself show that French listeners do not trust them. The great majority prefer to tune in on neighboring stations—Radio Luxembourg, Europe No. 1 and Radio Monte Carlo—which in principle are privately owned and have studios or transmitting stations outside French territory. However, a few years ago the French Government acquired financial or administrative control of some of these stations. They also face the constant threat of being denied the use of installations located in France. For the past year, the political news and comments of these supposedly "private" stations have been forced, through indirect pressure, to conform more and more to the R.T.F.'s "general line." Nevertheless, in the spring of 1964 these outlying stations still occasionally present "unorthodox" points of view and sometimes permit arguments or debates in which the official doctrine is not always regarded as gospel truth. But on the whole, freedom of information on the radio has been steadily losing ground and the present trend is against the objective presentation of news and comment. Here government action is slower and less open, but its unrelenting purpose is to bring the presumably "independent" stations into line with official policy.

Finally, of course, perhaps the most important control exerted by the government on television and radio is to prevent its

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use by the opposition—except under stated and highly restrictive conditions. Thus one more vital avenue to information and free discussion is closed to Frenchmen.

IV

Given this situation, what do the French think of General de Gaulle's foreign policy? There is obviously no over-all answer to this question. Two methods of inquiry are open to us: (1) the public opinion polls taken by the excellent French Institute of Public Opinion and other specialized organizations, as well as surveys made by some newspapers among their readers; and (2) private conversations with Frenchmen and Frenchwomen of different ages and social positions and living in different regions.

In January 1964, according to public opinion polls, only one Frenchman in four thought that foreign policy was France's most important problem. Two-thirds attached greater importance to domestic and social policy. Less than half of the persons questioned were "interested in international politics." In this respect, French opinion is probably no different from opinion in other democratic countries.

The General's diplomacy is approved, by varying percentages, on many points: thus, the recognition of China, the breaking off of negotiations with Great Britain on the Common Market, and the treaty of friendship and coöperation with Bonn are approved by about 50 percent and disapproved by about 20 percent. Four out of ten Frenchmen are "satisfied with France's international role," four have no opinion, two are "dissatisfied."

The French, in 1963 and 1964, seem to be in agreement with the main lines of General de Gaulle's diplomacy. Only 27 percent think that France should be aligned with the United States and 5 percent favor alignment with the Soviet Union, but nearly 60 percent believe that France should not be aligned with either side. Nevertheless, more than half of the persons questioned consider that France's *fundamental* interests are close to those of the United States and nearly 60 percent feel that they are different from the Soviet Union's. At the same time, nearly three-fourths of those expressing a view believe that the United States and the Soviet Union have drawn closer in the last few years.

On some other aspects of the General's policy of *grandeur*, the polls show a measure of disapproval or division of opinion. Thus, in April 1964 we find that 40 percent of the French people hold

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that France should not have its own *force de frappe,* while 39 percent think that it should. But 45 percent consider that France cannot shoulder the financial burden of a French nuclear deterrent, and only 29 percent believe that it can.

When, in July 1963, France refused to sign the nuclear test-ban treaty, de Gaulle appears to have gone against the wishes of the French people. For prior to the signing of the treaty, 70 percent were in favor of France's accession to it (9 percent against), and even after the General held a press conference to explain the reasons for his refusal, 53 percent continued to feel that France should become a signatory. But in the space of 18 days, the percentage of those opposed to the signing rose from 9 percent to 29 percent—an indication of de Gaulle's personal influence. Again, in a poll taken last year, 46 percent of the French favored reduction of aid to Africa and 42 percent wanted expenditure on national defense to be reduced. Those figures have since risen still higher.

In shaping the attitudes of Frenchmen toward other nations, de Gaulle has known both failure and success. Under his influence, friendly feelings toward Western Germany have greatly increased. Paradoxically, however, despite all the mass media campaigns mentioned earlier, the popularity of the United States is steadily rising, while that of Great Britain varies by only a few points, as will be seen from the table below, based on the findings of the French Institute of Public Opinion. To the question, "What is your opinion of the following countries?", these answers (in percentages) were received in three separate years:

	U.S.A.			U.S.S.R.			Western Germany			Great Britain		
	1961	'63	'64	1961	'63	'64	1961	'63	'64	1961	'63	'64
Good	49	46	52	18	23	25	30	39	53	44	40	43
Neither good nor bad	32	34	31	29	35	42	32	37	29	36	39	36
Bad	7	10	11	37	30	25	19	13	9	6	13	14
No reply	12	10	6	16	12	8	19	11	9	14	8	7

Naturally, as Dr. Gallup's countrymen are well aware, public opinion polls have only an indicative value. Results may depend on timing and on the way the question is phrased, and they do not reflect intensity of feeling. Nevertheless, we are led to the conclusion that while de Gaulle's diplomatic initiatives are usually approved by varying majorities, he does not always command approval when it comes to financial issues which affect everyone, or to age-old friendships such as that felt for the United

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States—no doubt more strongly in the provinces than in the Parisian stamping grounds of American tourists.

Turning now to my own private poll, based on recent and extensive conversations on foreign policy issues with persons of different backgrounds, ages and political views, in Paris and in the provinces, I have drawn the following conclusions:

1. The great majority of the French people are rather pleased and flattered by what they regard as the General's challenge to the United States, the Soviet Union and, to a lesser extent, Great Britain. They see it as a sign of increased French power and prestige and fail to glimpse the danger of a profound deterioration of the Atlantic Alliance and of French relations with America and Britain. Nevertheless, a minority composed of intellectuals, members of the liberal professions and businessmen who know something about the English-speaking countries through travel or reading, disapprove of the manner and substance of de Gaulle's anti-American and anti-British decisions.

2. A certain selfish nationalism apparent in the positions taken by General de Gaulle—an attitude which might be summed up by the slogan "France above all"—is also approved of by the great majority of those to whom I talked.

3. The somewhat condescending contempt which most Frenchmen have always felt for their next-door neighbors—the Spanish, the Italians, the Swiss, the Belgians and the English—is still there. But the traditional fear of the Germans, mingled with respect for their past performances on the field of battle and in the industrial sphere, is being gradually transformed into feelings of friendship; painful memories seem to be as readily forgotten as debts of gratitude. The European idea has certainly lost ground under the impact of the General's policies, while the traditional xenophobia of the French has increased in the last few years. Yet, paradoxically, the broad masses of the French people continue to think that they themselves (and their policies) are respected, approved of and loved both by their neighbors and by the rest of the world.

4. The attitude toward the United States and toward Americans is ambivalent. A general feeling of friendship and sympathy is still there. Nevertheless, as the French have a certain inferiority complex—military, economic and historical (the 1940 defeat, the 1945 liberation)—they are flattered by the fact that de Gaulle is not afraid to "stand up" to the Americans.

5. The possible conflict in financial terms between the Gen-

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eral's policy of *grandeur* (heavy expenditures on the *force de frappe* and on aid to the underdeveloped countries) and the country's own internal needs (housing, schools, highways, rural development) is only beginning to be understood by the French. It is certainly in this sphere that de Gaulle's policy is least popular and that the opposition, if it manages to organize and make itself heard, has the most effective case against de Gaulle.

6. Blind faith in the General and respect for his omniscient wisdom are widespread among the population, particularly among women, and even in traditionally left-wing circles.

7. The Communists, who are the most highly organized political party in France, and who have their own means of propaganda (newspapers, periodicals, public meetings, trade-union action), are now attacking de Gaulle mainly for his domestic social and economic policy. They have recently soft-pedalled criticism of his foreign policy, because of the growing gulf between Paris and Washington (indirectly to Moscow's advantage) and no doubt also because of the prospects of a rapprochement between the Soviet Union and France.

8. The French have greater reservations about the General's military policy, which they find somewhat over-ambitious; this is true of all classes of society. I found hardly anyone who had any illusions that in case of a world conflict France would wield great power, or would even have an important part to play. In general, the French are conscious of the unequal stature of France as compared to the two superpowers of today—the United States and the Soviet Union—or the giant of tomorrow, Communist China. But the fact that de Gaulle behaves like an equal of the world's greatest powers undoubtedly pleases them, and because of that attitude they are willing to give him carte blanche in the conduct of foreign affairs.

9. It does not follow that the French are with the General in all the diplomatic undertakings to which he commits the country. As we have seen, his very negative attitude toward America is not unreservedly accepted; most Frenchmen realize, after all, that the United States with its nuclear weapons constitutes the one shield that protects France and Western Europe from the danger of Soviet domination. But one need not be in General de Gaulle's confidence to hazard the guess that he too is fully aware of this fact.

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JULY 1914—JULY 1964

By William H. McNeill

THE lights of nineteenth-century liberalism that Lord Grey saw going out all over Europe on the night of August 3, 1914, dimmed and sputtered toward extinction during the years of furious war that followed. But new lights flared up during the war itself which have since continued to elaborate an electrified wonderland which no man of 1914 could easily have imagined. The new landscape is still unfamiliar: things change even as we look at them. Remote controls and energies entirely alien to ordinary, age-old sensory experience inform our electric power grids and make them function. The same seems true of modern societies, imparting vastly enlarged capabilities to leaders who sometimes seem not to know how to use them.

Amid bewildering change, global in scope and reaching so deep into the fabric of each human society as to affect almost every living person, reliable guide lines to our understanding, much less to effective action, are hard to find. Still, half a century has now elapsed since Lord Grey's liberal, nineteenth-century world leaped toward its own destruction. With 50 years' perspective it ought to begin to be possible to estimate trends and detect the lines of development in Western civilization that have become important since 1914.

On the other hand, one may argue that the transformation is so profound that even after 50 years the outcome cannot yet be understood. If, for example, mankind is now on the verge of shifting the fundamental rhythms of human life from an agricultural to an urban setting, who can yet say what the patterns of daily experience will become? Problems of social control are even more unfathomable. For if the farmer's simple but well proven equation between hard work in the fields and economic return ceases to have relevance to more than a minority left behind on the land, what new social disciplines will be required to apportion goods to appetites? And if natural laws, exhibited in the elemental vagaries of weather, cease to regulate the economic lives of the majority of human beings, what man-made laws will be required to supply their place? And how will such laws be authenticated or enforced?

The shift from a fundamentally agricultural style of human

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existence is already an accomplished fact in every important Western country, and Russia likewise has recently reduced her farming population to a minority. But our attitudes and expectations for both ourselves and others are still largely governed by the habits and outlook of an earlier, agricultural life. In time, presumably, the daily experience of office, shop and factory, of city streets and public highways, and of homes open to television and radio, magazines and bulk mailings, will bring profound changes. Indeed, the changes may in time become as great as those which transformed roving bands of hunters into sedentary villagers some eight thousand years ago when agriculture was new. It took several centuries for something approximating a stable agricultural style of village life to evolve in the ancient Near East. Our transition to a post-agricultural style of society may well take longer, since the complexity of the cultural factors to be readjusted to one another has become so very great. Fifty or even a hundred years is certainly too short a time for the acute initial crisis of transition to fade into new routines. It therefore seems entirely too soon to try to discern any definite new stabilization of our emergent industrial-and-leisured urban society—if, indeed, stabilization is ever to be expected.

Nevertheless, in the light of what has happened during the past half century a few observations about where we seem to be going and how recent experience differs from the familiar framework of the deeper past may be warranted.

Most basic of all is the encroachment of conscious management upon realms of human behavior and social relationships formerly assumed to be natural, necessary or sacred, and therefore beyond man's power of deliberate alteration. This, surely, reflects our recent wholesale emancipation from the land. The farmer, after all, lives under the lash of a nature that is sometimes benevolent, sometimes destructive, always uncontrollable, and to be propitiated, if at all, only through prayer. The urban dweller does not quite escape the forces of nature, but they shrink to marginal importance in ordinary, everyday life. What matters far more are the habits, will and orders of other men, for it is these that define social status, daily routines, economic rewards and most other parameters of behavior.

Until recently this fact was disguised by firm customary definitions of most social relationships, and by theories that posited either divine will or natural law as the basis for human society.

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But in view of what has been done since 1914 to transform economic and social relationships according to arbitrary human will and political plan, the older confidence in the existence of binding laws that unambiguously define either the necessary or the best possible system of society can scarcely be sustained. Even more unsettling is our general if still reluctant recognition of the scope and depth of irrational forces in human behavior—a recognition which at a blow destroys the dogmatic basis of classical and Marxian economics, and calls family as well as all other social institutions and customary codes for private life into question.

Both of these solvents to older certainties deserve elaboration.

II

During World War I each of the major belligerent states brought manpower and raw materials, public opinion and economic consumption within the scope of official controls. Enormous success was achieved. Social engineers, masquerading as general staff officers, dollar-a-year men, munitions tsars, war information officers and the like concentrated a far larger proportion of the resources of entire nations upon the war effort than had ever been done or even conceived previously.

Successful planning and manipulation on such a scale tended to perpetuate itself, for after millions of men had been rudely and rationally uprooted from their wonted modes of life, spontaneous return to a privately regulated economy keyed to quite different goals was always difficult, and sometimes impossible. The massive unsettlement of habit and custom inherent in the war experience itself, together with new winds of doctrine blowing both from Moscow (after 1917) and from Rome (after 1922), made normalcy precarious, even in the United States, where war mobilization had bitten far less deeply into civil society than was the case in Europe.

Nevertheless, prior to the Great Depression of the early 1930s only devastated and revolutionary Russia attempted any general application of techniques for economic planning and control in time of peace. And even in Russia, Lenin recoiled from the effort to manage the entire economy by proclaiming a new economic policy (N.E.P.) in 1921 that gave considerable scope to private initiative. But in the late '20s and early '30s one country after another responded to prolonged malfunctioning of the privately

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regulated economy by again beginning to extend the scope of conscious, official direction. The Russians preceded most of the rest of the world by inaugurating the first Five Year Plan in 1928; and as befitted their revolutionary principles, Communist response to N.E.P.'s malfunction was radical and violent, involving a frontal attack upon the economic interests and customary behaviors of the peasant majority. German and American reactions did not manifest their full force before January 1933, when Franklin Roosevelt and Adolf Hitler came to power. France and Britain were slower to tamper with traditional liberal limitations on governmental action, and their responses lacked the confused vigor common to Communist Russia, Nazi Germany and the American New Deal.

Nor was it merely vigor and confusion which these three régimes had in common. Despite their very great ideological differences, Stalin's Five Year Plans, Hitler's New Order and Roosevelt's New Deal all found useful precedents in the war efforts of 1914–21 for peacetime remodeling of social and economic relations on a scale previously unattempted. Hitler's success as a social engineer made Germany again a great and aggressive world power, and promptly precipitated World War II. New and even larger-scale social engineering ensued, for the imperatives of victory were comparatively unambiguous, and required coördination of effort from whole nations and associations of nations. As a result, German, Japanese and Anglo-American authorities undertook economic and military planning on a trans-national scale, as the Russians had been doing within the borders of the U.S.S.R. since 1928.

This was, assuredly, one of the most significant aspects of World War II, for in breaking through national barriers, the war mobilization of Hitler's *Festung Europe,* Japan's Co-Prosperity Sphere and the Allied Lend-Lease and postwar aid programs all dramatized the decay of separate national sovereignties. World War II clearly announced to all the power wielders and would-be power wielders of the world the technical feasibility of trans-national (and prospectively of world-wide) direction of human behavior, roughly according to plan.

To be sure, after the end of major military operations in 1945 came a general retreat from the full rigor of wartime controls. Yet the retreat was partial. Trans-national economic planning in both the Communist and non-Communist worlds continued to en-

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gage official attention. Success was particularly striking in Western Europe where postwar emergency arrangements soon gave way to longer-term organizations like the Coal and Steel Community and the Common Market. These perpetuate in peacetime the sort of intimate trans-national economic integration that Nazi jack boots first stamped across a prostrate Europe. Under the new economic and military régime which Western nations have shaped for themselves, old intra-European national rivalries seem sure to weaken and may eventually fade from political importance. The world wars of our time may prove, among other things, to be Western Europe's last civil conflict.

In other parts of the world the trend of political development in recent years appears exactly opposite to that prevailing in Europe. Fragmentation rather than integration has characterized the political and economic development of all the lands in Asia and Africa where local independence movements have overthrown European imperial tutelage. In trying to understand what is taking place in these complex and little-known parts of the world, it is instructive to compare African and Asian experience since World War II with the history of Eastern Europe between the two wars. In Eastern Europe, World War I opened the way for local nationalisms to create, in the name of national self-determination, a series of smaller but still ethnically mixed states from the once imposing hulks of the Austrian, Russian and Ottoman empires. The success of these nationalist movements rested on effective political appeal to local peasantries. And once in office, nationalist leaders regularly disappointed their peasant followers. To keep power they or their successors without exception resorted to authoritarian police rule.

The political dynamic of the various independence movements of ex-colonial territories since World War II is strikingly similar. The fundamental axis of public affairs seems generally to be the eruption of peasant discontent upon the political stage. Ancient rural grievances against landlords, usurers or even tribal chiefs, together with city idlers, corrupt politicians, overbearing foreigners and outsiders of every sort are no longer nursed in private. Instead the peasantries of the earth, sometimes driven by overpopulation and land shortage and always drawn by the glitter of urban modernity from which traditional social arrangements shut them out, have listened eagerly to preachers of revolution; and wherever such preachers have attained a modicum of co-

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hesion, the peasants stand ready to lend their massive weight of numbers to the revolutionary movement.

In this connection it is both instructive and ironic to note that since 1923, when proletarian revolution in Germany definitively failed, Marxism has won all of its important successes by appealing to angry peasantries. The fact that Marxist terminology and ideals are urban and industrial scarcely constitutes a handicap, for these are also the ideals of the excluded peasantries. To enjoy freedom from landlords, tax collectors and cheating merchants, together with access to the goods and gadgets of modern industry, precisely defines the peasant aspiration. Traditional Marxism lends itself admirably to such a dream. The only difficulty arises after the revolutionaries have taken power and confront the task of trying to implement a basically contradictory program.

The nub of the contradiction lies in this: if peasants are left to their own devices without coercion from landlords or tax collectors they tend to consume most of what they produce and will not spontaneously part with nearly enough foodstuffs to feed the cities, much less to pay for what a modernizing government needs or wishes to import.

In any such confrontation, city folks have a strategic advantage that has frustrated peasant protest throughout history. Urban crowds resent starvation and will riot against any régime that allows peasants to refrain from feeding them. And since city crowds are concentrated and ever-present around the seat of government, whereas any particular village is isolated and need be visited only occasionally by tax collectors, there can be small question as to which side will normally prevail. To remain in office, the government must do something to get food into the towns. If such official efforts fail, the government simply dissolves, leaving other, more local régimes to confront the same dilemma. The unchecked ravaging of small irregular armed bands represents the ultimate devolution of public power. Such bands survive only by taking food at the point of a gun from those who have it, thus in an elementally brutal fashion resolving the dilemma that an angry and aroused peasantry presents to any and all government.

Ultimate devolution to violent and unmitigated localism is scarcely possible today, since even the weapons of guerrilla war are usually the products of industrially advanced societies. Any more orderly and centralized régime requires a vast array of

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equipment like repeating rifles and machine guns, trucks and typewriters, watches and filing cabinets—not to mention tanks, airplanes and electronic computers—to maintain civil peace at home and security against foreign rivals. At least initially, an agrarian society must import practically every such item. It is hard indeed to pay for such expensive toys, yet to produce them at home is even more expensive, since this requires large capital expenditures and the acquisition of new and sometimes recondite skills.

Communist experience in Russia is here very much to the point. Only by exploiting peasant villages through the simple device of seizing all the grain that could be found at harvest time, and doling out minimal seed supplies when the planting season came around, was it possible to feed the towns and the growing labor force required for industrial construction. Moreover, Russia's Five Year Plans directed industrial construction first and foremost to the support of an armaments industry that could make the state and its administration secure against foreign and domestic dangers.

Harsh though such a régime was toward its peasant subjects, the reasoning behind Stalin's policies seems sound. For in general, a government ruling an agrarian population today must need choose between two very awkward alternatives: either to accept (whether by gift, loan or purchase) the accoutrements of military power from the government of some other, more industrialized society, in which case full independence may be endangered, and the régime may expose itself to devastating criticism for being a mere puppet in the hands of foreigners; or else to contravene the immediate will and interests of the peasant majority in order to create at home the necessary industrial establishment wherewith to produce the sinews of military power, which can be done only by forcible capital accumulation drawn mainly from the agricultural segment of the economy. The acute embarrassment likely to arise from either of these positions needs no elaboration. It explains much of the irritability and systematic ingratitude with which American and other foreign aid programs have been received by the governments of still predominantly agrarian societies.

Régimes that must either oppress their own people severely or somehow manage simultaneously to fawn and frown on foreign benefactors are necessarily fragile. By contrast, the trans-na-

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tional economic consolidation of the industrialized nations of Europe appears solid and likely to become lasting. Integration of manpower and resources within larger and larger territories seems clearly to cut with the grain of the industrial process, permitting economies of scale and allowing modern techniques of industrial planning fuller geographic and technical scope. Indeed, nothing short of the globe entire seems at all likely to allow optimal range for modern administrative skill. Even with existing methods of communication and transport, world-wide coordination at least on a crude political-military level is clearly within bounds of possibility. Electronic computers and other new devices for data processing and calculation make it seem likely that in time to come far more precise and delicate techniques for social management and economic planning will emerge toward full practicability, on a trans-national and, eventually, on a genuinely global scale.

III

Whether such potentialities will ever be brought to reality depends in large part on a second major characteristic of our time: our new consciousness of the human unconscious.This is shot through with paradox. In what sense can anyone be conscious of the unconscious? How can we penetrate the dark animal depths of our psyche? Only by reasoning, whose very success in discovering the pervasiveness of human irrationality clearly calls its own adequacy into question!

Nevertheless, even crude and vague recognition of the role irrational drives may have in shaping human behavior opens the door on another paradox. For only by coping rationally with mass irrationality can social engineering become really successful. Yet, if such skills should ever develop, the human status of those subjected to manipulation would be rather horrifyingly infringed. Who, under such circumstances, manages whom? And for whose benefit?

Recoiling from the prospect of the division of humanity into a small company of calculating managers and a mass of more or less completely irrational followers, one may even wonder whether the age-old, blind and brutal arbitrament of force is not to be preferred to the rationalities allowing a superior few to exploit human animality in the mass. In our atomic age, this, however, is surely the counsel of despair. We are caught by our

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own cleverness. Once having deliberately set hand upon the levers that affect human behavior, it is hard to stop short of a far more complete mastery of the art of manipulating others than men have anywhere yet achieved. For it seems clear that many well-meant schemes for social melioration will fail without much greater control of the irrational than now is embodied in rules of thumb, individual charisma and ritualized gestures of political and social leadership. The Alliance for Progress, for example, may well be destined to crumble through collision with deep-seated frustrations and angers latent among the peoples of Latin America. If so, hate and violence may be expected to eclipse the imperfect administrative rationality and blundering good will that inspire social planning in that part of the world today. Would not more skillful psychological manipulation, if anyone knew how to divert mass frustrations into less disruptive channels, therefore justify itself?

These are truly difficult dilemmas, and their urgency is not lessened by the fact that all over the globe, and not least in the industrially more advanced nations, traditional definitions of how to behave are rapidly losing precision and persuasiveness. How far such disruption can go remains to be seen. A human society can probably exist only by virtue of an elaborate "cake of custom" that channels behavior into a restricted number of acceptable and roughly predictable patterns. What seems to threaten the whole post-1914 world is a general dissolution of local cakes of custom, leaving millions without reasonably precise convictions as to what they should do, and under what circumstances they should do it.

This is psychologically a very trying position in which to live; but deliberate affirmation of what one does not naïvely believe is almost as difficult as chronic indecision. Either posture, because of its inherent inadequacy, invites sporadic eruptions of the irrational upon the plane of overt behavior, making social as well as personal relations distinctly less predictable than in more stable societies.

No doubt the rational examination of man and society is partly responsible for the decay of old certainties. Psychologists, for example, have been known to discount traditional mores as mere "repression," and the whole company of those who have sought to anatomize modern society scientifically—Marxians, historicists, social Darwinists, cultural anthropologists and others

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—also tend to call the validity of any particular set of rules and sanctions into question.

Nevertheless it seems safe to suggest that it is not ideas that act as the most powerful solvents to traditional society, but the massive upheaval of daily routines provoked mainly by war and industrialization. For such upheavals have planted new aspirations and opened windows upon new ambitions for almost the whole mass of living humanity, with consequences still unforeseeable. As traditional relationships and acquiescence in long-standing inequities and inequalities weaken, hope and hate struggle for mastery in the hearts of millions, and scope both for rationalistic planners and for gusts of atavistic irrationality enormously enlarge.

Such polarities between heights and depths, thought and passion, culture and animality, are, presumably, normal to the human condition. What gives the past half century its unusual character is the scale, mass and range of the phenomenon. In an age when all familiar customary and institutional landmarks are called into question, the range of the possible widens. Choice becomes both more difficult and more imperative. Vast consequences may flow from a single act; yet prolonged effort may utterly fail. Every quality of human life is heightened, every dimension enlarged, since in a more radical sense than was true of any civilized age of the past, we hold the future in our hands, to mold it one way or another until somehow, sometime, the acute crisis of transition from an agricultural to a post-agricultural style of human life fades before the accomplished fact—or some man-made catastrophe either wipes us all out or, through the destruction of our cities, sets back the process for a few decades or centuries.

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SARAJEVO FIFTY YEARS AFTER

By Vladimir Dedijer

BECAUSE of the international conditions under which it occurred and the region where it took place, no other political murder in modern history has had such momentous consequences as the assassination of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand von Österreich-Este, the heir apparent to the throne of the Hapsburg Empire, at the hands of Gavrilo Princip, in Sarajevo on June 28, 1914. In his native Bosnia, whose tribal society had been disintegrating under the impact of modern colonialism, Princip fired his pistol not only at an Archduke but also at the façade of a quiet, apparently stable world.

In reality, the year 1914 found Europe in a state of turmoil, and rapidly approaching the end of an era. Germany, with her increasing industry and population, was challenging Britain as the leading world power. The imperialist rivalry was intensified by the system of secret alliances; Britain, for one, found common interests even with her century-long opponent, Tsarist Russia.

The Balkans, the bridge between Europe, Asia and Africa, was a particularly sensitive area over which the Great Powers clashed. Germany and Austria-Hungary found a common interest in penetrating to the warmer seas through this region. France, Russia and Britain tried to establish a barrier to the "Drang nach Osten" by backing the small, economically underdeveloped Balkan states which were eager to be modernized. The leading European banking concerns were competing for the financing, through state loans, of the armaments of the Balkan armies. The success of Serbia, Greece, Bulgaria and Montenegro in the 1912–1913 war, ending the centuries-long rule of the Ottoman Empire in Europe, was hailed in the stock exchanges of the European capitals as a victory for Schneider Creusot and Vickers-Armstrong over Krupp and Skoda.

One of the most controversial issues of modern history arises from this question: What were Princip's motives and who were his instigators, if any, and his accomplices? Sir Edward Grey described Princip's crime as a perfect political murder, in the sense that it would be impossible for the truth ever to be established.

This mystification over the Sarajevo assassination has arisen

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primarily in connection with the issue of the responsibility for the First World War. For some, Princip's conspiracy was a basic cause; for others it was merely a pretext, the spark which detonated a mass of hatred with which the world already had been charged, destroying the precarious balance of power among the empires which dominated Europe and shared the world.

At the very beginning of hostilities, Germany and Austria-Hungary claimed that the war's crucial cause was the Sarajevo murder. In trying to establish Serbia's role in instigating the crime, they intended to lay the blame for the war at her door, and thereby inculpate her allies: Russia, Britain and France. On the other hand, in the Peace Treaty of Versailles, the victorious powers laid the sole responsibility on the shoulders of Germany and her allies. "War guilt" became a basic issue in international relations between the two world wars, and it dominated the internal politics of Germany. Adolf Hitler's promise to free Germany from the punitive restrictions of Versailles paved his way to the Berlin Chancellery; they served him perfectly in his plans for resurrecting the driving forces of German imperialism.

The historians took up this controversy and by 1939 there had been some 3,000 books and pamphlets published on the subject. Different writers named the following countries as the hotbed of the Sarajevo conspiracy: Serbia, Russia, Hungary, Austria, Germany, France and Great Britain.

The Serbian Government was accused, first, of organizing the plot. Others blamed the government for silently sanctioning the conspiracy of the Belgrade secret society *Ujedinjenje ili smrt* (Union or Death), headed by Colonel Dragutin Dimitrijević-Apis, by not trying to prevent it and by neglecting to inform Vienna of what it knew. It was alleged also that the Serbian heir apparent, Alexander, was involved in the conspiracy.

Russia, too, has been named an instigator because in 1914 she was Serbia's most trusted ally. Some claimed it was her policy to provoke a war to take revenge for the humiliation she suffered at the hands of Austria-Hungary in 1909 and 1913. Several writers alleged that the Russian General Staff and the Russian Secret Police, *Okhrana,* were the driving forces behind Colonel Dimitrijević-Apis. There were theories also that Trotsky and the Russian Social Revolutionaries instigated the assassination.

Others accused France and Great Britain, as allies of Russia and Serbia, of being the centers of the conspiracy. Father Anton

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Puntigam, S. J., even during the First World War alleged that the Sarajevo assassination was initiated, organized and carried out by Continental Freemasonry and that one of the assassins was himself a Freemason.

Vienna, Budapest and Berlin were blamed by some either of knowing about the preparations for the assassination of the Archduke (who was unpopular in many circles in both Vienna and Budapest) and doing nothing to prevent it, or of actually taking part in the conspiracy itself through their agents in the South Slav secret societies. Several writers have hinted that the Hungarian Prime Minister, Count Stephen Tisza, the deadly enemy of the Archduke, was in secret league with Colonel Apis. The Archduke's eldest son, Max Hohenberg, in 1937 accused the German Secret Service of being behind the assassins in Sarajevo.[1]

Thus the whole issue of the Sarajevo assassination has been treated almost entirely from the standpoint of responsibility for the First World War—as a legalistic question; hypotheses were put forth as to which side might have had an interest in eliminating the Archduke and then the smallest details were eagerly collected to prove the thesis.

The least elaborated side of the Sarajevo story deals with the assassins themselves: their psychological and intellectual characteristics, the social and political milieu in which they grew up, the interrelations between their political and personal motives,[2] and the relations of the secret Bosnian societies with other secret societies among the South Slavs. Therefore, we have to relate the Sarajevo assassination not only to the external relations of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and to the character and actions of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand, but also to the problems of life and society within the two provinces. Today, 50 years after the crime, one can gain a clearer picture of the complexities of the Sarajevo assassination from those archives which are open for academic research.

II

The private papers (*Nachlass*) of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand and the archives of his *Militärkanzlei* (military chancel-

[1] When Austria was occupied by the Nazis in 1938, this allegation, among other reasons, led Max Hohenberg and his younger brother to Dachau concentration camp.

[2] At the outset it can be said that mental illness was not a cause. Princip and his accomplices were sane and fully aware of their crime, which they defended from the first moment they were caught.

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lery), which this writer examined for several years, comparing them with the relevant documents of the German Foreign Office, make it possible to assess more fully the character of the Archduke and his plans for the reform of the Hapsburg Empire.

The Archduke, an energetic man with a lucid mind, was brought up in the strict legitimist tradition of clerical monarchism; his lifetime goal was to restore the greatness of the Hapsburg Dynasty. His private letters to his uncle, the Emperor Franz Joseph, reveal a fairly good sense of humor, and his many reports on the festivities which he attended at the royal capitals of Europe have touches of an almost Twainian satire. Yet he was wholly an aristocrat. When he met Theodore Roosevelt in 1910 in London, he reported to the Emperor that "Rooseveldt"[8] distinguished himself by "a remarkable lack of court manners," adding that he "was enormously witty—to put it more clearly: impertinent."

The Archduke was a relentless traveler with a talent for quickly grasping the situation around him. His several reports from Cairo are full of bitter criticism of the British rule in Egypt and the Sudan. Franz Ferdinand was a devoted father. He listened attentively to the advice not only of his wife, the Duchess of Hohenberg, but also of his father-confessors, even on matters of state. He felt most at home among the big landowners of Bohemia and the army generals. His financial affairs preoccupied much of his time; he had interests in the Skoda armaments works and used his power to give the banking concerns of his choice priority in the building of the Austro-Hungarian Navy and in the exploitation of the rich Bosnian ore mines. He was particularly hostile to the Rothschilds.

He sharply disagreed with the Emperor over the reforms of the Empire. For Franz Joseph, the 1867 Compromise, which introduced a kind of dualism within Austria-Hungary, represented the cornerstone of the Monarchy; for the Archduke, it was a humiliation of the royal family at the hands of the Magyar gentry. In his correspondence and private talks with the German and Russian Emperors, he used the harshest language about the Magyars. As far back as 1907, with the help of Foreign Minister Aehrenthal, he began formulating the so-called *Thronwechsel* program, the policies he would follow on his accession to the

[8] The Archduke was an anti-Semite, and this is manifested even in his humorous spelling of Roosevelt's name with a "dt."

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throne, and whenever the aging Franz Joseph was threatened by his chronic bronchitis, a new version of the plan was elaborated. The last revision was made in April 1914. As the documents from the *Nachlass* show, it was much harsher than has been generally believed. Hungary was to be reduced to the status of a Hapsburg crown land. If the Hungarian Prime Minister, Count Stephen Tisza, should reject the Archduke's plan, the Army would be ready to move in. In the *Nachlass* are the texts of the Archduke's orders to the Minister of War and to the Army corps commanders, typed on the proper paper and needing only the Archduke's signature and the date in order to be implemented. In 1913 the Archduke began replacing the Magyar units in Hungary with non-Magyar regiments recruited from other parts of the Empire.

The Archduke envisaged having on his side the non-Magyar nationalities in Hungary. In his proclamation he promised general suffrage, but the *Thronwechsel* documentation, and particularly his correspondence with the Emperor Wilhelm in 1909, reveal that this was only a tactical move; he had no intention of giving equal rights to the non-Magyar peoples or of granting their demands for badly needed agricultural reforms. He rejected Wilhelm's opinion that the Slavs represented the immediate danger for both Germanic empires, and stated that he first had to punish the Magyars, "the teachers of rebellion to other nationalities," before dealing with the Slavs. The *Thronwechsel* documentation throws new light on the plan for a third federative unit of the Monarchy composed of the South Slavs. The Archduke completely discarded this plan as dangerous; yet he permitted it to remain in public discussion in order to frighten the Magyars, as well as to drive a wedge between the Serbs and the Croats.

The Archduke envisaged a more absolutist and centralized state; the German element was to become the cement of the Empire and he emphasized more reliance on the Army as the most faithful instrument of the Dynasty. As in the internal relations of the Empire he was a defender of legitimacy and the established order, so in international relations he cherished the idea of the unity of all monarchs against revolution—a kind of revival of the Holy Alliance. He even dreamt of restoring the Papal State in Italy. He hoped for particularly warm relations with the Russian Tsars, always aware that Nicholas I saved the Hapsburg throne in 1849. Although his relations with General Conrad, the Chief

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of the General Staff, were much closer than it has been supposed, he often warned him against provoking a war with Russia:

> I shall never lead a war against Russia. I shall make sacrifices to avoid it. A war between Austria and Russia would end either with the overthrow of the Romanovs or with the overthrow of the Hapsburgs—or perhaps with the overthrow of both.

When the political realities of the first decade of the twentieth century gave little possibility for relying on the Russian Tsar, the Archduke turned toward Germany. He had to forget his hostility toward the Hohenzollern Dynasty, stemming from the defeat of the Hapsburgs in 1866 by Protestant Prussia, and his public statements "that the hypertrophy of Prussia is a misfortune," which will lead "to a terrible catastrophe," endangering "both the future of Germany and Austria-Hungary."

After the grave crisis with the Magyars in 1907, the Archduke approached the German Ambassador in Vienna with a request for support of his policies toward Budapest. The Ambassador reported to Berlin:

> One must keep in mind that the Archduke recently stated that "one must conquer Hungary once more with the help of Russia." Since Russia could not be used now for this purpose, we can assume the Archduke, by appealing to the monarchical principle, would like to use German help against the revolting Magyars . . . I would consider this participation on our side a great error. The Magyars even at this date have not forgotten this Russian intervention, not to speak of the kind of gratitude Russia got from Austria.

The Archduke and Emperor Wilhelm established closer political relations; they saw eye to eye on many problems. Unlike Franz Joseph, who was principally interested in Balkan affairs, the Archduke was an imperialist in the modern sense of the word. He supported Wilhelm's aspirations for a big navy and felt that the Monarchy should exercise its prestige in all parts of the world. During the Boxer uprising in China, he bitterly complained: "It is scandalous that we did not send any troops to China, while such small, ridiculous states as Belgium and Portugal had their troops there."

Faithful to his conceptions of legitimacy and fearful of risking a big war with the Great Powers, at a time when his own state was not yet stabilized, the Archduke outlined with the opening sentences of the 1914 *Thronwechsel* the foreign policy he would follow when he ascended to the throne: "Foreign countries have to be assured that the policy of peace will be preserved under the

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maintenance of our trusted alliances, especially the one with Germany." But he added: "A revolution in Hungary, war with Italy and perhaps with Serbia and Montenegro, are expected with certainty."

The Archduke believed that a war against Serbia could be localized, particularly after the meeting at Konopischt, in October 1913, when the Emperor Wilhelm finally committed himself to backing more actively Austria-Hungary's policy in the Balkans.

III

Judging from the documents in the *Nachlass, Militärkanzlei* and other sources, the Archduke's life was threatened many times. Apparently three attempts against his life were made (in 1902, 1906 and 1910); many other conspiracies were detected, and the number of warnings and rumors received by the police was countless. It is interesting that in the Vienna archives the Magyars are seldom mentioned as plotters and the most frequently accused are the Italians and the South Slavs, both those living within the Monarchy and those in overseas émigré communities. Like the Irish Fenians, wherever they lived they plotted against the tyranny in their old home. The Archduke read all the police reports and wrote his directives in the margins; often he would accuse the wrong man.[4]

The group of Bosnian youths who killed the Archduke has been called by some historians "Young Bosnia," but actually no organization of that name existed. However, there were scores of secret clubs and societies with basically the same characteristics. Understandably, they usually did not keep elaborate minutes of their doings. Primary sources on the life and work of Princip and his accomplices are scarce and those that exist must be treated with care; in a part of the South Slav society, for example, there is a kind of idolatry of Princip.[5]

Princip and his friends were under the strong influence of the milieu in which they grew up. Most of them were born among villagers who lived in feudal bondage to the Hapsburg rule. In 1910 the illiteracy rate in Bosnia was 87 percent. Consequently

[4] In May 1914 he commented bitterly on a report about the "anti-state" activities of Michael Pupin, of Columbia University, an American of Serbian descent.

[5] This writer was given proof that some of Princip's letters were forged. Also some of the surviving members of the outer ring of conspirators had their personal prejudices: after World War I, Borivoj Jevtić praised Princip but accused some of the other assassins (particularly Danilo Ilić and Nedeljko Čabrinović) of being cowards and almost traitors. From the minutes of the interrogation one gets the impression that this accusation was unfounded.

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oral folklore, poetry and ethics were functional. Among the rural South Slavs the belief flourished that to kill a foreign tyrant was the noblest goal in life, and this was expressed in the Kosovo cycle of the folklore epics. This saga grew up after the Battle of Kosovo, on June 28, 1389, when the Turks destroyed the independent, mediæval state of Serbia. The Harvard graduate, John Reed, roaming through the Balkans before the First World War, found it very much alive: "Among the Serbs," he wrote, "every peasant soldier knows what he is fighting for. When he was a baby, his mother greeted him: 'Hail, little avenger of Kosovo!' " Gavrilo Princip and his accomplices knew the Kosovo heroic poems by heart: it was a most unfortunate decision of the Archduke to visit Sarajevo on the June 28 anniversary.

The Young Bosnians were also greatly influenced by Schiller's conceptions of tyrannicide, as expressed in "William Tell," as well as by the teachings of Mazzini. In the Serbian student publication *Zora*, in Vienna in 1910, a long essay was published on tyrannicide and its moral justification.

Princip and his friends were rebels not only against a foreign rule which kept their country in the position of a colony, but also against their parents and their teachers, whom they denounced for their conservatism and slave mentality.

They were pure ascetics: they did not drink; an expression of love toward a girl was regarded as a violation of her dignity; physiological life had little meaning. Literature was their world. To write in free verse was regarded as a sign of rebellion against their teachers, who preferred the classics. Their idols were Gorki, Andreyev, Guyot, Whitman, Oscar Wilde and Henrik Ibsen. They built their own theory of permanent revolution, which resembled Ibsen's view; they published long essays on Ibsen and had read his correspondence with Georg Brandes, the eminent Danish literary critic. Princip tried his hand at poetry, but without much success. He promised Ivo Andrić, the president of their secret literary society, that he would show him his verses one day, but he never did. Ivo Andrić survived and got the Nobel Prize for Literature in 1961; his "Story from Japan," written after he had left jail in 1918, is a kind of literary testament of Princip's generation, expressing the peasant restlessness and the dichotomy between revolution and rebellion.

The Young Bosnians, being somewhat primitive rebels, did not have much appreciation of the theories of Social Democracy,

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which did not seem to them relevant to the non-industrial peasant society of Bosnia. Besides, these youths were highly critical of the centralistic principle of Social Democratic organization. During his Balkan journeys and in Switzerland, Trotsky met some of the members of these societies and tried to talk them out of individual terrorism, but with little success.[6]

Princip and his accomplices had no particular grievance against Archduke Ferdinand; they were ready to kill any Hapsburg dignitary as a protest against the conditions in which their country existed. They had plotted against the Emperor Franz Joseph, his ministers, Burian and Bilinski, and against all the Bosnian Governors. In the summer of 1910, when the Emperor Franz Joseph came to visit Bosnia and Herzegovina, he was almost assassinated. A student named Bogdan Zerajić, with a gun in his pocket, was standing at the Mostar railway station on June 3, only a few steps from the old Emperor. Zerajić did not shoot because "he was so much impressed by the serenity radiating from the face of the old man." But a few days later, on June 16, 1910, he fired five shots at General Varešanin, the Governor of the provinces, and with the last bullet committed suicide. In 1912, Princip gave his word at Zerajić's grave that he would avenge him by assassinating the first Hapsburg he met, and on the eve of June 28, 1914, he placed a wreath on Zerajić's tomb.

The Young Bosnians had contact with the secret societies in Serbia and in the South Slav provinces under Hapsburg rule, particularly Croatia and Slovenia. Princip knew personally Luka Jukić, who had tried to kill the Royal Commissioner, Count Slavko Cuvaj, in Zagreb on June 8, 1912. The Slovene secret revolutionary society, *Preporod,* had very close relations with the Bosnians. But it is an open question whether the Slovene revolutionary, Ivan Endlicher, was involved in the plot of June 28. The act of a Croat youth, Stjepan Dojtić, who had left his job in Illinois in order to try to kill the Governor of Croatia, Count Ivo Skerletz, in August 1913, was hailed by Princip.

From the Austrian archives it is clear that the Bosnians had contacts with European anarchist organizations; the Hapsburg spies had information from a Paris anarchist society that Zerajić

[6] He had nothing to do with their plot, although immediately after June 28, 1914, Vladimir Gaćinović, one of Princip's friends, gave Trotsky a story about the conspiracy which he published in 1915 in a Kiev paper. Closer ideological links existed with the Russian social revolutionaries, particularly with M. A. Natanson, who took to Russia in 1917 the most important parts of the Gaćinović archives.

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intended to assassinate the Emperor Franz Joseph. The interview by the Russo-American anarchist Alexander Berkman, which appeared in *The New York Times* of June 29, 1914, is still a puzzle to the historian. Berkman said: "The assassination of Ferdinand was a plot of the anarchists and revolutionaries" and that their plan was "to strike down the only man strong enough to continue the iron rule of Emperor Francis Joseph." Berkman also claimed that "Austria-Hungary is a hotbed of revolution" and that "the anarchists, the revolutionaries and the strong republican factors . . . have tried to make complications which would bring on a civil war." Berkman did not deny this interview, although in his book, "ABC of Anarchism," published in 1929, he said that Princip was a Serbian patriot who had never heard of anarchism. Yet, after Princip's arrest, police searching his room found a selection of anarchist writing from Bakunin to Kropotkin. It is interesting that in jail Princip told Dr. Martin Pappenheim, the prison medical officer, that he believed that his act would provoke a world revolution.

Both Princip and Čabrinović were extremely sensitive young men. Princip suffered much from an inferiority complex, particularly because he was rejected in 1912 as a volunteer in the Serbian Army. Čabrinović had a hard childhood. When he was a 13-year-old apprentice, a journeyman pressed a red-hot iron on his neck out of fun. Čabrinović's father was very strict and often beat him. He fled from his home but wrote many moving letters to his grandmother and sisters. Čabrinović's father was accused of being an Austrian spy and this haunted the young boy. When he was caught, his first words were: "I am a Serbian hero."

Some of the Bosnian students studying in France and Switzerland had planned as early as January 1914 to act against Franz Ferdinand. Princip and his friends in Sarajevo decided in March of that year to move against the Archduke when they read in the papers about his coming visit to Sarajevo. Five out of the six Sarajevo assassins were young men, between the ages of 16 and 20. Their attempt at crime was the most amateurish political homicide of modern history; it was a miracle that they were not caught before the 28th. The assassination itself was a product of pure chance. After Čabrinović threw his bomb, all of the other assassins left their assigned places, except Princip. The Archduke's driver took a wrong turn and while backing the car out he made the fatal mistake of stopping just in front of Princip, who

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from a distance of a few feet shot at the Archduke and Governor Potiorek. The first bullet hit the Archduke, but the second hit the Duchess of Hohenberg. At the interrogation half an hour later, Princip declared that he felt sorry for accidentally shooting the Archduchess.

IV

The latest historical evidence suggests that the Sarajevo assassination was a result of collusion between the secret revolutionary societies of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Colonel Apis' *Ujedinjenje ili smrt* based in Belgrade—although their motives were by no means identical.

In assessing the role of Colonel Apis' secret society, it is important to take into account the changes which took place within it between the time it was founded in 1911 and the eve of World War I. In the two Balkan wars, some of the leading members of the society were killed in action, including Ljuba Jovanović-Čupa, the editor of the society's paper *Pijemont,* a man of great influence among the South Slav youth. From all the evidence, Jovanović was a Freemason and published in *Pijemont* several articles on Freemasonry. Since Jovanović was killed in the summer of 1913, the theory that Freemasons organized the Sarajevo plot through Apis' society loses one of its main supports.

The successes of the Serbian Army in the 1912–1913 wars opened the possibility for closer collaboration between Apis and the societies of Bosnia. Yet, there were differences between Colonel Apis' national program and the Bosnians'. Colonel Apis heralded Serb supremacy over the other South Slavs (for him Croatia was just a Serb province), while Princip and his friends favored federalism with equality for all South Slavs. Apis' program had elements of an East-Orthodox clericalism, while Princip's was atheistic. Colonel Apis was a general staff officer who favored the use of the Army, while individual terror was the very basis of Princip's credo. An article in *Pijemont* of October 1911 ridiculed the idea of political homicide. But the two groups found a common base for action against the Archduke Franz Ferdinand in 1914. The main go-between was Major Vojin Tankosić, the right-hand man of Colonel Apis and the leader of *Komite,* the Serbian guerrilla force operating in Macedonia which many Bosnian students joined as volunteers. Tankosić, himself of Bosnian descent, was looked upon with veneration by these Bosnians.

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Having seen what motivated Princip and his friends in deciding to assassinate the Archduke, we must turn to analyzing Apis' motives as well. He was not an anarchistic youth, but a cool-minded and well-trained general staff officer. He was aware of the plight of the Serbian Army after two wars and the Albanian rebellion, in which losses among the officers were great and military equipment was exhausted. To risk a war against Austria-Hungary under these conditions was unthinkable. Also Apis knew that Russia, Serbia's closest ally, had not completed her army reforms.

The theories that both Princip's group and Colonel Apis were moved to action by some outside force (the Russian General Staff or the German General Staff, as some historians claim) seem to be based on inadequate evidence. The Bosnians had contacts with some anarchistic groups outside their own country, and with the Russian revolutionary socialists, but there is no evidence that any intelligence services of the Great Powers succeeded in establishing control over the Bosnians.[7] Colonel Apis was also a rather independent man. Accusations of complicity with Austria-Hungary have no basis. It is true that from 1903, when Austro-Hungarian authorities helped the conspirators against Alexander Obrenović, some of the older officers of Apis' group preserved their Viennese contacts,[8] but Apis himself looked upon Austria-Hungary as the most deadly enemy of Serbia.

Colonel Apis' relations with Germany are of a more complex character. He himself visited Germany several times; his *Pijemont* praised the role of the German Army in the "resurrection of the German nation;" and he had rather close relations with the Serbian diplomat Miloš Bogičević, who defected to Germany in 1915. But there appears to be no evidence to prove that Colonel Apis worked as a German agent, as he has been accused by some historians. He maintained contacts with the Germans only for the purpose of trying to augment the differences between Vienna and Berlin.

Nor was Colonel Apis a Russophile. *Pijemont* attacked all the Great Powers for neglecting the interests of smaller nations, and was particularly critical of Russia's secret agreements with the

[7] There were rumors that Mustafa Golubić, an important member of the Bosnians, worked for the Russian *Okhrana*. This writer checked the names of all the leading members of Princip's society in the archives of the Balkan section of *Okhrana* (as they are preserved in the Hoover Institution for War, Revolution and Peace, Stanford University), but none of them was on the list of *Okhrana's* confidants.

[8] Colonel Mašin and Colonel Damjan Popović for a time favored Skoda guns over French ones.

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Hapsburgs over the Balkans, calling her a "brotherly Judas." The reports of the French Ambassador in St. Petersburg suggest that Emperor Nicholas II was hostile to Colonel Apis and that he pressed King Peter of Serbia several times to dismiss him.[9]

Of all the theories as to why Colonel Apis decided to take part in the conspiracy against Franz Ferdinand, the most probable is that he feared that at the Konopischt meeting between the Emperor Wilhelm and the Archduke, at the end of October 1913, Germany had given Austria-Hungary a free hand to crush Serbia. By murdering the Archduke, Apis believed that he would cause confusion among the enemy ranks and thus force the Viennese war party to postpone its designs against Serbia at a time when she and her ally, Russia, were not ready for war. Significantly, the attacks in *Pijemont* against the Archduke increased after the Konopischt meeting. In the issue of January 2, 1914, following an article by Stefan Grossman marking the Archduke's fiftieth birthday, the editor added his own comment which amounted to a public threat of death to the Archduke. Indeed, Apis instructed his men at that time to explore the possibilities for eliminating Franz Ferdinand.

Princip came to Belgrade in January 1914 to prepare for his final matriculation examination and in mid-March, when his group from Sarajevo sent him a press clipping about the Archduke's visit to Bosnia, he contacted the Bosnian students in Belgrade, asking them for weapons. Thus a direct link was established with Colonel Apis through Major Vojin Tankosić, and a coördination of all conspiratorial groups at last was achieved.

V

The relations of the Serbian Government, Colonel Apis and the Young Bosnians during the fateful weeks before June 28, 1914, can now be more easily assessed in view of new historical evidence.

The Royal Jugoslav Governments did not publish the official Serbian documentations on the Sarajevo plot because the whole issue had deep internal political repercussions. Between 1903 and 1914 Colonel Apis was the *eminence gris* of Serbia's political life,

[9] It is interesting that in 1917, when Apis faced the death sentence passed on the insistence of the Regent Alexander Karadjordjevic, Kerensky's government gave the strongest support to Apis. Relations between Hartwig, the Russian Minister in Belgrade, and his military attaché Artamonov were not particularly close, although this was not the case with Captain Alexander Ivanovich Werhovski, Artamonov's deputy, who later became Kerensky's Minister of War, and finally one of the commanders of the Red Army.

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a kind of king-maker. He was challenged from the beginning by the Radical Party and its leader Nikola Pašić, who was the Prime Minister of Serbia before the First World War. Their disagreement came into the open in May 1914, when Apis provoked the dismissal of Pašić by King Peter. The Russian Government intervened and Pašić was reinstated. On June 10 Apis tried to organize a coup d'état, but his influence was waning and his old comrades rejected his orders. At this stage Prince Alexander moved into the conflict, siding with Pašić. As a result King Peter had to resign, Alexander became the regent and new elections were announced for August 1. Despite the outbreak of war, the conflict did not recede, and in 1917 Apis and his principal followers were arrested, charged with attempted assassination of Alexander; Apis and two of his lieutenants were executed.

In view of these events, any publication of the relevant documents on Sarajevo, 1914, could have hurt the interest of the Crown as well as of the powerful Radicals. But during the Second World War, German troops captured the Jugoslav archives and a collection of the Serbian documentation was in press in May 1945, but was never published. These archives were returned to Belgrade, but some of the key documents are still missing. At the retrial of Apis in Belgrade in 1953, most of the documentations were revealed. Hans Uebersberger also published some of the Serbian documents in 1958 in his book "Öesterreich zwischen Russland und Serbien," although not objectively. The recently published memoirs of Slobodan Jovanović, one of the last Royal Prime Ministers of Jugoslavia and a historian of reputation, who was a friend of Apis and had contacts with King Alexander, contributed much to clarifying some of the missing links in this complex historical issue.

Major Tankosić aided Princip and his accomplices in crossing from Serbia to Bosnia through a secret "kanal," the underground link between the two countries. It happened that the same people were serving in the underground chains of both Colonel Apis' military intelligence and *Narodna Odbrana,* a society which had a more cultural function among the South Slavs in Bosnia and which was under the influence of the Serbian Government.

One of the peasants, Jakov Milović, who helped Princip to cross the border to Bosnia, was at the same time a confidant of *Narodna Odbrana,* and he at once informed Boža Milanović, his contact in Šabac, the Serbian border town, that he had guided

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two schoolboys who were carrying four revolvers and six bombs. Milanović sent an urgent message to his superior in Belgrade, General Boža Janković, the President of *Narodna Odbrana,* who in turn informed the Minister of the Interior, and finally the report reached Prime Minister Pašić.

In his own hand Pašić made a summary of the first part of the document and this piece of paper, without a date, exists in the Serbian archives. It was published by Uebersberger in 1958 together with a facsimile of the first part of the document in which all the information about the crossing of the schoolboys was mentioned. But Uebersberger omitted the second part of this document, which is of vital importance in assessing the responsibility of the Serbian Government for the Sarajevo crime. However, the page proofs of the projected German publication of the Serbian documents show a facsimile of the second part of the document.

On the basis of this report, Pašić contacted the Chief of the General Staff asking him to investigate Colonel Apis, because the report mentioned the fact that the weapons were carried to Bosnia at the request of Rade Malobabić, the chief secret agent of Serbian Military Intelligence in Bosnia, Herzegovina and Croatia. Apis wrote a long explanation in his own hand (without a date), stating that the revolvers and bombs were sent for the protection of his confidants in Austro-Hungarian territory.

But Pašić was not satisfied with this answer and ordered an official investigation which was conducted by the Chief of the Judiciary Department of the Ministry of War, Colonel Stanko Cvetković. At the same time the Minister of War issued an order to the Military Frontier units to prevent the crossing of people to Bosnia or the transport of weapons, and the civil authorities in Šabac also started their investigation and issued similar orders.

Under these conditions, Colonel Apis decided to stop Princip and his accomplices.[10] One of his men contacted Danilo Ilić, a teacher from Sarajevo, who was the main technical organizer of the plot. Ilić tried his best to convince Princip to postpone his action, but Princip stubbornly rejected such a suggestion. At the investigation and at the trial, as the available official documentation reveals, Ilić spoke about his conflict with Princip on this issue.

[10] *Narodna Odbrana* on three occasions sent messages to their contact man in Bosnia to stop the plot.

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But now the affair took a new turn. Rade Malobabić appeared in Bosnia seven or eight days before the 28th, and, according to the information revealed in a recent book on Princip by Dr. Drago Ljubibratić, he revoked Apis' previous decision to abandon the plot. Malobabić seems to have been at the exact spot where the Archduke was killed.

The question is why Malobabić acted in this way. Was he induced by Colonel Apis or did he act under someone else's order? The Serbian Government ordered the arrest of Malobabić as soon as he recrossed the border into Serbia and accused him publicly of being "an Austrian spy." But this accusation has not been confirmed. This writer's opinion is that Malobabić acted on the orders of Major Vojin Tankosić, a man of violent character, who was much perturbed by Colonel Apis' failure to win over Pašić during the crucial weeks before June 28. This hypothesis is confirmed by Tankosić's statement when he was arrested in Belgrade following the Archduke's assassination. When he was asked why he had done such a thing, he answered: "To spite Pašić."

To sum up the issue concerning the amount of knowledge the Serbian Government had about the Sarajevo plot, it appears that Pašić knew about the crossing of the armed men, but not about the plot itself. Naturally he presumed what might happen in view of the Archduke's visit to Bosnia and tried his best to prevent any conflict with Austria by ordering investigations against Apis and directing the border guards to stop the illegal crossing of the frontier. But it is important that in the second part of the report he received from the Ministry of the Interior the purpose of sending the arms was stated to be to arm Malobabić's chain of intelligence men in Austro-Hungarian territory, and the plot against the Archduke was not mentioned at all.

Thanks to new primary sources, the story of the Sarajevo assassination looks simpler than before, when the whole issue was blurred by the problem of responsibility for the First World War. The Archduke was killed by the joint action of the secret revolutionary societies of Bosnia and Belgrade. The theories that Russian, German, Austrian, or British and French agencies participated, or that Colonel Apis was in league with the Hungarian Prime Minister, Count Stephen Tisza, have not been proved by the available documentation.

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U.S. POLICY IN LATIN AMERICA

By Hubert H. Humphrey

IN any analysis of United States policy in Latin America, the first question which should be considered is: What priority is attached to Latin America in the whole spectrum of our foreign-policy considerations? Once the relative importance or unimportance of hemispheric problems is established, one can then move on to consider the question of basic U.S. policy in Latin America. Having delineated the fundamental lines of policy, one can consider finally the effective means of implementing it. On these three questions I shall focus my discussion.

On numerous occasions President Kennedy indicated the priority he placed on Latin America in the total spectrum of foreign-policy considerations by describing it as "the most critical area in the world." But two decades of constant preoccupation with Europe and Asia have left an imbalance in our global commitments that has not yet been wholly rectified. Although the United States must continue to be concerned with developments in many parts of the world, it is no longer either necessary or possible for the United States to become deeply involved in every area of the world and to undertake the massive political, military and economic commitments that such involvement entails. The break-up of the bipolar world of the postwar era and the emergence of independent centers of power in the non-Communist world should in the decade ahead allow the United States greater freedom to concentrate its resources in areas of primary concern to our national interest.

Europe remains of crucial importance in our foreign policy considerations and will retain this status for the foreseeable future. But while the internal political, social and economic patterns of Europe are well determined by now, this is not the case with Latin America. The future structure of society and the external policy of Latin nations remain unanswered questions. Marxism as a guide to social development is a spent force in most European countries, but it remains a lively alternative in Latin America today. The example of Cuba suggests both the immediacy of the Marxist threat to U.S. interests and the nature of the problems which we face when Marxism is accepted as a guide to the development of a Latin American society.

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The obvious geopolitical factors of proximity, size and population make the Latin American continent of particular importance to us. Central and South America form a land mass over twice the size of the United States and larger than non-Communist Asia. The combined present population of 200 million is likely to approximate 450 to 500 million by the year 2000.

Unlike Asia, Latin America enjoys a balance between population and land and at the same time is rich in natural resources. Aside from Europe, Canada and Japan, it is both the largest market for American exports and the principal source of many raw materials imported by the United States. It is the recipient of the largest capital investment, presently totaling over $8 billion. Trade with Latin America totaled over $6.6 billion in 1963, amounting to over three-fourths of our total trade with the southern half of the world. With imports of $3.4 billion in 1963, the United States remains by far the most important market for Latin American exports.

These economic and physical data only begin to indicate the importance of Latin America to the United States. A common European inheritance has left in the Americas, North and South, a widespread belief in constitutional government, in political democracy, and a belief in the dignity of the individual resulting from a common Judaeo-Christian tradition. In short, the United States and Latin America, though different in many ways, share a political, religious and cultural tradition that is "Western" both in origin and content.

In the bipolar world of the past two decades both the United States and Latin America faced a common threat of Communist imperialism directed from the Soviet Union. With the break-up of the bipolar world and the emergence of at least four centers of power—the United States, the Soviet Union, Western Europe and Mainland China—the position of the Western Hemisphere in world power relationships is changing. East-West relationships have been modified, while the future pattern of North-South relationships is not yet settled.

The emergence of a powerful Western Europe—likely to pursue a more independent foreign policy—makes hemispheric cooperation more urgent if the nations of this hemisphere are not only to solve their immediate internal problems but to play a proper role in world affairs in future decades. Although the decade of the 1960s is a crucial one for the United States and

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Latin America, the development of our hemispheric policy should look two or three decades ahead. We must keep in mind not only the political, economic and social problems that confront Latin America in the 1960s but also the position of the Western Hemisphere in the international relations of the 1980s and 1990s. If the hemisphere remains united, it can, with a population of 900 million people by the year 2000 and a level of economic development that its resources indicate is possible, play a major role in shaping the world of future decades, regardless of events in Asia, Europe or the Soviet Union. But neither unity within Latin America itself nor unity within the hemisphere is guaranteed. Our policy should be designed to discourage intra-hemispheric rivalry which would Balkanize the continent, as well as to prevent Communist subversion which would divide the hemisphere into an endless struggle between Communist and non-Communist states.

Our concept of hemispheric unity should not be defined in any exclusive sense that would actively discourage a greater Western European contribution to the social, economic and cultural development of Latin America. Indeed, we should actively encourage Europe to expand its involvement in Latin America, both in terms of long-term development assistance and expansion of existing cultural and educational programs. But we cannot view with equanimity the separation of Latin America from the United States and Europe in favor of an exclusive association or identification with the "third world." Latin countries will and should continue to be different from both the United States and Europe, but they need not see their own future destiny in terms of the non-Western southern half of the world just because they share with the societies of Asia and Africa a less developed status.

Although President Kennedy altered the priority which we attach to Latin American problems, it remains for his successors fully to translate that priority within the machinery of the U.S. Government. In one of his first official decisions, President Johnson acted to end the division of authority that had hampered policy implementation and to upgrade the status of top officials responsible for our relations with Latin America. This upgrading must continue and should eventually result in the establishment of an under secretary post in the State Department and high-ranking positions in our defense, intelligence and informa-

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tion agencies as well. When we see the Secretary of State or Defense directly involved in the problems of U.S. relations with Brazil or Argentina and an Assistant Secretary of State being dispatched to deal with a problem in Southeast Asia, we shall then be able to conclude that the day-to-day operations of the Government reflect the set of priorities enunciated by President Kennedy in describing Latin America as "the most critical area in the world."

II

Turning now to policy within the hemisphere, it remains my belief that the basis of our policy for Latin America should be the Alliance for Progress as originally conceived by President Kennedy and agreed to by the 20 American Republics in the Charter of Punta del Este. The aim of the Alliance is summarized in the Declaration of the Peoples of the Americas which precedes the Charter: "to unite in a common effort to bring our people accelerated economic progress and broader social justice within the framework of personal dignity and personal liberty." This objective is to be implemented through systematic social and economic programs designed to abolish the shocking economic and social inequality, between privileged and impoverished, between glittering capitals and festering slums, between booming industrial regions and primitive rural areas. The Alliance is designed to be a peaceful alternative to violent revolution in meeting the challenge of an unjust socio-economic order.

In discussing the Alliance, I am making several assumptions which cannot be spelled out in a brief article: (1) that "Latin America" is not a homogeneous unit, but a continent of widely diversified peoples, sharply varied economies and both highly advanced and grossly undeveloped regions; (2) that we recognize the differences between individual countries and adjust our policies accordingly; and (3) that the actions of Latin American countries are far more important than those of the United States in accomplishing the goals of the Alliance for Progress.

In recent months, questions have arisen both in this country and in Latin America about the validity of the original conception of the Alliance and about the strength of the United States commitment to it. Today we are told by some that the great mistake of Alliance officials was in arousing hopes and expectations that could not be fulfilled. We are told that what is needed

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are fewer statements about the philosophy of the Alliance, the ideology of the Alliance, fewer broad-gauged political doctrines and more hardheaded pragmatic emphasis on economic lending programs. Such an appraisal reflects a misunderstanding of current conditions and trends in Latin America. It reflects a misunderstanding of what President Kennedy had in mind in launching the Alliance for Progress.

It was recognized from the beginning that the success of the grand strategy for coöperation with Latin America, the Alliance for Progress, depended on more than economic development. It was realized that for the policy to succeed, the Alliance must have a political content and an ideological substance, in addition to a strong program of economic development. It must come to symbolize the hopes and aspirations of both the élite groups and the masses of Latin American people. It must have a mystique all its own, capable of inspiring a following.

President Kennedy himself was the symbol of the Alliance, the symbol of the hope and imagination which is needed. He realized that though Latin America faces grave economic problems, these must be seen within a broader political context. It is not just a matter of satisfying physical needs and raising material standards of living. What is more important is the problem of inspiring hope, of commanding the intellectual and emotional allegiance of those who will shape the society—both the élite groups and the popular classes. He realized that the hopes and expectations aroused could not all be satisfied in the immediate future—nor need they be. What can be accomplished in a material sense in a very limited period of time will always fall short of expectations. This should not discourage us. What is important is that we be prepared to give some evidence that progress is being made, that material betterment is on the way, and that there is sound reason for believing that the unmet material problems of society will be solved in the future. This means of course that we must have both short-range socially oriented projects to give visible evidence of immediate progress, and long-range development projects which are essential to improving the condition of the society. I believe that President Johnson shares this view. His speech of May 11 to the Latin American Ambassadors clearly indicates that he understands that mere pragmatic economic programs are not enough, that the Alliance is political and social as well as economic in nature.

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Much of the premature pessimism that has been expressed about the Alliance results therefore from a misunderstanding of its original concept, from an underestimation of the magnitude of the task and from mistaken analogies based on European experience under the Marshall Plan.

Today we should be well aware that nostalgic recollection of the dramatic success of the Marshall Plan in restoring economic and social vitality to the war-ravaged, but highly advanced, modern societies of Western Europe does little to illuminate the path to speedy economic and social development in underdeveloped areas of Latin America. The reform and modification of social and economic traditions that have persisted for two centuries are not going to be accomplished in two years—and probably not in a decade.

In view of the criticism leveled at the Alliance, the persistence of political instability in many countries and the ever-present Communist threat in others, some will be tempted to abandon the original emphasis of the Alliance on radical economic and social reform. Some will be tempted to return to less venturesome, more conventional goals, to place less emphasis on reform and more on working with the established groups to minimize political instability. Indeed, there are those who believe we should abandon our identification of the Alliance with "peaceful revolution," with rapid reform of the economic and social structure of Latin American societies. I believe this would be a grave mistake.

Although the observation that Latin America is in the midst of a political, economic and social revolution has become a commonplace, it is true. Only a few decades ago it could be said that the fatalism of most Latin Americans was well expressed in the remark of the late nineteenth-century Chilean President Barros Lucco: "There are only two kinds of problems facing society: those which get solved by themselves—and those which defy solution." Today, however, in most Latin American nations there is not only a burning awareness of the enormous human cost of perpetuating a status quo which exploits the many for the benefit of the few, but also a well-developed consciousness that the status quo can be changed, that radical improvement in the condition and status of the mass of the people can be achieved through deliberate, systematic political action. For the deprived mass of the people, the status quo is no longer a burden

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to be patiently borne, but an incubus to be cast off. Is it appropriate to define Alliance policy as favoring social "revolution" —or should this word be avoided in favor of "evolution" or some other expression? "Evolution," if carefully examined, proves to be inadequate, for it implies an unconscious, non-deliberate change that is slow and gradual. What is required is conscious, rapid change in the socio-economic structure, a process that can correctly and precisely be called a revolution. If used not as a slogan but in its precise sense, the policy of peaceful social and economic revolution is a correct characterization of Alliance policy. We should not hesitate to identify ourselves with it in Latin America, just as President Johnson associated himself with it in his "war on poverty" throughout the world when he recently remarked: "If a peaceful revolution in these areas is impossible, a violent revolution is inevitable."

In the revolutionary atmosphere which does exist in a number of important Latin American countries, ideological factors are often as important as straight economic programs. I am impressed, for example, with the fact that the governments which achieved the greatest political stability and economic progress in the last decade were the strongly ideological democratic parties led by Betancourt, José Figueres and Muñoz Marín. I am impressed, too, by the fact that the two fastest-growing political movements in the larger countries of South America today are the two most intensely ideological movements—the Marxist and the Christian Democratic.

Both of these are flourishing, particularly among the younger groups. We should not forget that half of the population of Latin America today is under 18. In a discussion of the present situation in Latin America with a distinguished Latin American, Dr. Rafael Caldera of the COPEI Party in Venezuela, we agreed that one reason why his party and other Christian Democratic parties in South America are flourishing today among the impatient, idealistic younger groups is that they offer an ideological alternative to Marxism, an integrated approach to the political, economic and social problems of society. I know that we pragmatic North Americans find it difficult to understand why a Latin American considers the philosophy and ideology of a party as important as the specific practical measures it recommends. We are only now coming to realize that the ideological basis of Communism—not its economic critique—is its principal

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attraction for students and educated groups in Latin America. It is for that reason that Communism captures the university before the slum.

If the social and economic objectives of the Alliance are to be achieved, we must lend our strong support to those governments and those political parties which are really committed to the Alliance program, which are committed to modifying the antiquated economic and social structure of society. Although there is and will continue to be a wide variety of parties and governments, we are most likely to see the aims of the Alliance realized and our own interests served if we strongly support reformist governments like those of Romulo Betancourt in Venezuela and Belaúnde Terry in Peru, reformist political parties like those that provided leadership in the Caribbean area during the past two decades, and the Christian Democratic parties that are rapidly emerging as a major political force in South America.

III

It would be a mistake to interpret the Alliance program exclusively in terms of a social and economic revolution and to ignore the equally important aim of building political democracy and constitutional government. As the first U.S. Coördinator of the Alliance for Progress, Ambassador Teodoro Moscoso, once remarked, "Free countries do not develop on bread alone." The quest for first-class citizenship, the growth of representative political institutions, and the accomplishment of economic and social reform within the framework of constitutional government are an essential part of the Alliance, as President Johnson emphasized once again in his speech of May 11. And the indispensable ingredient for successfully achieving both the socio-economic and the political goals of the Alliance is political leadership. If there has been one preëminent disappointment about the Alliance in its first three years, it is the failure of many Latin American countries to come forth with able, responsible political leaders who are capable of mobilizing support for Alliance programs, of building political institutions and administrative structures which are able to sustain and implement the basic modifications of society that are needed. We have seen a number of cases where constitutional government has been interrupted, sometimes because an elected government proved to be incompetent;

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in other cases because fragile constitutional structures and political institutions were unable to withstand the assault of non-constitutional groups—usually led by the military—intent on seizing power. It is this situation that has confronted our policy-makers with one of the most sensitive policy dilemmas of the past three years.

How does the United States deal with governments that have come to power through non-constitutional means? We of course cannot determine the type of governments that take office in Latin American countries. We have no choice but to work with many governments. But we should distinguish between constitutional governments pursuing progressive policies and those which shoot their way to power. We may not be able to prevent the emergence of juntas, but we can and should distinguish between dictators and democrats. In those instances when we must temporarily deal with non-constitutional governments, we should use all our levers of influence to restore constitutional government at the earliest possible time.

The problem confronting us is made even more difficult when a constitutional government is overthrown in order to meet an acknowledged Communist threat or to uproot Communist infiltration that has progressed under the protection of democratic institutions. This should not be a pretext for circumvention of constitutional procedures or for maintaining military juntas in power in violation of the constitution. In those extraordinary situations, certainly we should be reluctant to embrace a new government before waiting to discover whether purges, military decrees, censorship, revocation of political rights and mass arrests represent a momentary aberration or a permanent characteristic of the régime. Similarly, pledges of economic assistance under the Alliance for Progress should naturally await evidence that the new government will meet the standards for economic assistance specified in the Alliance charter.

In dealing with these situations we should always keep in mind the results of our policy of embracing "anti-Communist" military dictators during much of the 1950s—results dramatically illustrated when an American Vice President was nearly mobbed in Caracas in 1958.

The use of anti-Communism as a deceptive slogan in the past should not blind us to the true nature of the Communist threat in this hemisphere today. This threat is real and must be met if

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hemispheric unity, political democracy and socio-economic progress are to be achieved.

The record of Venezuelan President Romulo Betancourt merits attention in this regard because it reveals rare insight into the nature of the Communist threat in the Western Hemisphere. In confronting the Communist problem, he has kept in mind the distinction between the three salient strands of the Communist threat in Latin America: first, the ideological strain which was discussed earlier; second, the appeal of the Communist economic model as a solution to the economic needs of impoverished people; third, the attempt of a Communist régime —Cuba, for example—and Communist groups within Latin American countries to subvert non-Communist governments through armed attack, internal terror and sabotage, through propaganda or through quiet infiltration and popular-front movements.

One cannot meet the appeal of the second with solutions appropriate only for the third. The economic threat cannot be met by military solutions, but rather by programs which fall under the Alliance—effective mobilization of resources and accomplishment of reforms by local governments, combined with U.S. help in the form of loans, "food for peace," the Peace Corps and technical assistance. The security problem cannot be met alone by these economic programs, but requires measures which are primarily paramilitary, political and propagandistic.

One should not conclude that the face of the Communist threat in Latin America is always the same. It is not. The approach and tactics of Communist parties vary from country to country. In Brazil, Communist infiltration from the top by a government tolerant of Communist-oriented groups posed a quite different problem from that in Venezuela. Different again is the situation in Chile, where a Communist-Socialist coalition seeks power through regular elections to be held later this year. Methods of combatting Communist infiltration must be adapted to the situation.

Subversion from abroad remains a major aspect of the Communist threat to many Latin American countries, particularly those in the Caribbean—and the principal source of this subversion continues to be Castro's Cuba. The case of Venezuela is a good illustration. For Venezuela today, as for many other Latin American neighbors, the Castro government in Cuba is

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not a nuisance to be ignored but a menace to be eliminated. Communist subversion from Cuba is not a "myth" to be exposed but an ever-present reality to be faced.

The report issued in February of this year by the Organization of American States makes it indisputably clear that Cuba has smuggled arms to terrorists in Venezuela. There is now photographic evidence of the plan and plot to subvert the Betancourt government at the time of the election last December.

What should the U.S. position be in such cases? Our national policy should be one of clear, unequivocal support for taking the necessary steps to cut off arms shipments from Cuba to Venezuela or any other Latin American nation. Cuba must not be permitted to be an arsenal for terrorism, revolution and chaos. Instead of merely worrying about governments of friendly countries being able to stay in power and resist violence, we should choke off the source of that violence.

I believe that we should wholeheartedly support the position of the Venezuelan Government in the O.A.S., where it has requested joint sanctions against Cuba. I hope that the required action can be accomplished within the framework of the O.A.S. But if it cannot, this should not mean that we will permit friendly governments like that in Venezuela to remain defenseless because of the inaction of its neighbors. The existing machinery of the O.A.S. should not be permitted to impede the successful handling of problems of this sort.

There may be instances where it is actually preferable to take bilateral action to meet a Communist threat rather than require the participation or approval of all members of the O.A.S. An effective response to Communist subversion does not always require that all Latin American governments publicly and officially take a strong positive position. Undue pressure to do so may sometimes be counter-productive, by weakening the political position of a government which is fundamentally anti-Communist but whose freedom of action is restricted by a delicate balance of internal political force. The machinery of the O.A.S. should be sufficiently flexible to permit bilateral action as well as multilateral action where it may be required.

I do not favor a military invasion of Cuba. Even less do I favor so great a preoccupation with Cuba that all other hemispheric issues are ignored. But so long as the stated purpose of the Castro régime is to export its Communist revolution, it will

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remain a threat to many Latin American governments. So long as it remains a threat to them, it remains much more than a nuisance to the United States. For our own interests are inextricably bound up with those of our neighbors in the hemisphere.

IV

In implementing the policy outlined above it should be understood that methods must vary from country to country, that U.S. action in implementing the Alliance for Progress is dependent upon the actions of Latin American countries. For the immediate future I would mention several lines of action which might be effective in realizing our objectives. If rapid progress is to be made in achieving the social and economic objectives of the Alliance for Progress, it will require in the next decade both greater mobilization of resources by Latin American governments and a larger infusion of external resources. These external resources will come chiefly from three sources: (1) aid from foreign governments and international lending agencies; (2) trade; and (3) foreign private investment.

All three of these are essential to most Latin American countries and will continue to be for the foreseeable future. In the face of continued Congressional criticism of foreign aid and disappointment abroad with the volume of aid and the conditions attached to it, there has been a tendency to disparage foreign aid; Latin Americans look to trade and North Americans to private investment as a substitute.

Trade brings into a country needed foreign exchange, but it carries with it no guarantee that the foreign exchange will be used for purposes having a high priority in the development of an economy or society. The exchange usually goes to a relatively few people in the commercial sector and, in the absence of effective progressive tax systems or exchange controls, can be spent on luxury items or sent abroad to foreign banks. Foreign aid not only brings in needed capital but capital that can be easily channelled into those projects and those sectors of society deemed of crucial importance.

Foreign private investment—as many previously skeptical Latin Americans have now learned after experimenting with swollen, inefficient state business corporations—is absolutely essential both to increase the productivity of a country and to

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develop an efficient industrial and agricultural sector. With the strong encouragement of the U.S. Government—for example, through investment guarantees and tax credits—American business can continue to provide leadership in building a strong private sector in Latin American countries. But it is a mistake to claim too much for private investment, to ignore the necessity of expending large sums on the economic and social infra-structure (highways, ports, dams, schools and health systems) which can be financed only by public funds.

All three—aid, trade and private investment—are essential to social and economic progress in Latin America. In my view, we in the United States do not allocate the amount of resources to Latin America required to do the job that needs to be done. Although Latin American countries may be less capable of absorbing large amounts of capital than were the European countries under the Marshall Plan, it is nevertheless true that our contribution to the Alliance for Progress is pitifully small compared to the billions of dollars—mostly in grants, not loans —that we poured into Europe after the Second World War. In line with the priority which we should assign to Latin America in our global policy considerations, our aid to this area should be substantially increased for the rest of the decade.

There is no reason, however, why the increased aid to Latin America should come exclusively from the United States. It should be recognized that the European contribution to Latin America need not be limited to respecting embargoes on trade with Cuba. European countries—together with other countries like Japan and Canada that conduct substantial trade with the area—should be strongly encouraged to contribute to the infusion of capital that is required, and on terms that are favorable. This assistance should represent private investment as well as government aid.

Trade may not be a panacea for the problems of Latin America, but it now seems clear that we must give greater attention to developing trade within this hemisphere. The terms of trade for Latin American countries have remained unstable. Although commodity prices have shot upward during the past year, it is unclear whether this is a temporary improvement or a long-range trend. Trade among Latin American countries has not flourished, with the exception of the recently established Central American Common Market. Our exports to Latin America have

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leveled off, and it is clear that we shall face increasing competition there with Europe and Japan.

It is too early to say exactly what regional mechanisms should be used to bring about increased trade between the United States and Latin America, to promote competition and stable trade relations within the hemisphere. The brief experience of the Central American Common Market indicates what can be achieved in a limited area if individual countries are willing to look beyond their borders. The experience with LAFTA—Latin American Free Trade Area—thus far is less promising. Certainly, one of the problems which should be given early consideration by the newly created Inter-American Committee for the Alliance for Progress and by the Inter-American Development Bank is the possibility of giving greater impetus to the regional movement in the LAFTA countries. The Inter-American Development Bank has begun to finance the acceleration of regional trade within LAFTA, and its efforts should be supplemented.

As for the United States, I believe that we must soon undertake an intensive review of our hemispheric trade policy. Trade is essential to the economic prosperity of the hemisphere and we should give careful consideration to the possibility of developing a more cohesive trading area, which would not only bring economic advantages but would also promote the political unity of the hemisphere.

The next step in promoting a hemispheric trade zone might be to lend our strong support to the development of LAFTA in the same way that we gave our backing to the Common Market in Europe and to the Central American Common Market. We should promote the creation of new exports and the expansion of existing exports by supplementing the funds now available for this purpose from the I.D.B. We should participate in planning LAFTA's development and encourage American business to do likewise. Once LAFTA has made significant progress, we can then consider what new trade relationships should be developed between the LAFTA area and the United States and Canada.

In the future, decisions on questions of basic importance to the development of the Alliance for Progress, such as those on aid and trade, should naturally be made through the Inter-American Committee for the Alliance for Progress. Just as the United States Government has improved its machinery for

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handling hemispheric affairs, so the members of the Alliance have created a mechanism to facilitate truly multilateral decision-making on hemispheric problems. But this new organ can succeed only to the extent that it has the strong support of the nations of the hemisphere, especially the United States. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee has indicated the strong Congressional sentiment in favor of multilateralism, thereby giving the Executive branch the freedom it needs to assist in acceleration of the trend from unilateral to multilateral decision-making under the Alliance for Progress.

In pursuing the political objectives of the Alliance for Progress—both the positive aim of inspiring a commitment to constitutional government and democratic institutions and the negative objective of thwarting Communist expansion—we would do well to divert more attention and resources to programs in the educational, ideological, cultural and propaganda fields. We should expand programs aimed both at the élite and at the popular classes. According to the best information available to me, approximately 3,000 Brazilians were brought to the United States during the past ten years under our various educational and cultural exchange programs. If we really appreciated the revolutionary atmosphere in Latin America today and understood the nature of the Communist appeal to younger people who will become the élite of their societies, we would raise this figure to 3,000 per year.

Similarly we should use all possible leverage to encourage Latin American governments to expend the resources needed to wipe out illiteracy among the mass of the people. Where the determination exists, illiteracy can be effectively eliminated in a brief period, a fact that has been proven by the Castro government in Cuba. Of the many reasons which could be advanced in support of crash programs to end illiteracy, I will cite only three. First, active popular participation in political life under a democratic government is impossible if half the population cannot read and write. Second, historically no society that has succeeded in abolishing illiteracy has remained poor for long. Third, the balanced population growth rate that will be necessary in the future is not likely to be accomplished while half the population remains illiterate.

In our efforts to coöperate with Latin Americans in realizing the objectives of the Alliance, we should be aware of the renais-

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sance of one of the traditional institutions found in all Latin American societies—the Roman Catholic Church. One of the most encouraging trends of the past decade has been the new awakening on the part of Church leaders to the shocking social and economic problems of the continent, and the new determination to meet those problems now through fundamental reforms.

Today in Chile, Panama, Venezuela, Brazil, Argentina and Colombia members of the hierarchy are actively pushing the reforms stipulated under the Alliance Charter. Whereas formerly the active espousal of progressive social and economic policies was largely confined to religious orders like the Maryknoll priests or to isolated pastors, today they are supported by occupants of metropolitan sees. The farsighted social and economic philosophy of the late Pope John's social encyclicals *Mater et Magistra* and *Pacem in Terris* is being strongly pushed by the Vatican. Men who once would have been "promoted" to mountain parishes for their advanced views are now being appointed bishops and cardinals.

The Church's role is important not only in promoting economic and social reform, but also in building free societies and encouraging hemispheric unity. The building of a just economic and social order requires the rapid modification—sometimes the destruction—of old institutions. In a revolutionary era, the temptation is great for the state to absorb total responsibility in the social and economic order, to eliminate all institutions which it cannot directly control itself, to create an atomized society. History teaches us—and the recent example of Cuba reminds us once again—that it is the atomized society that is easy prey for totalitarian government. In one of the best capsule definitions of totalitarian government, Hannah Arendt once defined it as the elimination of all subgroups between the individual and the state. During the next decade, when revolutionary change will be the order of the day in many countries, there may be times when a brake is needed on the action of the state if social pluralism and individual political liberty are to be preserved. In some Latin American countries, it may be the Church that will be called upon to play that role.

Finally, the Catholic Church—together with Roman law and the Spanish language—is one of the principal unifying forces in this vast continent. In an age of rampant nationalism, the common bond which the Church provides may have a powerful

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impact in overcoming the separatist tendencies of the age and in achieving hemispheric unity.

In conclusion, I would emphasize that quite apart from the specific programs which we may support in implementing our policy in Latin America—programs of aid, trade, private investment, education or propaganda—what is equally important is our success in solving our own preëminent social problem—achieving equality for the Negro—and our attitude toward our fellow citizens in the hemisphere. In a continent where the large majority of people are non-white, a continent that includes societies like Brazil which have developed a harmonious multi-racial society, it is hard to exaggerate the importance which people attach to our efforts to extend the benefits of modern civilization to the Negro minority in the United States, just as Latin American countries are striving to make them available to the majority of their own people.

President Kennedy is revered for opening up a new era in relations between the United States and Latin America, not primarily because he promised material assistance, but because he conveyed an understanding and respect for Latin American people, for their culture and many of their traditions. He did not regard Latin American people as inferior or expect them to see the solution to their own problems in blind imitation of the United States. It is this attitude of understanding and respect that must permeate not only our leadership, but our entire society. This will not be easy to accomplish—as most adults in this country were educated in schools where the overwhelming majority of textbooks and reference books either ignored Latin America or reflected a condescending attitude toward Latin Americans. Written chiefly by authors sympathetic to a northern European cultural inheritance, which historically has been fundamentally unsympathetic to Latin culture, these books have been all too important an influence in shaping the attitude of generations of Americans. Change in popular attitudes comes slowly. A full appreciation of the importance of Latin America will come only when our educational system begins to reflect the priority stated by President Kennedy when he described Latin America as the most critical area in the world.

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WHAT NEXT IN SOVIET PLANNING?

By Leon Smolinski

ACADEMICIAN Victor Glushkov, the head of the Soviet program of research in cybernetics, estimated recently that, failing a radical reform in planning methods, the planning bureaucracy would grow 36-fold by 1980, requiring the services of the entire Soviet population. Such warnings are not exactly novel. Some forty years ago, the dying Lenin wrote: "Vital work we do is sinking in a dead sea of paperwork. We get sucked in by a foul bureaucratic swamp." In 1933, Leon Trotsky saw acute symptoms of the same disease. "Bureaucracy acts at random," he wrote, "it rejects objective criteria, it does not recognize laws other than the law of its own will, it substitutes commands for plans and pressure for calculation."[1]

Trotsky's indictment reads surprisingly like Premier Khrushchev's recent attacks upon Gosplan and its methods. The disease he recognized has now reached an acute stage and may seriously impede further growth of the Soviet economy. Until recently, analysis of these important processes was difficult because of the lack of information. In particular, little was known about the way in which economic decisions are actually made at the top and at the enterprise level. Interesting disclosures made recently about these previously forbidden matters have not yet received the attention they deserve.

II

A centrally planned economy is usually looked upon as a more or less efficient machine for the production and distribution of goods. A cybernetician would view it somewhat differently: as a machine which, more or less efficiently, generates, processes and distributes information. The two functions are intimately related. Channels of information and flows of commodities are, in fact, interrelated parts of a highly complex network. To produce a carload of, say, ball bearings, it takes not only so much steel, machinery, manpower and time; it also takes an information input in the form of data concerning the availability of resources and the demand for the product. These data are gathered, processed and forwarded to the decision-makers who issue orders to pro-

[1] *Biulleten' opozitsii*, 1933, No. 33, p. 2.

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ducers and receive reports which may give rise to new, modified decisions.

All these activities can obviously be handled in a variety of ways. The flow of information may take place within the confines of a small privately owned shop or, at the other extreme, it may involve thousands of messages passing among hundreds of agencies. Whatever the nature of the information system involved, a cybernetician would begin his analysis with such questions as: How much information is needed per unit of output (say, per carload of ball bearings), and what is its cost? Who receives the data and in what detail? Who processes them and by what means? Who makes the decisions? How is their execution controlled?

To provide satisfactory answers to these questions in the Soviet case and to follow our carload of ball bearings through all the recesses of the information system, nothing short of a treatise on the organization and functioning of the Soviet economy would do. Significantly enough, such a treatise would also go a long way toward answering the question how Russia is ruled. Information flows point toward centers of power. "Knowledge is power," asserted Francis Bacon.

But power wielded is not necessarily in proportion to the knowledge possessed. An acute disproportion of this kind seems to lie at the heart of Soviet planners' present difficulties. The Stalinist solution to economic planning and administration which still survives in the Soviet Union amounts to highly centralized, authoritarian decision-making, based on inadequate information and imposed upon the enterprises by long chains of bureaucratic command. To the extent that up-to-date, well-coördinated information is lacking, decisions—including some key choices which affect the course of economic development for years to come—tend to be based on rules of thumb and intuition. But intuition is a poor substitute for information in directing a complex, modern economy. Uninformed choices are costly and wasteful. The famous mathematician, L. V. Kantorovich, estimates that the introduction of more rational methods of economic planning and administration would raise Soviet industrial output by as much as 50 percent without additional inputs.

In the Soviet economy central planners decide by-and-large not only what but also how to produce. In this system, an enterprise, throughout its life cycle, is essentially a recipient of com-

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mands and a supplier of data on which subsequent commands are in turn based.

Let us examine first the birth permit of a Soviet enterprise, its so-called *proiekt*. Central planners have a virtual monopoly of investment decisions. Through the annual investment plan they apportion funds among industries and, within an industry, among individual projects. No industrial establishment may be legally built without a detailed *proiekt, viz.* engineering design, cost estimates and blueprints, prepared by a central designing organization according to the planners' directives, approved by the latter and then transmitted to the builders for execution.

One is immediately impressed by the extraordinary amount of detailed information reported to the planners and sent out by them as orders in connection with these decisions. The project of the Novo Lipetsk steel mill, for example, comprises 91 volumes totaling 70,000 pages (one is not surprised to learn that the designers are paid by the sheet . . .). "Literally everything is anticipated in these blueprints, the emplacement of each nail, lamp or washstand. Only one aspect of the project is not considered at all: its economic effectiveness."[2] In fact, the actual cost of building a factory is difficult and often impossible to establish. "Nor is anyone really interested in it." The same is true of projects for new machinery.[3]

Thus, paradoxically enough, while the planners receive and send out literally carloads of engineering data in connection with each important investment decision, they remain ignorant of perhaps the most crucial implications of their choices—the project's economic effectiveness and the cost of the alternatives foregone.

The basic operational directive which is to guide the Soviet factory manager in his day-by-day activities is his annual *Tekhpromfinplan*. This voluminous document sets out for each year in advance the volume and assortment of output, the methods of production to be employed, the cost and physical amount of each input to be used, the financial results (profits, cost reduction, etc.) to be aimed at in each quarter and month, and much more.

Preparation of that document is both time- and labor-consuming. It takes more than six months to complete the job. And then, as was recently disclosed, a curious thing happens. "This

[2] *Izvestia,* April 20, 1963; *Ekonomicheskaia gazeta,* November 10, 1962, p. 21.
[3] T. Khachaturov, *Voprosy ekonomiki,* 1963, No. 11, p. 31.

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most important planning document does not perform the role assigned to it. Instead of serving the purposes of the day-by-day operational guidance, it is filed away in the factory's archives and in the Sovnarkhoz's archives and is consulted only in extreme cases."[4]

There appear to be at least two excellent reasons for this anticlimactic action. First, despite or perhaps because of its mass of detail, the *Tekhpromfinplan* tends to be unrealistic and to lack consistency right from the start. Out of one thousand such documents recently examined by Soviet economists, not a single one was found to be balanced out and internally consistent. Another diffculty is that the planners are attempting, as it were, to use a snapshot, taken once a year, where a continuously working movie camera is needed. The economy, especially such a dynamic one as the Soviet, does not stand still. "Life alters plans every month, every week. Meanwhile, it takes no less than two or three months to recompute the *Tekhpromfinplan* of a typical machine-building factory with its 30 to 40 thousand indicators."[5]

The supply plan is another important lever of control in central planners' hands. As a general rule, Soviet enterprises are not allowed to sell producer goods to each other except by previous authorization and in amounts prescribed by higher authorities. Each summer the enterprise files with a regional *Sovnarkhoz* (Economic Council) a request (*zaiavka*) for the various supplies it will presumably need during the next year. Negotiations take place, in the course of which the original requests are usually pared down, consolidated and sent to republic ministries. In the case of some 18,000 commodities deemed to be of a national importance, final coördination and allocation take place at the central level, by Gosplan and the Sovnarkhoz U.S.S.R. The downward flow of commands takes place and eventually each enterprise is provided with buying permits and selling orders which enable it to conclude contracts with suppliers. This system was designed to prevent direct, uncoördinated dealings among the enterprises and is quite effective in that: "The buyer is separated from the seller by a long barrier of agencies and organizations. . . . For example, documents concerning distribution of tires pass through 32 echelons, ball bearings through 20 agencies. . . . Each time plans are changed, this long process is

[4] Iu. Cherniak, *Planovoe khoziaistvo,* 1963, No. 8, p. 53.
[5] *Ibid.* See also *Izvestia,* May 30, 1963, p. 3.

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repeated."[6] The prohibitive amount of paperwork involved may be gathered from the well-publicized experience of the Moscow automobile plant named after Likhachev. The documentation required for it to obtain its annual supply of ball bearings from the adjacent GPZ factory weighs over 400 pounds and is handled by 14 agencies.

After this laborious process is completed, the Likhachev factory will obtain the permit to buy the ball bearings it needs. But will it now get the ball bearings? This is by no means certain. In fact, its supplier, the GPZ factory, received as many as 4,000 complaints about the non-delivery or delayed delivery of ball bearings during the first six months of 1963. Persistent shortages of ball bearings have been reported throughout the country, and in some cases led to work stoppages of entire factories. The fault was attributed to errors and miscalculations in the supply plans. The same is true of various other producer goods that are centrally allocated. In the Soviet economy, which is run without adequate inventories and reserves, any such shortage tends to spread—through what might be called a "bottleneck multiplier" —to higher stages of production, where it gives rise to magnified losses. For example, due to a miscalculation in the supply of fanbelts, tens of thousands of tractors and trucks remained idle last year and grain went unharvested. The cumulative loss to the economy may thus be out of all proportion to the value of the original item and "for lack of a nail" a production battle may be lost. According to Professor V. V. Novozhilov, malfunctioning of the supply system costs the Soviet industry each year roughly 25 percent of its potential output. No wonder. How can a plant manager present detailed requests for next year's supplies and equipment before knowing what products his factory will be asked to turn out and in what amounts? Even if coördination of data at the subsequent stages of the bureaucratic process were perfect and if each supplier adhered strictly to his plan, shortages would still persist as long as the paper pyramids are erected on such shaky foundations.

III

Some generalization can now be made about the informational aspects of Soviet economic planning. The planners obviously attempt to obtain extremely detailed information from the en-

[6] N. Razumov, *Voprosy ekonomiki*, 1963, No. 7, p. 129.

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terprises and to direct their activities in equally minute detail. Professor Birman, Pro-rector of the Moscow Institute of National Economy, characterizes this approach as "the vicious attempt to gather in one document a whole ocean of commodities and to track the flows of each of them down from the center, . . . an attempt to anticipate and plan each motion a worker makes, each turn of the screw."[7]

The system's ability to handle and digest the required data appears to be taxed to the limit. Data are collected and processed by seventeenth-century methods, complains Academician Liusternik. "Central planning agencies get literally drowned in the avalanches of documentation." And an expensive drowning it is: over ten million specialized officials are engaged in collecting and processing economic data.[8] At the same time that central planners are "drowning in an ocean of data," they nevertheless suffer from a shortage of information. The knowledge which they ultimately distill from that ocean is largely of the wrong kind; it is useless or inadequate for making those crucial choices which, in the Soviet economy, they alone can make. It enables them to determine the emplacement of each nail in a new steel mill. But should the steel mill have been built in the first place? "Knowledge is power," but only to the extent that it renders the decision-maker aware of the various alternative courses of action open to him and of their probable implications.

From this viewpoint, the ultimate yield of the "avalanches of data" descending upon the Soviet planners is less than modest. Thus, at best, only two or three alternative variants of the annual national economic plan are considered by the planners before their final choice is made. Academician Gnedenko points out that "one cannot even talk of selecting the optimum variant" under these conditions.[9] And its companion piece, the national supply plan, is prepared in only one or two variants.

In his important speech of February 14, 1964, Premier Khrushchev describes the way in which the key output and investment decisions were taken by Gosplan. "A circle, in geometry, is divided into 360 grades. Suppose now that these 360 parts are all apportioned among committees, ministries and

[7] *Ekonomicheskaia gazeta,* March 30, 1963, p. 7.

[8] N. Kovalev, *Voprosy ekonomiki,* 1962, No. 8, p. 101; G. Pirogov, *Planovoe khoziaistvo,* 1963, No. 8, p. 49.

[9] B. Gnedenko, "Pro matematichni metody v ekonomichnykh doslidzhenniakh," *Ekonomika radianskoi Ukrainy,* 1960, No. 4, p. 80. See also *Izvestia,* November 7, 1963, p. 3.

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departments of Gosplan, each of which takes care of only the segment allotted to it." Then, apparently, the agency in charge of "a segment" sets its output goal for the next year simply by mechanical extrapolation of its average rate of growth over recent years. Investment funds were apportioned among industries by similar means. Bureaucrats in charge of these crucial decisions often wear departmental blinkers and neglect interrelationships among sectors and products. Unbelievable as it may seem, even production of tires was planned without reference to the output of motor vehicles.

Setting targets by extrapolation obviously favors the established industries and products and impedes innovation. This conservative bias makes shifts in priorities, as set by the political leaders, difficult to implement. Khrushchev has related the difficulties encountered on that count in implementing the crash program of expansion of the chemical industry launched in 1958.[10] The bureaucratic Frankenstein created in order to impose the leaders' preferences upon the economy has developed distinct preferences, momentum and inertia of its own. Trotsky's predictions are coming true.

Khrushchev's vitriolic attacks on Gosplan's methods, the far-reaching administrative reorganization of the economy following the November 1962 Plenum, the virtual scrapping of the Seven Year Plan in June 1963 and the enactment of the new Two Year Plan—all have dramatized the extent of the malfunctioning of the economy and the top leadership's recognition of the need for reform. What, then, has been prescribed to cure the ailment?

An influential group of conservatives among the Soviet planning executives and economists, while agreeing that the present system of planning does not work satisfactorily, attribute its failures to insufficient detail of information received and orders issued by the planners. They argue accordingly that the use of prices as the basis for decisions should be further restricted and replaced by ever more detailed calculations in physical terms. Decisions concerning the assortment and quality of the product which are still largely left to the managers should be taken away from them. But who would handle the huge volume of data required for this attempt to anticipate and program everything in advance? The centralizers have a ready answer: high speed electronic computers would do the job.

[10] N. S. Khrushchev's speeches, *Izvestia*, November 20, 1962; April 24, 1963; June 29, 1963.

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There is some truth in the centralizers' diagnosis but not in their prescription. Academician Nemchinov points out that since Soviet prices fail to reflect the actual cost of resources, managerial incentives based on them often work at cross-purposes and "those commodities which are in shortest supply are also often the least profitable for the enterprises to produce." But, after all, the existing prices and incentives are of the planners' own making and could be redesigned so as to assure that, to quote Professor Liberman, "what is good for the national economy would also become profitable for the enterprise."[11] Instead, the centralizers propose to eliminate the existing feedbacks altogether and advocate an attempt to program in advance, from the center, "each motion a worker makes, each turn of the screw. . . ."

This attempt is utopian. As V. M. Glushkov has recently shown, it implies that the central planners would have to consider several quintillion relationships among the various products, probably the largest integer ever considered in economic analysis. Glushkov adds that even if high-speed electronic computers performing 30,000 operations a second were harnessed to that task, it would require one million computers working without interruption for several years.[12] And, of course, the economy would not remain frozen, waiting for the computations to be completed.

Glushkov's picturesque illustration dramatizes the fact that the Soviet economic bureaucracy cannot be catapulted from the seventeenth into the twentieth century by the mere use of electronic computers. Academician Berg compares it to the effort to modernize a spade by attaching an electric motor. "The organizations which computers are supposed to eliminate," writes another critic, "try instead themselves to apply the computers. . . . The existing system of economic information just cannot be adapted to new conditions."[13]

The well-known Liberman proposals are in fact extremely moderate compared to others which have thus far passed unnoticed in the West. Liberman's central idea is: let the enterprise

[11] Liberman's proposals are discussed in M. I. Goldman, "Economic Controversy in the Soviet Union," *Foreign Affairs*, April 1963.

[12] V. M. Glushkov, "Ekonomika i kibernetika," *Vestnik akademii nauk SSSR*, 1963, No. 10, p. 11 f.

[13] G. Kh. Popov, "Elektronnaia sistema ekonomicheskoi informatsii," *Vestnik moskovskogo universiteta*, 1962, No. 5, p. 29, 21.

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decide how to produce, once the planners have told it *what* to produce. Under this scheme, the higher authorities would continue to set output and assortment goals for each enterprise, decide who buys what products and ration out material supplies. A prohibitive amount of paperwork would still be required. To paraphrase Birman, while the Central Planning Board would no longer have to track down "each motion a worker makes," it would still have to calculate the orbit of each nut and bolt manufactured in the Soviet Union and to regulate the quintillions of relationships resulting therefrom.

Birman's own proposals for reform are perhaps the most far-reaching of all. He proposes to do away with all physical output targets except for two or three dozen key products such as steel, oil, electric power. For all the other millions of products the enterprise itself would decide what to produce so as to maximize its profits on the basis of orders received from wholesale trade and from industrial consumers. Central allocation of producer goods would be abolished. Instead, enterprises would be permitted to purchase materials and machinery directly from producers at government-fixed prices. Enterprises would compete for orders rather than evade them. Automatic self-regulation by the forces of the buyers' market would replace the present system of guaranteed sales and uncertain supplies. The enterprises' compliance with the planners' broad goals would be assured primarily by indirect regulation through prices, incentives, credit and financial policies, rather than by direct controls and communications with each manager.

An enormous saving would thus be achieved in terms of the information flows, of the amount of knowledge the planners would have to obtain and transmit. Except for the few products already mentioned, the central planners' task would be largely limited to setting the optimum proportions among the key aggregates—national income, investment, the rates of growth of the basic sectors and regions. In setting up these targets the planners would make wide use of mathematical models constructed with the aid of electronic computers.

IV

This step from muddling through to modeling would greatly improve the effectiveness of Soviet economic planning. Instead of the present two or three variants of the national economic

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plan, a great many alternative courses of action could be appraised. The plan finally selected would be far more likely to assure the fulfillment of the planners' preferences at the lowest possible cost. The planners would then be dealing with the proper subjects for decision and policy. Substantial decentralization of decision-making would be achieved but, in the final analysis, while sacrificing most of their rights to receive reports and issue orders, the planners might actually have more knowledge and correspondingly more power.

How would this power be used? The focus of the debate shifts increasingly to the fundamental questions: Who is going to make the decisions? Whose preferences are the plans to implement? Until recently, discussion of these topics would have been unthinkable. Mathematical economists were going out of their way to emphasize that they intended to use their models solely in order to suggest the most economical ways of reaching the planners' goals, without questioning or analyzing the goals themselves.

But, in the light of Khrushchev's remarks upon Gosplan's targeting methods, the planners' preferences turned out to differ from and even to conflict with those of the political leadership. The implications of this state of affairs were not lost upon the mathematical economists. At a recent conference a mathematician, V. A. Volkonskii, objected to the view expressed by a conservative economist, Boiarskii, that the model-builders should take decisions on ends as given and limit themselves to the search for optimum means of reaching these predetermined ends. This would mean, Volkonskii argues, "leaving such decisions to the practitioners, without any attempt at theoretical justification."[14]

But what is the proper theoretical basis for making decisions on ends? Why, for example, should one product-mix be chosen in preference to other possible combinations of products? Volkonskii proposes "the democratic approach" to this key decision. The planners should ascertain what are the actual preferences of the majority of the population and follow them—an implicit reinstatement of the principle of consumer sovereignty.

The very fact that these sensitive topics can now be publicly discussed by scholars throws revealing light upon the extent of

[14] *Problemy optimal'nogo planirovania, proektirovania i upravlenia proizvodstvom,* Moscow, 1963, p. 502–504.

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relaxation of political controls in that area. In the past, political leaders had jealously guarded their monopoly with respect to decisions on ends against any infringement, real or imagined, on the part of economists. A whole generation of brilliant pioneers of mathematical economics perished during the first Five Year Plan, having been accused of "mathematical deviation in planning," of wanting "to crank out the plan's goals" with their desk calculators. In his letter to Yaroshenko, Stalin specifically excluded any problems of economic planning from the area in which economists were allowed to roam.

But times have changed. The present generation of mathematical programmers has more to offer than the early pioneers of the twenties. Computers have taken the place of desk-calculators, highly sophisticated econometric methods have been developed. And, if economists have more to offer, leaders have now less to lose since various key decisions on goals have, in the course of time, slipped anyway into the hands of the Gosplan bureaucrats. In this predicament, the leadership may be inclined to utilize the economists' expert knowledge and to let them participate in some of the basic decisions on ends. This is implied in Khrushchev's announcement, on February 14, 1964, of the creation of a new council to be composed of scientists and economists, along with political leaders and planning practitioners, which will deal with key decisions on economic and technical progress.

What are the probable effects of the various reforms in planning methods proposed by Soviet scholars? A Western observer tends naturally to sympathize with the would-be reformers' courageous efforts, in the expectation that they would promote efficiency, rationality and freedom of choice. How justified are such expectations?

Mathematical economists believe that the substitution of programming methods for rules of thumb in Soviet planning would raise the aggregate product by at least 50 percent.[15] Conjectural as such estimates are, the efficiency with which the Soviet system operates would undoubtedly be greatly improved. We would be well advised, however, to keep in mind that rationally allocated resources may serve highly irrational ends. Indeed, to the extent

[15] *Trudy nauchnogo soveshchania po primenenii matematicheskikh metodov v ekonomicheskikh issledovaniakh i planirovanii,* Vol. I, Moscow, 1961, p. 126. It is interesting to note that Novozhilov attributes at least one-half of this potential gain to the improvement in informational efficiency of planning which the use of mathematical methods would make possible.

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that we mistrust the Soviet ends, it might be "rational" on our part to root for the all-out centralizers ridiculed by Birman. Their attempts to plan everything would soon turn everyone into a planner. And an economy à la Glushkov where everyone is engaged in paperwork may not be efficient but is, at least, likely to be peaceful.

The crucial decisions remain, therefore, those on ends, and here the participation of Soviet scholars may have a humanizing influence. It is significant that their first venture into this long forbidden area resulted in Volkonskii's eloquent plea for respecting consumers' choices.[16] It would be wrong to believe that all mathematical programmers are likely to share Volkonskii's concern for democratic principles. Computers might well be used in order to invade the still remaining areas of privacy and freedom. Thus, P. P. Maslov envisions a mathematical model of the utilization of people's lives, compiled in terms of man-days of life, work, rest and self-education,[17] clearly an invaluable tool in the hands of a government that has never been reluctant to utilize lives for its purposes. Absolute knowledge may corrupt absolutely.

The ultimate effect which planning by computers may have on the freedom of producers' choice is as conjectural as in the case of consumer choice. Birman's vision of a partly decentralized economy where important choices are left to the plant managers' initiative may not be borne out by future events. The use of computers in American industry has, in many cases, promoted centralization. Whatever these ultimate effects may be, the current transition from charismatics to mathematics in Soviet economic planning is bound to have a profound influence upon its efficiency, upon the style of leadership and the economic climate of the country.

[16] Another straw in the wind is the publication in *Pravda* (February 24 and 25, 1964) of an article by Professor A. Arzumanian, an economist, questioning the prevailing policy of a preferential growth of heavy industry.

[17] *Voprosy filosofii*, 1962, No. 3.

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THE FABRIC OF AFRICAN CULTURES

By Ezekiel Mphahlele

Mother-of-someone,
Come out and see:
here's a son-in-law,
he brings rain
and cold.

Sister, daughter-of-someone,
you go
to the home of strangers;
do you truly
desert your mother?

Come out and see
your daughter's gown;
our bride
she's wrapped in silk.

You're so fair,
girl, so fair:
What had you to do
with such a coalblack
groom?

What had you to do
with me,
my girl?—
you found me in such rags.

Come my love,
let's run away
to shanty town,
tin-and-sack town,
let's run away
and lose ourselves
in shanty town.
The girl said No-no,
my Ma will come for me
Pa will kill me.
I'll go alone, then,
I'll find another bride
and lose myself
in shanty town.
No, don't go,
my love,
I won't come
but don't go.
And I went to shanty town
and broke to pieces-pieces
the heart of my beloved.

THE music floats in the night across the vast complex of African townships (or "locations" as they are called in South Africa). It is heard in all parts of this black metropolis because it is a loud and robust music. The singing dancers—all young men and women and boys and girls—stamp it out on the street each night for a whole month before a wedding until it sounds as if the musicians were trapped in a sunset-to-midnight orgy. The friends of the prospective groom and bride come and join in the dance and song. And so the theme of the music unfolds.

The second lyric quoted above, unlike the first, tells the story of delinquency. There is a ring of urgency in the words. And as the moon goes down, as if poised for a slow-motion hurtle behind the horizon, the musicians disperse. Tomorrow night again, they will sing. And here the city boy and girl have come in at a

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certain point of cultural continuity, a continuity that is being lived by country folk. The music is still intact; only the lyrics are drawn from city life.

Somewhere else in a dance hall a jazz combo is creating music; music taken from American Negro jazz and hammered out on the anvil of the South African experience: slum living, thuggery, police raids, job-hunting, shifting ghettos, and so on. The penny-whistle takes the key melody, with bass and drums keeping the rhythm. On and off the sax weaves its way through the penny-whistle notes. The musicians grope their way through the notes, expressing by this improvisation the uncertainty and restlessness of urban life which rejects the Negro: its expectations, its violence. They play in order to escape from the pain of rejection and to assert their human dignity.

Those who dance to this music are also caught up in the tangle. They also improvise, although this is not immediately important. But there is something distinctly physical about their dance idiom, the way in which the bodies move—physical in a way the European idiom is not.

And so an urban culture has evolved. It is an escape route for a people on the run; but it is the only virile culture in South Africa, beside which the derivative and fragmented one of the whites (English and Afrikaans) looks sterile; it is something that sustains the black man.

There is another kind of music. This is the four-part choral music composed by Africans. And it is celebrated at annual *eisteddfods* where schools and adult choral societies compete. Some of the music is pastoral, full of nostalgia about pastoral tribal life. But much of it talks of freedom, exhorts people toward unity; it is about passes and liquor raids and police terror. This music has stood the test of time and does not follow fashions as pop music does.

Among the 4,000,000 Africans who are now urbanized, there are several who maintain links with their people in the country, because they are relative newcomers in the towns. There is also a large population of female domestics who live on employers' premises and are in constant touch with their country folk. They are highly sophisticated, dress smartly in pay-while-you-wear clothes, but are not involved in the rough-and-tumble existence of location people. They carry back to their "reserves" transistor radios and gramophones, concertinas, mouth organs, town gad-

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gets and foods, and new-style clothing. Those who envy them go to the towns to look for work, or allow themselves to be recruited for mine labor. The system of migrant labor is thus consolidated. The intercourse between town and country is thus established and maintained. Family life is broken in the process. But the human traffic keeps moving, like droves of ants, with a tragic inevitability. The lives of the 3,000,000 Africans in the rural areas have consequently been disturbed. The land does not hold much for them any more. The members of the family who have gone to the towns will send money when they can and when they have not been swallowed up by urban life. The Christian church, the school, the occasional mission clinic and hospital exert an influence of another kind.

Then there are the 3,000,000 Africans working on white people's farms as labor tenants. They have, like the town folk, cut their tribal moorings, and owe no allegiance to a chief. Here cultural life seems to turn around in circles, finding no nourishment from either rural or urban life. Something about these people hangs in suspension, as if waiting for a fulfillment, the energy for which they are incapable of generating.

Any visitor who sees an urban African smartly dressed in American-style clothes, who sees him go to a cinema, read comics and paperback thrillers (as well as the English newspapers), who sees him collect jazz records—in short, the visitor who sees him live in town like one who is committed to it, and lives by its assumptions, may think the African has wholly surrendered his traditional values to an urban life that is a bad imitation of the "white" way of life. The townsman may well have done this. Indeed, if he was born in town, there is nothing to surrender; he merely takes his place in the scheme of things.

But there is a definite line of continuity in African cultures which acts on individuals and groups like the string by which a kite is held to the ground; it tacks and weaves and noses up, a toy of the wind while it remains up there; and yet it responds to the continual tug the boy gives it toward the ground. Again, the stresses and tensions and segregated existence of South African urban life have the effect of evoking the traditional African sense of community so that the individual draws strength from the group. The wedding ceremony itself is a mixture of civil, Christian and African customs. Many more people come to the wedding feast than have been formally invited;

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the relationships between aunts, uncles, fathers and mothers maintain a hard but acceptable African code during the negotiations for the bride and during the wedding celebrations. In the midst of all these, receptions are held in dance halls and a jazz band is hired for the occasion.

At funerals family relationships also follow an African code. Each night for a whole week before the burial of the deceased, relatives, friends and acquaintances gather in his house to sing hymns, speechify, always in praise; they drink and pray. And altogether it is turned into a social occasion. A few days after the burial, relatives busy themselves with the washing of the bedding in the whole house. A year later, the widow will shed her black mourning, and she is then permitted by custom to put on any color of dress. Birth and the child's "coming out" (of the house) are also causes for get-togethers and a "little tea-and-cake." These are age-old customs taken from tradition and given an urban form.

Always Africans gravitate toward one another, even in the towns. A European suburb always looks dead on weekends. Most likely the inhabitants have gone out for a "little quiet"; or they are at the sports grounds; or they have gone picnicking. Although they may be thrown together in public places, it seems to be regarded as an unfortunate necessity. Africans, on the other hand, swarm the streets on weekends, just walking about and visiting. There is a continuous din in our areas: radios are switched on full blast. And even in this melting pot that is urban life, human beings matter more to us than things. We are not always, like Europeans, trying to master things, conquer or tame our setting. Formal education throws up individual talent which in turn, side by side with a money economy, builds up an individualism that creates problems unknown in traditional societies, where the welfare of the group took precedence over that of the individual. It is because of this, perhaps, that African writers, artists (who now do not serve group religious interests as the traditional sculptor did), teachers, doctors, occupy a special place as individuals in relation to their fellow men.

Worship in the so-called established churches, but particularly in the "separatist" or independent churches, has taken on a theatrical-revivalist character, and it is now clearly a pleasurable rather than a painful experience. There is a striking similarity between independent churches in Africa and their American

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Negro counterparts. Furthermore, belief in one God has reinforced in the African mind his reverence for and trust in ancestral spirits rather than exorcised them.

When I was a boy in a slum "location" of Pretoria in the 1930s, we were taught African ways of behavior at home: to take something with two hands from a grown-up; to curtsy while receiving something from an adult if you were a girl; never to occupy a seat while a grown-up stands; never to drink water before an adult if one was sent to fetch him some; never to sit in the company of adults or take part in their conversation; to allow the eldest child to take the first pick of anything given to the children to share, and to make the others follow in descending order of age. As much as city conditions allow, the family is still regarded by us as the center of society that must hold, whatever else may crumble around us. Our people take strong offense if a relative, no matter how distant, comes to our neighborhood and goes away without calling on them.

These are the broad elements of the "African Personality" that we can be sure are common to most of our societies on this continent: the place of the extended family in the social structure; the sense of communal responsibility; the tendency to gravitate toward other people rather than toward things and places; reverence for ancestral spirits; audience participation in entertainment activities. For the rest, we are all ambivalent personalities, switching from one form of response to another as we find convenient. Think of the educated African trying to concentrate on his private studies for a university degree in his house amidst loud street singing and dancing; think of the "been-to" who comes back home with an American or European wife whom he has then to initiate (or decline to do so) into the unending maze of relationships running through his extended family. This ambivalence is part of the "African Personality," and its nuances defy the politician's definition of the concept. Perhaps it is the artist, the writer, the musician, the actor who will reveal it for us—even that portion of it that lies in our ambivalence.

All this should be a warning to those Africans who think of a culture as an anthropological thing that belongs in the past and must be reconstructed as a mere landmark or a monument; the here and now of its struggle to come to terms with modern technology, with the confrontation of other ways of life, must

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give as valid a definition to our culture as its historical past. When one sees the granite monument that Indian culture and civilization are, and what a barricade against change they have been through the years, one begins to wonder if after all the African is not at a greater advantage for being able to absorb and contain the shock of change—if one can say this without justifying and approving the ruthless battering down of much of his culture by overzealous Christian proselytizing.

The most recent laws that have serious consequences for cultural growth and self-realization in South Africa are the Bantu Authorities and Bantu Education Acts. The former provides the government with an instrument for splitting African communities into ethnic groups, and through the latter it has devised a system of education that trains the African to serve his ethnic group on the assumption that his people must not be given weapons whereby they can compete with the European. The perverted logic of it is that this provides an opportunity for the black man to live his own culture (meaning obviously tribal culture) and saves him years of frustration which lie before him if he tries to make a living in what has already been pegged as white man's territory, and in a society that disowns him. This of necessity means an inferior education and undermines the advance Africans have made in producing a considerable intellectual force that is now making itself felt in the politics of resistance. This law supplements ethnic grouping in breaking the back of African nationalism, which has built up over the last 50 years to the point where intertribal marriages are commonplace and tribal divisions, particularly in the towns, are a thing of the past.

Whatever happens, it is quite clear that the proletarian culture will continue to gain strength if only as an unconscious defiance against the process of fragmentation.

II

Everywhere in black Africa one sees two main types of urban communities: the type represented by Johannesburg, Brazzaville, Dakar and Nairobi on the one hand, and that typified by Lagos and Accra on the other. In the former category we see distinctly segregated black and white communities. The institutions in European areas are usually geographically or economically or legally inaccessible to the Africans, except the élite. So the Negroes are thrown on their resources: they make their

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own music, create their own fun, borrowing what they want from European technology and art. Life is invariably much more vibrant, robust and full of zest in these Negro ghettos than in the white areas, whose culture must be derivative and linked with the metropolitan centers, wriggling away without direction, like a lizard's tail cut off from the body.

The capitals of English-speaking Africa, on the other hand, are solidly African in atmosphere, if not wholly in architecture. Before independence, whites here also shut Africans out of their so-called "government reservation areas," but lately have come to realize that they were shutting themselves in. The Africans have developed their "high-life" music and dance, as have South Africans their "kwela." There is a tremendous amount of self-confidence among English-speaking Africans because British indirect rule left much of their educational culture intact. But they have a high regard for British educational institutions, of which they are products, and a traditional distrust for American education. The encounter with more and more Americans through the Peace Corps and research students may have the effect of at least preventing the youth from adopting anti-American slogans and labels, and this in turn demands that they establish their relationships with Americans and British independently within the limits of current anti-West group attitudes. This is particularly so because British educators and administrators have played no mean role in instilling this distrust of American education, and it can therefore be outgrown. Certainly revulsion is setting in against Western educational institutions in general. There are paradoxes here: one is that while the British have wanted, through indirect rule, to guarantee their subjects cultural independence, they have tried to prejudice them against the non-British institutions of the West; another is that the longer it takes for the communities under British influence to revolutionize their curricula in secondary school and university to fit African political and socio-economic aspirations, the louder Western institutions are renounced. Indeed the renunciation comes mostly from university students and not from the élite or the huge civil-service class that has emerged from a British education; the educated African does not collect *objets d'art,* and neither the artist nor the writer can hope for an audience among these groups for a long time to come. Their solid African-ness expresses itself in other ways.

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African intellectual activity is derivative, because traditionally we did not analyze and formulate intellectual systems. Painting also is largely a foreign tradition. And the West African who comes out of art school, which is without exception part of a university, finds he has to do something desperate to relate to his immediate environment, in order to rid himself of the European influences that have been imposed upon him by his mentors. Because he has come into a line of continuity in a European tradition, and his people have no painting tradition apart from rock paintings that reflected a stylized group attitude, the student artist has no way of knowing what influences are bad and which will advance his work. His best course, then, is to relate to the monumental tradition of wood and bronze sculpture that tends to overwhelm him.

His problem here is to use this tradition in such a way as to recapture not just the image but also the original impulse that produced it; and this, on impossible terms: society's needs have changed to some extent; the chiefs who once patronized this religious traditional art have lost their power or are no more. But the very continuity of his people's life and its organization at deeper levels is sufficient for a real artist to draw his material and styles from. Those who have already begun to do this are but a negligible number.

The English-speaking novelist, poet, playwright in West Africa is very much an individualist. He is little influenced by his next-door neighbor, the French-speaking Negro, who demands that a black man's writing should give expression to the African's revulsion against European culture and re-assert his own people's cultural values—that it should follow a program. Yet Ghanaian poets like George Awoonor-Williams and Kwesi Brew, the Nigerians like Chinua Achebe (novelist), Wole Soyinka (playwright), John Pepper Clark (poet)—to mention only representative names—show in their work the unconscious urge to come to terms with their traditional past, to determine their position in relation to it. Stylistically, all these fall in the British tradition. They are, however, giving English a fresh and new usage.

Except for Amos Tutuola of "Palmwine Drinkard" fame, writers in this part of Africa are university graduates. They and other graduates can now look back on their past and on the strands of continuity in the culture of their communities without a sense of shame. They are now keen to collect the oral lit-

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erature of their societies for research purposes, to try to locate the point where the rupture set in, and to see what use they can make of the literature. Oral forms will certainly be of greater interest to those who want to write in their vernacular languages. An African writer will argue that he chooses to write in English so as to reach a wider reading public; and he will say that in his formative years he was too busy learning to master the tools that gave the colonial overlord power to give attention to his own vernacular as a literary medium. Literacy in English was one of these tools. But as English is only a political medium of communication—spoken only by the educated for inter-tribal understanding and not by the masses—there is not the setting to nourish the writer's language as there is for writers who are surrounded by people who speak English all the time. He finds that for the sake of authenticity he has to continue to listen to the speech idiom of his people and try to put across his thoughts in English without fear of sounding un-English.

East African writing shows the same trend as that in West Africa. The problems are mostly similar. The exception is that Swahili is a very close competitor of English as a literary language, in a way West African languages are not. It has evolved a rich vocabulary and idiom and has an old poetic tradition. Novelists still have to emerge who will use Swahili. Meantime there are those who write in English, like Kenya's novelists James Ngugi and Grace Ogot and others, who are publishing short stories and political and social comment. There is the same general theme running through their work as in West African writing—the relation between the new and the old. In addition, there has been the ten-year-long state of emergency and the Mau Mau phenomenon; one does not begin to feel the degree to which these ten years shook Kenyans until one reads their stories.

Africans in this region have not yet been given the opportunity to decide whether they want to be fully committed to urban life or not. A self-contained urban culture has to be given time to evolve. Already an exciting popular guitar music is flourishing. East Africans who, like South Africans, have a marked sense of melody and harmony, have put the guitar to vital popular use in a way West Africans have done with percussion instruments.

Outside the Kamba carvings, which have now become slick souvenir craftwork for the tourist industry, there are very interesting carvings of a complex surrealist form produced by the

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Makonde of South Tanganyika. Carving as an art is not so widespread here as in West Africa. There are also several painters with remarkable ability. As they have little to refer to in the form of a three-dimensional traditional idiom, such as the West African wood carvings, the painters have to rely entirely on the crafts and the verbal arts of their people. This is in itself very rich material. They also reflect in their work the shock that accompanies a confrontation with a foreign culture. Because so many graduates from the fine-arts departments of the colleges are absorbed into the teaching profession, there have emerged less than a handful of full-time painters and sculptors in this region in the last 28 years during which the fine arts have been taught at Makerere College in Uganda. Those who are coming out now are becoming conscious of the heavy missionary influence in their art and want to do something about it. If the dialogue about the "African Personality"—however uncritical it may be—achieves nothing else, it will have at least shaken these artists out of their complacency and created a climate in which the purely representational idiom that abounds at present will take on the dimension of social criticism or social significance.

Writing and painting in South Africa, as can be imagined, give expression to the physical and mental agony experienced in a life I have intimated earlier. There is plenty of protest, rejection of the status quo; there are also romantic-escapist moods, and somewhere rejection meets acceptance. There is sensuous imagery, and the writer and the artist record minute-by-minute experience, quivering with an impressionism that they have assimilated from American Negro jazz and literature. These artists, like their communities, take their African-ness for granted and merely assert their human dignity; the African in them is there, resisting and yielding in turn to the pressures of town life and European values. Fiction writers like Richard Rive, Alex la Guma, Can Themba, Casey Motsisi, Arthur Maimane, Peter Abrahams and others take their cue mainly from the American Negro tradition.

There are several vernacular writers. Sotho, Xhosa and Zulu have been literary media for nearly a century now. Much of the oral literature has also been recorded over the 40 years that Bantu languages have been the subject of university study and research in South Africa. There are Bantu novels with adult ideas as distinct from the volume of small "readers" that are

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being published for school children in and outside South Africa. Some of these novels have become classics. It is significant that Bantu literature in South Africa engages itself with the theme of alienation as a result of the impact of European culture on the indigenous—a subject that does not worry the writer who uses English; the latter falls in the urban stream of consciousness in which people are sure not only that they want to be city dwellers but also what kind they want to be.

III

There are Africans who, prompted by their vision of a culturally united Africa, feel that a Pan-African approach to the promotion of culture is more important than a national one. These are Negroes of French influence. In order that these assimilated men should search for the roots of African culture, their poetry, like that of Sédar Senghor, Birago and David Diop, recalls the world of ancestral spirits, masks, shrines, sacrifices and smoking blood, naked feet dancing, and so on.

But it is only the élite who have been assimilated and who assert this importance of being Negro—*négritude*. The masses are naturally unaffected, and there is the same basic continuity in their lives that we see in most of black Africa. Again, the symbols of African culture recalled by *négritude*-inspired poetry are really the outward visible features; their essence or substance eludes the poet and French rhetoric does not make the search for it easier.

One only begins to understand the humiliation that the assimilated African feels, and his revulsion and anger against the European way of life, when one sees the extent to which the *centre culturel français* has entrenched itself as an institution in the former French colonies, resisting any non-French influence. Africans here are still very much dependent on institutions of higher education in France, and the African students there do not take *négritude* seriously. Dakar University is still as French as ever, while the universities in Ghana, Nigeria and East Africa are now independent of London.

It may not be amiss to quote an excerpt from a talk I gave at a conference in Dakar on African literature in April 1963:

> Who is so stupid as to deny the historical fact of négritude as both a protest and a positive assertion of African cultural values? All this is valid. What I do not accept is the way in which too much of the poetry inspired

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by it romanticizes Africa—as a symbol of innocence, purity and artless primitiveness. I feel insulted when some people imply that Africa is not also a violent continent. I am a violent person, and proud of it because it is often a healthy human state of mind; some day I'm going to plunder, rape, set things on fire; I'm going to cut someone's throat; I'm going to subvert a government; I'm going to organize a coup d'état; yes, I'm going to oppress my own people; I'm going to hunt down the rich fat black men who bully the small, weak black men and destroy them; I'm going to become a capitalist, and woe to all who cross my path or who want to be my servants or chauffeurs and so on; I'm going to lead a breakaway church—there is money in it; I'm going to attack the black bourgeoisie while I cultivate a garden, rear dogs and parrots; listen to jazz and classics, read "culture" and so on. Yes, I'm also going to organize a strike. Don't you know that sometimes I kill to the rhythm of drums and cut the sinews of a baby to cure it of paralysis? . . .

This is only a dramatization of what Africa can do and is doing. The image of Africa consists of all these and others. And négritude poetry pretends that they do not constitute the image and leaves them out. So we are told only half—often even a falsified half—of the story of Africa. Sheer romanticism that fails to see the large landscape of the personality of the African makes bad poetry. Facile protest also makes bad poetry. The omission of these elements of a continent in turmoil reflects a defective poetic vision. The greatest poetry of Léopold Sédar Senghor is that which portrays in himself the meeting point of Europe and Africa. This is the most realistic and honest and most meaningful symbol of Africa—an ambivalent continent searching for equilibrium. This synthesis of Europe and Africa does not necessarily reject the Negro-ness of the African. An image of Africa that only glorifies our ancestors and celebrates our "purity" and "innocence" is an image of a continent lying in state.

Camara Laye's "Le Regard du Roi," Ferdinand Oyono's "Le Vieux Nègre et la Medaille" and Mongo Beti's "Le Pauvre Christ de Bomba" are not bullied by négritude. They are concerned in portraying the black-white encounter, and they do this, notwithstanding, with a devastating poetic sense of irony unmatched by any that one sees in the English novel by Africans. Nor does the fascinating work of the Congolese poet, Tchikaya U'Tamsi, require négritude to attain the power it has.

Négritude, while a valuable slogan politically, can, because its apostles have set it up as a principle of art, amount to self-enslavement—"autocolonization," to quote a French writer speaking of African politics and economics. We should not allow ourselves to be bullied at gunpoint into producing literature that is supposed to contain a négritude theme and style. For now we are told, also, that there is *un style négro-africain* and that therefore we have to sloganize and write to a march. We are also told that négritude is less a matter of theme than style.

I say, then, that négritude can go on as a socio-political slogan, but that it has no right to set itself up as a standard of literary performance; there I refuse to go along. I refuse to be put in a Negro file—for sociologists to come and examine me. And yet I am no less committed to the African revolution. Art unifies even while it distinguishes men; and I regard it as

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an insult to the African for anyone to suggest—as the apostles of négritude often do—that because we write independently on different themes in divers modes and styles all over Africa, we are therefore ripe victims of Balkanization.

Let négritude make the theme of literature if people want to use it. But we must remember that literature springs from an individual's experience in the context of the culture and assumptions of the group. In its effort to take in the whole man, literature also tries to see far ahead, to project a prophetic vision, such as a writer is capable of, based on contemporary experience. It must at least set in motion vibrations in us that will continue even after we have read it, prompting us to continue inquiring into its meaning. And literature and art are too big for négritude; this had better be left as a historical phase.

If African culture is worth anything at all, it should not require myths to prop it up. These thoughts are not new at all. I have come to them after physical and mental agony. And this is of course not my monopoly either. It is the price Africa has to pay. And if you thought that the end of colonialism was the end of the agony, then it is time to wake up.

IV

A Pan-African view of culture cannot be a substitute for the practical involvement, at different levels, of communities in national culture. It can and must reinforce national cultures. Ghana is perhaps the only African country where the government takes direct responsibility for organizing culture for everybody who cares for it. Through its Institute of Art and Culture the government channels money to regional cultural centers, and traditional music and theatre inspired by traditional forms thrive for the enjoyment of all. The school of music and drama attached to the Institute of African Studies at the University of Ghana engages in research into oral literature, indigenous music and drama; students are surrounded with these forms even while they learn Western techniques. Somewhere they must find a point of integration. It is also admirable that Ghanaians should, through direct government responsibility, keep reminding themselves that culture is not something to dress up for, for the élite, but to be lived by the maximum number of people; this the government makes possible.

In the larger and the poorer countries, there is ample scope for private cultural institutions. In Nigeria, for instance, there are writers' and artists' clubs called Mbari—one each at Ibadan, Oshogbo and Enugu. They promote music, theatre, art and creative writing with an African basis. The University of Ibadan's school of drama has gone into the creation of indigenous theatre

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on a big scale. The school is also helping a popular Yoruba singing troupe in its programs, most impressive of which has been the recent adaptation of Amos Tutuola's "Palmwine Drinkard" for the stage, performed in Yoruba with music and dance.

There is a center in Nairobi similar to the Mbari and serving a similar function. It has the added role of harmonizing and reconciling tribal idioms and modes in music and dance toward the establishing of a national culture in Kenya. The Tanganyika Government has a Ministry of National Culture and Youth. Unlike Ghana, this ministry organizes mostly national festivals and individual talent is not yet provided for. South Africa's Union Artists, with its Music and Drama Association, promotes musical shows such as the recent *King Kong* and *Sponono,* which have also been taken overseas. Individual music troupes are also being assisted by the Union. Here again, the accent is on African themes adapted to modern forms.

These institutions clearly point to the fact that there are groups of people who are concerned to strike a course that will lead them to a definition of the national culture within which they operate, who are concerned to bridge the gap between urban and rural cultures as a way of restoring equilibrium in fast-changing times. And it is perhaps the Western elements of these cultures that will yet be the unifying force as a common medium. The alternative to these national institutions, if we lose a sense of proportion, is for us to arrange huge Pan-African get-togethers simply to glory in our corporate blackness, rail against some ill-defined neo-colonialism, talk culture in English and French, go back home and watch our traditional dances as something outside of ourselves, like tourists, without any inclination to live our cultures. One can foresee that our cultures are going to be exposed to more European influences and absorb more. There are other conditioning factors in our cultural development: the seemingly inevitable drive toward one-party states; toward African socialism with the family as the vital unit and pivot of what President Nyerere calls *ujama*—neighborliness; the establishment of departments of African studies in our universities. One thing is certain, if nothing else is: it is that the African wants to determine his cultural organization himself. And in many areas he wants to decolonize his mind.

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WHICH ROAD FOR SOUTHEAST ASIA?

By Thanat Khoman

TO a great many Americans and Europeans, Southeast Asia today must look like an incurably troubled area. They see that there has been fighting in Laos and vicinity, and that a shooting war is raging in South Viet Nam, killing not only natives but also foreign advisers who have been sent there to help the South Vietnamese defend themselves. They also have read that one nation is confronting another, threatening to crush it flat as a pancake; and perhaps they may have noticed vociferous statements by an ex-king who wants to lay his country at the feet of Communist leaders unless certain Western nations beckon him to take back a few million dollars of aid which he had spurned and proceed to fall on their knees to receive his diktat at an international conference. All this must appear a hazy, unhealthy and utterly confusing situation. Leading their own orderly and prosperous lives, they must incline to shrug their shoulders and ask why their governments don't keep out of such brawls and leave these quarreling people to their own fate.

Even in Thailand, which though not unaffected by these worrisome developments remains an island of peace and tranquillity in the sea of turmoils, people also voice the same queries. Would they not be happier if their leaders could behave like the three legendary monkeys? Unfortunately, there is no such simple way out, and much as the Thai nation wants—like nations in America and Europe—to be left alone to lead a quiet life of its own choice, circumstances simply do not allow it to do so. On the contrary, Thailand perforce must bear its share of the threats and dangers which assault Southeast Asia like furious surf from a stormy sea.

How did this state of affairs come about? The facts are complex, but a brief analysis may be attempted.

Prior to World War I, Southeast Asia, with the exception of Thailand, was under Western colonial rule. The British, French, Dutch and Americans shared control of the region. After 1904 and the formation of the so-called Entente Cordiale, Britain and France agreed to divide their respective zones of influence and not trespass into each other's domain, thus sparing Thailand, then Siam, from falling under the colonial yoke. The agreement

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also called a halt to the colony-hunting game widely practiced hitherto by many Western nations. Southeast Asia acquired a kind of stability which prevailed until the Second World War.

As the Nazi war machine rolled from one victory to another in Europe, Japan, which had already moved into the Asian mainland, struck at Southeast Asia and succeeded in displacing the Western powers. Until the end of the war in the Pacific, Japan was in full control over Asia as far as the eastern confines of India. That overlordship came to a close at the surrender on the battleship *Missouri*.

Even though the war ended in victory for the Western nations, which staged a temporary comeback into their former colonial domains, it had undermined the previous order of things in Southeast Asia and brought in a new pattern of life. One by one the Western rulers had to leave, some voluntarily, others by defeat and surrender. The air of Southeast Asia was filled with songs of freedom; the emerging sovereign nations gleefully celebrated their newly won independence. But amidst these boisterous activities a power vacuum developed, for Japan's military might had been smashed and the colonial powers sent home. None of the new nations in the region was strong enough to assert its authority. All of them, without exception, hardly possessed the attributes of modern powers. Even the older ones like Thailand were in the process of learning how to meet the requirements of a highly complex international life. In terms of power politics, Southeast Asia became more or less Balkanized, as Eastern Europe had been on the eve of World War I. Each nation, following its own destiny, spoke a political language of its own, which was not generally understood. There was neither unison nor a *lingua franca*.

II

The tasks confronting the newly independent Southeast Asian nations thus appear mainly to be twofold. They have first to devise their own internal order and structure, and then to define their position vis-à-vis the outside world.

In regard to the first, one conclusion seems to be beyond any doubt, namely that these nations do not want to preserve the foundation laid by their former masters. For most of them the colonial era evokes painful and, for some, even bitter memories. The relics of it must be erased as promptly and as completely

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as possible. After all, they are now fully sovereign. How then can a colonial framework fit their new status?

In their search for a social order of their choice, at least two patterns offer themselves: either the structure of most of the Western nations, known as capitalism or the free-enterprise system, or a more recent system developed by late-comers in the world community, socialism. The first system is not unfamiliar. They had seen it in operation at close range, and even distorted as it came to be applied to overseas territories. It may be highly beneficial to metropolitan countries; but the advantages turn out to be much less for colonies which do not have either political or social equality. The protecting nations may proclaim to the world the great weight of their white man's burden; they cannot hide, however, the truth that their colonies had brought to them shiploads of riches. It is difficult for newly independent nations to have much taste for capitalism or free enterprise which, as they knew it, often smacked of exploitation.

Moreover, even in metropolitan territories where equality seems to prevail, the success of the free-enterprise system, with all the advantages attributed to it, is conditioned upon a long accumulation of compounded human and material resources which new nations do not have or have only insufficiently. Nor can they afford to wend their way through the years of evolution as did those who preceded them. The emerging nations are in general retarded both economically and socially; they are therefore impatient to make up for lost time and to catch up with the advanced countries as swiftly as possible. Thus free enterprise does not appear to them to be the most desirable mold in which to cast their economy.

There remains the other alternative, socialism, which at least in one instance has given a performance not unworthy of consideration. The experience of the Soviet Union, once a nation with a backward peasant economy, cannot fail to attract attention and also, perhaps, more or less openly avowed admiration. True, its rise was accomplished by immense sacrifices in human lives and suffering. However, faraway nations which were not directly or indirectly affected cannot be expected to show strong sentiments about such things. Indeed, they all too willingly overlook the debit side of the experiment and are impressed only with the truly astounding results. Especially those nations which glorify themselves in what they call the revolutionary

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spirit and philosophy find the socialist system adequate and adaptable to their homeland. And in their overwhelming self-confidence, they believe that they will be able to avoid the pitfalls of the Russian experiment, keeping only its beneficial side.

In actual practice, neither has the free-enterprise concept been altogether discarded nor has socialism been adopted in its pure Marxist form. The result is a rather hybrid offshoot which may ultimately prove more suitable to Southeast Asian soil.

While some nations in this area have been attracted by the socialist experience, others like Thailand with longer traditions in freedom and independence, and particularly with no deep-seated grudge to bear against exploiting Western empire-builders, remain more firmly attached to the free-enterprise system. In their case, no revolutionary fires were needed to blaze away ties of bondage, and they show a greater inclination toward moderation than toward radical experiments involving heavy tolls in human life and misery. The soothing and peaceable Buddhist philosophy which advocates neither asceticism nor martyrdom certainly plays an important part in influencing the choice of an economic and social system, pointing toward a more moderate experience like Japan's rather than distant Russia's.

Japan, territorially small, also underwent an amazing experiment. From being a relatively insignificant nation, it rose to prominence among the Great Powers through methodical and determined effort. However, little trace of socialism is to be found in its great national undertakings. Its economic and social system has always been that of free enterprise, with its assets and drawbacks. Reduced by war to rubble and ashes, it now is making a spectacular comeback on the same basis as before. It has been vastly aided in reconstruction by the same people who rained destruction upon it. Nevertheless, if its methods of development and progress are so successful, they surely have some merit.

The conclusion seems to be that, instead of adopting a system that is still untested and untried in this part of the world, it is prudent to rely on examples of visible success closer home. This is why, in spite of a substantial upswing in favor of socialism, many nations in Southeast Asia still cling to the free-enterprise system, with necessary adaptations, as the course which will ensure their fuller and more orderly development.

Much the same reasoning applies to an even greater extent in the political field. Here the choice between free democracy and

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what is called people's democracy is easier, since few people, if any, ever choose of their own accord to embrace "people's democracy," or to use a plainer term, Communism. Usually, if not always, it is imposed upon them either in consequence of a war, as was done by the Soviet Union in the Eastern European countries, or as compound effects of historical, social and administrative circumstances, as in the case of Mainland China or Cuba.

The problem to be solved is whether a representative system or parliamentary democracy as practiced in Anglo-Saxon countries is susceptible of being adapted to Southeast Asia. The question lacks precision, since the American system, for example, has shades of difference from the traditional British parliamentary system. Be that as it may, certain Southeast Asian countries which inherited the tradition from their former rulers claim that the system is functioning satisfactorily and take pride in it. Another country has transplanted the American presidential concept. So far, no expressions of disappointment have been heard and all concerned are to be congratulated for their adaptability.

With others, including Thailand, the experiment has gone less well. It would be wrong as a result to jump to the conclusion that some Southeast Asian peoples are more democratic-minded than others. It would be closer to the truth to say that those who experienced Anglo-Saxon rule had the opportunity to be imbued with the traditions of their former tutors. But this is only a partial explanation, for a scrutiny of representative democracy as practiced in this region reveals a number of differences from the practice of it in its homeland. In the first place, its application here rests more upon financial means. Further, it leads to many widespread disturbances, some of which result in considerable losses of human life, especially during electoral contests. It may still be the same democratic representative system, but when transplanted to this region it seems to have altered its fundamental character and be reduced in worth and value.

Thailand may in this connection be a case apart, for the Thai people, imbued with the most egalitarian and compassionate of all faiths, Buddhism, have always practiced the basic tenets of democracy. They believe profoundly in human equality and there is never either class struggle or watertight compartmentalization between the various elements of the Thai society. Any individual may rise, on his own merits, from the humblest to the highest

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position. Most important of all, discrimination in all its forms is totally alien to the Thai mind. In spite of these assets, the Western representative system has not produced results measuring up to expectations; indeed, instead of bringing progress and stability, it once brought the Thai nation close to the brink of disintegration. This unsatisfactory performance may have originated in technical maladjustments. In any event, the Thai nation has for some time been at work to adapt the system to its own genius and make it function properly.

III

In addition to the task of determining their economic, social and political structures, there remains another problem of no less magnitude for the newly independent Southeast Asian countries—how to define their position, attitude and national line of conduct vis-à-vis the outside world.

Here again at least two possibilities are open, each of them advocated by a group of powers which aims to win adherents or at least good will and moral support. The competition is indeed very keen. The means used range from the usual international courtesies, friendly and frequent intercourse through normal diplomatic channels as well as personal contacts, to less suave media of propaganda including various kinds of pressure and even a resort to infiltration and subversion. But the most effective methods are no doubt found in trade relations and particularly in aid in various forms. These vary from less expensive methods such as technical coöperation and long-term loans with low or no interest to outright grants for economic or military purposes. The competition to win the hearts and minds of the emerging nations represents a serious undertaking to which both sides have been devoting much attention and energy as well as considerable resources; for success or failure will have wide implications for the future world status of each.

As far as Southeast Asia is concerned, this subtle but deadly campaign has shown only moderate gains for the socialist side. But though only North Viet Nam has fallen into the Communist orbit, as a result of the partition of Viet Nam at the 1954 Geneva Conference, this does not mean that the Communist side has lost out in the contest. On the contrary, since that conference, more and more determined efforts have been deployed to make further inroads into non-Communist adjacent areas of Laos, South Viet

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Nam and the northwestern part of Southeast Asia. The tactics combine infiltration, subversion, insurgency and even conventional military force. The supplies include not only propaganda and military equipment and materials but also well trained political and military cadres and technicians who play such a vital role in actual fighting in South Viet Nam.

In Laos, the Communist gains consisted firstly of securing de facto control over two of the Laotian northern provinces, even though these remain under the nominal authority of the central government, and a long corridor connecting North with South Viet Nam, through which military personnel and supplies steadily flow to sustain and intensify Communist Viet Cong operations in South Viet Nam. The Communists also scored an important victory by extorting an agreement from Western and other non-Communist nations assembled at the Second Geneva Conference in 1961–62 to confer legality on the Communist-controlled Pathet Lao, and to include it together with the neutralist and conservative groups in the so-called Government of National Union. This gives the Communist faction unprecedented power to make or break Laotian governments at will and might enable it to take over the whole Kingdom of Laos without firing a bullet—or using only a few bullets.

In South Viet Nam, whatever advantages the Communists have been able to secure are not without cost. Their investments both in terms of human life and resources have been heavy and continue to increase. The substantial assistance from the United States to South Viet Nam has prevented them from making significant advances. But they can now engage in larger military operations than before, and with supplies coming in more steadily through Laos and Cambodia, which provide a privileged sanctuary, immune from pursuit and retaliatory measures, they have become bolder and carry out their war with renewed vigor. Communist North Viet Nam, undeterred by either loss or cost, makes the seizure of South Viet Nam more than ever a national project of top priority. There can be no doubt that in this it is supported by its big brother further north.

Compared with other theaters of Communist operations, the northwestern part of Southeast Asia has drawn few newspaper headlines. However, this relative quietness gives no ground for optimism. In actual fact, the activities conducted there—mainly by the Chinese Communists—are ant-like and mostly clandes-

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tine. Instead of seeking publicity and spectacular results, they patiently aim at gradually undermining the existing structure. They seem to think that time is on their side. For our part, we hope that we shall be able to assess the extent of the damage done and possibly repair it before the entire edifice crumbles.

In the southern part of Southeast Asia, Communist activities are not carried on exclusively by Asian Communists but take on a wider international character; Communist progress or setbacks there are also better known than elsewhere. This does not mean, however, that they should not be closely watched. As is well known, the Communist Party of Indonesia is the third largest in the world, ranking next after those of the two principal Communist lands. Its assumption of power in a country with over one hundred million people would thus have far-reaching consequences for the whole area.

IV

The sympathy and support which the Free World has found among certain nations, both new and old, are due less to promises of material advantages and cajolery than to the similarity of ideals and approaches to international life. These nations realize that those who seek to dominate others either by guile or by force are a threat to their own free existence. They therefore have decided to join with other nations which make the same assessment of the danger, hoping that their combined efforts may curb any encroachment on their way of life and heritage of freedom. Far from banking on immediate material gains, they were aware that the decision to commit themselves would be less than lucrative. For it had to be expected that once they had done so, major attention and consideration would shift to other potential recruits. What they hoped for most was assurance that, should the danger materialize, they would not be left to themselves, and that others who had accepted the commitment toward them would in fact come to their help in an emergency.

The question which arises then is: Will the help come? To ask the question does not imply an intention to reflect on the moral integrity of one's allies and partners; it is rather an expression of realism and prudence. History, particularly of recent times, is strewn with examples of lesser nations being sacrificed by their allies on the pretext of preserving the peace of the world but actually because the national prestige and vital interests of those

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allies were not directly affected. International conferences were sometimes resorted to in order to afford a more or less honorable way out of the obligation. Or else the unfortunate victim was simply left to face either destruction or surrender.

These happen to be facts of international life. No responsible government nowadays can disregard them except at its own peril. Caution becomes even more necessary when international treaties abound with clauses euphemistically referring to so-called "constitutional processes" which may reflect either a deep deference to the legislative authority or provide a convenient escape device in case the discharge of the treaty obligation does not appear to serve national interests or becomes too onerous. In such event, it would not be too difficult to leave it to the legislature to stall or even to prevent action from being taken. The government which had undertaken the obligation would be faultless and blameless; but the result would still be that the assurance solemnly given would have come to naught.

These complex facts of international life are not unfamiliar even to those who recently attained nationhood. While awaiting the day of liberation, they had seen nations disappear, obliterated by aggression or split asunder by international treaties. Now they are asked to make up their minds, to choose to live with the free or the forward-looking (as the two sides like to depict themselves). If the dice are cast for the forward-looking they may have to wait a long time before the promised goal is ever attained. In the meantime, life will be asphyxiatingly drab, regimented and subdued by an ever-present iron discipline. If, on the other hand, they join with the free and become "safe," they foresee that many of the amenities with which they have been lavishly showered by both parties may soon taper off or even cease completely; this will be true, at any rate, of those coming from the other side. As regards the security which may be gained, elementary wisdom and simple object lessons reveal that it will be contingent upon the interests directly involved; and even if vital interests are actually involved, probably no great distinction will be made between committed and non-committed nations. The latter will be succored as surely as the former, if the peril facing them jeopardizes the national interests of others, too.

Under these circumstances is it reasonable to expect these nations to make a choice? They thereby lose many of the benefits, material and otherwise, which had been flowing to them from

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many sides. They have to incur more or less onerous obligations, while the security benefits will be dependent upon a number of uncertain factors. Moreover, those benefits may sometimes be enjoyed without undertaking any commitment in return. In these circumstances, the natural reaction seems to be not to make any choice, at least not at present. Such an attitude does not seem to be unrealistic and can scarcely be reproached. The new or small nations may say candidly that there is no hurry to choose one side or the other; and by postponing the choice, a moment may come when they can decide with proper appreciation of all the facts. This actually happens to be the attitude taken by many newly independent nations who have refused to join either of the two sides. Their policy of non-alignment serves, in their view, to maintain the delicate balance in our divided world.

V

Such is Southeast Asia in all its diversity of political structures, economic and social orders and national policies, as variegated in nuances and shades as a spring flowerbed. Will this diversity help or harm the region? Many of us who have our roots and a stake in it are anxious to know the answer. Will it work as a centrifugal force tearing this area apart? Or will it serve to unite and bind all the components together into a cohesive whole?

Much as we would like to concentrate on Southeast Asia alone, it is neither possible nor advisable to consider it "out of context," divorced from its surroundings, in particular ignoring the geopolitical fact that both to the east and the west stand two enormous colossi looking down on the area's rich and fertile plains, ready to release the teeming millions who fill to the brim their own parched and eroded lands. Even though these masses may seem amorphous, as indeed they were at the end of World War II, they are impressive enough by their sheer numbers. Can they be contained within their own sphere or will they spill over into the green valleys of Southeast Asia? The problem has become more urgent than it was. Prior to the war, many had left their ancestral homes, alternately scorched by drought or flooded by erratic rains, to seek a better living in more promising lands. The process then was more or less peaceful and unorganized. In the future, if any mass movement were to take place, particularly from the east, it is likely to be not in a single file but in close military formation.

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As the war ended, bringing freedom in its wake, there were some who dreamed of an Asian Entente Cordiale between Russia and China, the two most populous nations of Asia, which would carve up this region into zones of influence, as the two West European countries did early in the twentieth century. But the Communist régime in Mainland China has shown a preference for violent revolution over the traditional Buddhist-Gandhian philosophy of *ahimsa* (nonviolence), and made clear its determination not to share but to dominate. The Sino-Indian border dispute revealed that the plan for a peaceful division of Southeast Asia must be abandoned. The dragon shows no desire to let anyone share influence over this region; the dominant role will have to be exclusively its own.

Since then, new bids have been made to fill the power vacuum left by the departure of Western colonial rulers, one on a continental basis, the other on a more modest regional scale.

The first bid, in true oriental tradition, was made quietly. Except for a brief fracas in the high reaches of northwest Asia the manifestations of it were hardly perceptible; but there can be no mistake that it was made. From now on, if there was to be peace in Asia, it would eventually have to be a *Pax Sinica*. Highly sensitive Asian leaders, like the Cambodian and a few others, thinking they saw the signs of the times, hastened to endeavor to accommodate themselves to the new era. They hoped that by being among the first to jump onto the victorious bandwagon they would be sure of a privileged place in the future setup.

There also have been indications lately that some desire to fill the vacuum left by past colonial powers on a regional basis. Relying mainly on numbers and perhaps also on superiority in arms, they put forward claims that any modifications of the existing order and any arrangements which might alter the present setup in Southeast Asia, particularly its southern portion, would have to be subject to their prior concurrence and endorsement. Otherwise they would withhold approval and even show their opposition, if necessary by resort to force. The appearance of this trend in Southeast Asia, although not completely unexpected, has added a new element of uncertainty to the area.

Viewing these developments, nations outside the region, especially those which had once been involved there, have taken an alarming view of its future prospects. Consciously or otherwise, they seem to believe that the influence and authority of the *Pax*

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Sinica will ultimately engulf Asia, as the *Pax Romana* once covered Gaul and Western Europe. In their wisdom and farsightedness, they have suggested that Southeast Asia, or certain parts of it to begin with, should be neutralized. They do not pretend that such a solution will save the free nations of the area, but only that it may retard their downfall. This device of neutralization has been widely discussed during the past few months, and though it has met with a small measure of support it has encountered much greater opposition. Its main defects appear to stem from the fact that it has already been tried, and unsuccessfully, in Laos (because of a lack of good faith on the other side); and secondly because neutralization is not a solution but rather a temporary expedient, or at best a moratorium, before ultimate surrender and subjection take place. Consequently, while some may be prepared fatalistically to accept the curtailment of their rights and even the deprivation of their sovereignty, many more, accustomed to long traditions of freedom and independence, categorically reject such a prospect. In any case, they are not resigned to it. If their age-old heritage is to be lost, it will have to be after they have made every effort to defend it.

For a traditionally independent nation like Thailand, everything does not seem to be lost, even though the situation may look ominous. The solution is not to be found in submission, at present or in the future, but in gathering sufficient strength to meet the challenge and in joining with others who are imbued with the same faith in their future and are willing to ward off the danger and defend their patrimony. The problem is to arouse the conscience of as many Southeast Asian nations as possible to the necessity of combining their strength, of working closely together and presenting a solid front to anyone daring to entertain evil designs against them. If they succeed, not only will each and every one of them be spared from destruction, but the region as a whole will emerge as a strong and free community, capable of serving its own interests as well as those of the world at large. This, we hope, will be Southeast Asia's lasting call, and that it will be heard.

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SINO-SOVIET COMPETITION IN AFRICA

By Robert A. Scalapino

PREMIER Khrushchev's trip to Egypt marks the second round in what promises to be a titanic struggle between Russia and China for African affections. The Soviet leader has behaved in predictable fashion. He has condemned Western imperialism and pledged further assistance to African independence movements, additional economic aid to emerging African states and support to the Arab world in its quarrel with Israel. Each of these positions represented a response to Chou En-lai's earlier bid for influence among 250,000,000 Africans. Moreover, when Khrushchev decried the creation of racial or ethnic divisions in the world and championed instead "true proletarian internationalism," he was directly challenging Peking's right to speak in the name of progress of Marxism.

The Russians know that they are in serious trouble in the non-Western world today, and that many of their problems are caused not by the West but by their former comrades in Peking. The People's Republic of China, despite its substantial military and economic weaknesses, is now locked in a bitter struggle with the Soviet Union. It has already won some signal victories in Asia, particularly within the Communist movement, and it is now determined to make Africa the next major target. By the time the march toward independence has been completed on this continent, it is likely that some 40 sovereign states will have emerged. This will represent approximately one-third of the entire community of nations.

Soviet leaders are thus well aware of the fact that the outcome of this struggle could be crucial to the ultimate balance of power both in the world and in the Communist camp. They also know that this struggle cannot be won by military means. They have begun to fight hard, using a variety of psychological, political and economic weapons. But the battle is only in its opening stages, and it will surely grow more fierce. African leaders, meanwhile, watch developments with mixed emotions. There are certain advantages in being wooed vigorously by a number of suitors, but there are real dangers involved when complex international rivalries are transplanted onto the African continent.

Both the benefits and the dangers were illustrated by the re-

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cent African trip of Chou En-lai. For nearly two months, beginning in mid-December 1963, the Chinese Premier and a 60-man entourage visited ten states of North, West and East Africa. An assessment of current Sino-Soviet rivalry in Africa might well begin with an evaluation of Chou's journey, which had three basic objectives.

The first was to involve China as fully as possible in the process of African emergence and to thwart all attempts at the isolation of China from whatever source. The Chinese Communists began by countering Belgrade with Bandung. Fully conscious of the Jugoslav-Indian pincer movement against them, the Chinese repeatedly urged the convening of a second Bandung-type conference of all Afro-Asian states in preference to another Belgrade-type conference of non-aligned states from which China would be excluded. Chou's basic argument was a simple one: whatever our ideological and cultural differences, we have two vital goals in common. We are all committed to the establishment of our full independence and to the fight against imperialism, colonialism and neo-colonialism. Furthermore, we are all involved in the common struggle against backwardness and for economic development. Afro-Asian solidarity can be successfully achieved by keeping in mind these two primary objectives.

Having set forth the common goals of China and Africa, Chou next addressed himself to the question of how China could assist the Africans in their attainment. Borrowing from the Five Principles of Coexistence and the ten principles of Bandung, he outlined China's so-called "5-8 policy" toward emergent Africa. Significantly, he selected Algeria as the place to enunciate the five points "constituting China's consistent stand" with respect to political relations with Africa. The list was headed by a firm guarantee of support in the fight against imperialism and "for the winning and safeguarding of national independence." Support was also pledged to the African policies of peace, neutrality and non-alignment; to any form of regionalism or Pan-Africanism satisfactory to the Africans; to the settlement of differences by peaceful means; and to the struggle against interference "from whatever quarter" in the internal affairs of African states.

In Mali, Chou advanced the eight principles which, he asserted, governed Chinese economic and technical assistance. These included the themes that aid must be extended upon the basis of equality and mutual benefit, with no strings or special

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privileges requested by the donor; that the most favorable terms should be extended, with emphasis upon projects requiring minimal investment, yielding quick results, and aimed at launching nations on the road to self-reliance and independent economic development, not making them dependencies of China; that only equipment of the best quality should be sent and indigenous personnel should be fully trained by the Chinese; and that all Chinese experts would live at the same level as the experts of recipient countries, requesting no special favors.

China's 5-8 policy was intended to constitute a challenge to the Soviet Union quite as much as to the West. At its heart, Sino-Soviet competition in Africa will center on who is contributing most and demanding least. Who is prepared to make the greatest sacrifices on behalf of the National Liberation Movement? Who will abstain to the greatest extent from interference in the internal affairs of the African states and acknowledge most fully their desire for equality? Who will offer the most generous aid with the fewest strings?

China now uses in Africa the same arguments which she has advanced repeatedly against the Soviet Union within the international Communist movement. She charges that the Soviet Government under Khrushchev has at best given second priority to the liberation of colonial peoples, preferring an accommodation with the imperialist West. She asserts that the Russians employ typically imperialist methods in dealing with small states, interfering in their internal affairs and seeking to dictate to them. Soviet economic aid, according to the Chinese, is aimed at producing dependency upon the Soviet Union and providing a basis for obtaining special concessions. The eight principles advanced by Chou in Mali are in reality a product of Chinese grievances against the Russians based upon their experience with Soviet aid.

Before examining the Soviet answer, let us set forth briefly the other objectives of Chou's trip. A second major aim was to create in the African mind an image of China that would contradict the picture being painted by Peking's enemies. In this respect, Chou had a complicated task. In essence, he wanted to establish a series of dual images: a China dedicated to revolution and the overthrow of imperialism everywhere, but also a China committed to peaceful coexistence and non-interference in the internal affairs of states having a different social system;

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a China sharing a common timing of revolution and common problems of backwardness with Africa and hence able to understand Africa's problems and to exchange experiences, but also a China which by virtue of its size and accomplishments had to be regarded as a major world power, a state that could not be ignored or shunted to the political sidelines.

Two recent events had to be handled carefully by Chou—the Sino-Indian border conflict and the test-ban treaty. Many African leaders, including some on the left, have taken a dim view of the Chinese attack upon India. Almost all African states, moreover, signed the test-ban treaty despite Peking's violent attack upon it. Everywhere, Chou gave a spirited private defense of Chinese actions in the border controversy. In most states, he also made a public promise that China would strive for a peaceful and negotiated settlement of the dispute. At no point, however, did he indicate any change in China's attitude of qualified acceptance of the Colombo proposals. The present stumbling block to negotiations thus remains.

Nor did Chou give ground on the test-ban treaty. He advanced the customary Chinese position on disarmament with vigor: the world should accept complete disarmament and the total destruction of nuclear weapons, with nuclear-free zones being established as a preliminary step. Did not these positions, and the excellent relations which China enjoyed with such small neighbors as Nepal, Burma and Cambodia prove that the People's Republic was a peace-loving nation? The test-ban treaty, however, was totally improper in two basic senses, according to Chou. First, it was a fraud that did not guarantee peace but rather gave American imperialism certain significant military advantages. Second, it was a treaty negotiated essentially by the superpowers and then presented to the rest of the world to sign. Its primary purposes were to keep the nuclear club small and to perpetuate big-power control over the world.

Throughout his African journey, Chou played in contrapuntal fashion upon the themes of struggle and peace, backwardness and progress, weakness and power. Since imperialism and colonialism were the true threats to peace, he argued, the struggle against these forces was inseparable from the struggle for peace, and China stood in the forefront of both battles. A backward society itself, China could appreciate the revolutionary aspirations of the African people and their basic rejection of the status

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quo. If the have-not nations of the world hoped to have an influence in international affairs, they must overlook differences and achieve unity. Only then could separate weaknesses be turned into collective strength. And to impress Africans with the physical dimensions of the world's largest emerging society, Chou constantly told his audiences, "The 650,000,000 people of China stand with you!"

Chou's African trip had one final objective, that of allowing a top Chinese leader to assess the situation first hand, preparatory to reviewing Chinese policy toward this important continent. Today, Communist China stands at a crossroads in Africa, and certain basic decisions must be made concerning the future. Peking's African policies up to date, while reasonably successful, have been very modest. Should commitments be expanded and, if so, in what direction? The pace of political change in this area renders answers to these questions all the more imperative.

II

To appreciate this fact, let us briefly review the Chinese Communist record in Africa up to the present. The first substantial Chinese Communist contacts were in North Africa shortly after the establishment of the People's Republic in 1949. This was logical because "the liberation struggle" developed at an early point in this area; a sophisticated, articulate left existed in such countries as Egypt and Algeria; and Cairo in particular was a natural base for organizations such as the Afro-Asian Solidarity Council. Making use of the fierce struggle being waged by North African leaders against the British, French and Israelis, Peking proclaimed its full devotion to the Arab cause, hastened to establish relations with the Nasser government, gave support to the Algerian revolution and made Cairo its headquarters for contacts with all African revolutionaries. This policy paid dividends. By the end of 1963 the People's Republic had achieved recognition from four states in this area—the U.A.R., Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia. In the aftermath of Chou's visit, however, it was clear that Peking faced problems in North Africa. Only in Algeria did Chou come close to getting a response matching Chinese hopes, and even here there was an absence of full support for Chinese positions.

What were the difficulties? Three factors stand out. First, material needs and cultural ties both draw the nations of North

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Africa closer to the West or to the Soviet bloc than to the People's Republic of China. For this region, the revolutionary era is over and the era of construction has begun. Many unsettled problems remain, including some having dangerous international implications—like Arab-Israeli hostility. In general, however, North African leaders are now anxious to consolidate their power at home, create a unified nation and push forward with modernization. Is the Chinese position conducive to these goals, and can China provide hardware for these tasks? Moreover, can she truly communicate with a political élite that has its cultural roots in the Western and Islamic worlds?

Related to this point is a second one: North African leaders like Nasser and Ben Bella see their interests best served by maintaining a judicious balance between the West and the Soviet bloc. Such a balance is not aided by any marked degree of alignment with a China angry at almost everyone. Given their positions, the natural political center of gravity for the U.A.R. and Algeria is Belgrade, not Bandung. North African leaders, moreover, have their own ideas about the tactics and leadership of the African liberation movement. Nasser believes that Egypt has an important role to play both in the Arab world and in black Africa. Algeria shares its experiences and provides assistance to a variety of African revolutionaries. These states do not intend to allow Communist China to assume the leadership of the African revolutionary movement.

Indeed, even the "left" states of North Africa have had sufficient trouble with their own Communists to be on guard when embraced too warmly by foreign Communist leaders. In Morocco, ironically, accused Communists were coming to trial on charges of subversion even as Chou hailed the "growing friendship" of the Chinese and Moroccan peoples. Nasser's Communists are in jail, in exile or in retirement. Even Ben Bella, the only African leader to be publicly praised by Chou as leading his country upon the path of socialism, has made it clear that the Communists will not play a leading role in the Algerian revolution. The North African Communist parties, to be sure, are primarily Moscow-oriented, but the Chinese can scarcely benefit from prevailing political conditions, especially when the Peking line is that the proletariat (read C.P.) must capture national democratic revolutions at some strategic point so as to make possible an uninterrupted march to socialism.

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China also faces certain problems in East and Central Africa today. Here, too, contact was relatively early in terms of the political evolution of these regions. The Chinese made their initial contacts, generally through Cairo, while colonialism still prevailed over much of the area. Their basic tactic—like those employed by the Bolsheviks three decades earlier in Asia—has been to invest seed money in promising individuals. Generally, Peking has concentrated upon journalists, politicians and student-intellectual types. To those receptive, Peking has offered red-carpet trips to China, special training programs and funds for a variety of purposes.

The mass media have received particular attention. A number of journalists and presses have been subsidized with the result that a pro-Peking flavor can often be detected in the radical African press. The Chinese have also established one of the world's most powerful transmitters so as to beam Swahili, Arabic and English language programs into eastern Africa. Peking, however, does not confine its activities merely to propaganda. Increasingly, the Chinese have indicated a willingness to give substantial aid to revolutions against colonial or "reactionary" régimes.

The Chinese Communists appear to be involved, directly or indirectly, in every active revolution on the African continent at present. Perhaps the most striking example is the uprising led by Pierre Mulele in the Kwilu region of the Congo. Mulele, who only returned to the Congo in the fall of 1963 after two years in Peking, has sought to follow Maoist principles completely. He is seeking to develop a guerrilla movement based upon the support of the peasants. Instructions have been issued to the troops to cultivate the people, winning their confidence and support, so that the "Liberation Army" can swim in their midst as fish in the water—Mao's famous dictum.

Peking gives trips, funds and training to other revolutionary movements. Rwanda exiles plotting a return to power receive Chinese Communist assistance. Certain leaders of the Zimbabwe African People's Union, which aims at African control of Southern Rhodesia, have been ardently wooed by the Chinese. Full support has been promised the African nationalists of Angola and Mozambique, and leading representatives of both these movements have been to Peking where they presumably have obtained aid. South Africa represents a natural target. On April 13, 1964, a

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typical Peking "rally" on behalf of South African "freedom fighters" was held, with various African speakers being featured. The radical portion of the South African National Congress is reportedly under strong Peking influence. Thus, as the revolutionary tide sweeps through central and southern Africa, the Chinese Communists are determined to be in the vanguard.

Peking, however, is anxious to play both sides of the street. It has balanced its revolutionary program with one of seeking formal relations with self-governing African states of widely varying political coloration. Apparently there is only one qualification: recognition of Nationalist China is unacceptable. To some of the East African states, moreover, Peking has offered economic and technical assistance. The campaign to win friends thus progresses simultaneously at different levels and via different tactics.

As in North Africa, Peking's East African policy has produced mixed results. Most states in this area have granted recognition to the People's Republic and established formal relations with it. Some of Peking's seed money, moreover, appears to have paid off. At least a few individuals aided by the Chinese have been in a position to repay their benefactors. Perhaps more importantly, African nationalists still struggling against white rule are undeniably gravitating to the left at present, and Peking has good reason to hope that it can achieve major gains here, both against the West and against the Soviet Union.

There is a debit side to Peking's ledger, however. A program of "buying" individuals is not very costly, but its long-run effectiveness may be questioned. Most individuals do not stay hitched. Either they are independent-minded men who will take funds but not orders, or they are opportunists whose "convictions" last only as long as the subsidies. A more serious question for Peking is whether the Chinese can simultaneously ride the two tides now running strongly in this region: revolution and stabilization. If Peking continues to invest in revolution, it will inevitably gain the hostility of the African moderates. Because they are already suspicious of Peking and anxious to keep foreign interference in Africa to a minimum, many East African leaders would prefer that the Africans themselves underwrite the remaining liberation movements. If Peking decides to invest more heavily in stabilization, a much greater outlay of funds will be required.

In West Africa, the Chinese Communists were relatively late

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in their arrival. Thus they were confronted with independent states many of which were using the designation "socialist." It was in this part of Africa, therefore, that Peking first experimented with official aid programs. Beginning in 1960, the Chinese advanced credits and shortly thereafter started to operate tea and rice plantations, promised to build cigarette and match factories, and undertook technical training programs. These activities were in addition to Peking's usual programs of cultural relations. In this area, there is little evidence of the seed-money approach; extensive unofficial ties would be dangerous—as Russian experience has shown—and they are also basically unnecessary.

Up to date, the Chinese Communists have scored their most significant gains in selected parts of West Africa. In considerable measure, this is a product of the political climate of the region. But it is also a product of the Chinese capacity to learn from the mistakes of others, and their ability in this region to keep their policies clear and unambiguous. Their aid programs have been successful partly because they have been small-scale and hence have not involved the Chinese in the total planning process, with all of the complications which this involves. The Chinese have been in pursuit of immediate political gains. From all indications, their technicians have made no demands, there has been no interference in domestic politics, and no obvious *quid pro quo* has been sought. Peking has shown a capacity to tolerate waste and inefficiency without complaint. Even in this region, however, the issues for the future are troublesome. Should and can present activities be expanded? More importantly, in the long run, can Peking rely upon the parties and leaders of the African left? It is significant that Chou En-lai refused to apply the term "socialist" to the governments of Ghana, Mali or Guinea.

III

There can be little doubt that Communist China, despite the problems it faces, has scored significant gains in Africa during the past five years, some of them at the expense of the Soviet Union. How shall we assess the Russian position at present? Like Peking, Moscow has engaged in a wide range of activities: subsidization of journalists; training of revolutionaries; scholarship programs; and large-scale economic aid. In retrospect, it can perhaps be said that Russia was at the zenith of her *revolutionary*

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influence upon Africa in 1960. Prior to that time, she and her close allies stood as the sole alternatives to continued dependence upon the West. The Soviet Union, moreover, was able to outbid all external competitors in supporting national liberation movements, until the Chinese entered the field.

Even after 1960, the Soviet Union has continued to have certain significant advantages over the Chinese. As a major world power, it can confer a degree of prestige on a movement or government which Peking can scarcely offer. Moreover, unlike the Chinese, the Russians derive strength in the contest from industrialized allies. Finally, Soviet resources are infinitely greater than those of Peking. It is not surprising that Soviet operations have been on a much larger scale in almost all of the areas where these two nations are in serious conflict. According to figures believed reliable, Soviet credits extended to Algeria total $100 million whereas Chinese credits equal $50 million; Soviet aid to Somalia is $44 million in comparison with Chinese credits totaling $20 million; the figures for Ghana are $81 million and $20 million respectively; for Mali, $55 million and $19.6 million; and for Guinea, $80 million and $24 million. Only in Zanzibar did the Chinese recently commit themselves to a more extensive aid program than the Russians, and in the light of recent developments, that commitment may be reëxamined. If East European assistance were added to the Russian figures, the gap would be significantly wider.

In the competition for students, also, the Soviets are far ahead of the Chinese Communists. It is difficult to get reliable figures because many African students go to bloc countries "unofficially," but the evidence suggests that there are presently about 1,000 Ghanaian students in the Soviet bloc countries and no more than a handful (possibly 5–10) in China; there are some 600 Sudanese in the bloc and few if any in China; Guinea has about 600 students in the bloc, not more than 20 in China—and many of these may have returned home.

Both the Soviet Union and China have had difficulty in attracting good students and in satisfying those that they get. Indeed, in the light of Soviet experience, it may be doubted that having a large number of students is an asset. Relatively few Africans have thus far returned from the Communist world as enthusiastic supporters of the system. A significant number have been disillusioned. Linguistic and cultural barriers are formid-

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able, but social and political problems have also been serious. While the situation is not as critical as some Western reports have indicated, African students are a somewhat dubious factor in the struggle for influence. There is no reason to believe, however, that the Chinese problem in this respect is less difficult than the Russian.

Weighing these various factors, we can state that the Chinese Communists are engaged in an uphill struggle to match the Soviet Union in volume of aid, influence and general prestige on the African continent. Nevertheless, the Chinese have made recent gains, and the Soviets find themselves in trouble at many points. Perhaps the roots of the Soviet problem lie in three factors: racial-cultural differences; the developmental gap between the Soviet Union and Africa; and Soviet weaknesses or errors in diplomatic-political policies. Naturally, the Chinese have been quick to exploit these factors when they could do so. Thus, in some cases, they have thrown the Russians onto the defensive in spite of the much larger Soviet presence in the African scene.

Moscow has repeatedly charged Peking with using racism to advance its cause in Africa. There is some exaggeration in this charge, but it also contains an element of truth. The Chinese have rarely if ever resorted to straight racial appeals. To do so would be un-Marxian and probably unpolitic. As is the case with most people, Africans are primarily for the Africans. At the grass-roots level at least, there is no reason to believe that the Asian is regarded with any more enthusiasm than the European. A strong element of racialism does exist in contemporary Africa, but any direct appeal based upon this theme by the Chinese would probably backfire.

Nevertheless, the general thrust of the Chinese line in Africa has racial implications. The strong emphasis upon the unity of the Afro-Asian world, the heavy assault upon Western imperialism, even the slogan about the East wind prevailing over the West wind, suggest the unity of the black and yellow peoples against the whites. The unremitting attacks upon the Russians as non-Asians in the attempt to force them out of Afro-Asian organizations is clearly an effort by the Chinese to identify the Russian people with the advanced, Western world. Clearly, the many stories of discrimination in the Soviet Union against African students have done the Soviet image some harm. And it is possible that if anti-white sentiment in Africa were to be ex-

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tended or increased by a series of bloody liberation wars in the south, Chinese advantages over the Russians might also increase.

However, the most telling blows struck against the Russians by the Chinese relate to the issue of Soviet methods and motives. The Chinese have not hesitated to charge Russia with being guilty of big-power chauvinism in Africa—ignoring the rights of small nations, interfering in their internal affairs, making economic aid a weapon of Russian power. These charges strike home, of course, because there is some substance in them. In the postwar era, the Russians came forward rapidly as a global power from a background of relative inexperience in formal diplomacy and a record of great highhandedness in dealing with the international Communist movement. As a result, the Russians have made numerous mistakes in Africa. They have interfered in internal affairs, as in Guinea; they have often appeared to favor major-power diplomacy at the expense of small states; and they have granted economic aid on less generous terms than might have been possible.

Like certain Western powers, moreover, the Russians have often found the experience of aiding underdeveloped societies terribly frustrating. The usual complaints have been voiced: the unwillingness of aid recipients to take advice; massive inefficiency, waste and corruption; and lack of gratitude. The very scope of Soviet operations in some societies has presented a problem that the Chinese have not faced. The Russians have been intimately involved in the total economy, and hence forced to share the blame when general crises developed. In the final analysis, it might not be unfair to say that the Russians have faced the disadvantages of being *both* developed and developing in African eyes. On the one hand, Africans tend increasingly to group the Soviet Union with the advanced West, hence to doubt the applicability of the Soviet model and to view with suspicion Soviet economic and political objectives. But on the other hand, the Soviet Union frequently does not fare well when compared with the West in cultural or technological terms. This is important in a period when the African élite is still strongly influenced by Western civilization.

Needless to say, the Russians are not passive in the face of Chinese assaults. Recent months have witnessed a rising tide of counterattacks, many of them timed to coincide with the Chou En-lai trip. When Chou reached Algeria, Khrushchev managed

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to vie for the headlines by granting a major interview to African journalists that was spread across the Algerian press. Indirectly, he challenged many Chinese views on revolution and development, setting forth the Soviet position in persuasive fashion. In Mali, Sino-Soviet rivalry has grown truly intense. When Chou landed at the Bamako airport, Soviet leaflets entitled "Friends and Comrades in Africa" were being distributed among the crowd gathered to greet the Chinese Premier. The leaflets contained a recitation of the extensive aid given Africa by the Russians and a vitriolic attack upon the Chinese for their attempts to disrupt proletarian internationalism and use Africa for their own ends. These are but two of many examples of the spreading quarrel that could be cited. Despite the difficulties, the Russians have shown no intention of halting economic aid or terminating their scholarship program. They continue to fight for the right to be represented in Afro-Asian organizations. African delegations fly into Moscow in increasing numbers.

What are the main conclusions to be drawn at this stage? Four basic points would appear to merit emphasis:

1. A bitter struggle for influence has now erupted on the African continent, a struggle between the Soviet Union and China in which all available political and economic weapons are being used. Fundamentally, the basic issues involved are the same as those that provoked the global Sino-Soviet split: a conflict over organization, decision-making and leadership in the revolutionary movement; sharply differing positions on the most appropriate tactics and strategy for Communist victory in the late twentieth century; and quarrels over the proper treatment to be given comrades and allies. Each of these basic issues reflects in some measure the different traditions, timing of revolution, stage of development and degree of power that mark the two Communist giants.

Increasingly, the central tactic of the Chinese in Africa and elsewhere appears to be that of trying to couple the Soviet Union and the United States together, as the two imperialist superpowers which threaten the rest of the world. The Chinese seek to isolate their two primary opponents and to establish a series of "United Fronts"—one tying them with the Afro-Asian-Latin American world, another connecting them with selected "advanced" or "transitional" societies of Europe and Asia. Thus Peking will strive with all its capacity to read the Russians out

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of the Afro-Asian group, and present itself as the leading revolutionary model.

The Russians, on the other hand, are increasingly drawn to the strategy of banking upon *development* rather than revolution, in the belief that the leaders of post-independence Africa are primarily interested in political unification and economic modernization, and that socialism can be achieved only in the context of indigenous development. Thus their tactic is to underwrite certain lines of economic and political "growth" in Africa while charging that the Chinese are attempting to force the pace of African revolution on behalf of their own selfish bid for world power.

2. In assessing the tide of battle, one cannot ignore recent Chinese gains. In the past few years, Peking has made its presence felt throughout the African continent. Prior to 1956, no African state recognized Communist China. Today, that government is recognized by 14 African states (counting Tanganyika and Zanzibar as one). Now, however, the Chinese may well have reached a more difficult part of the road. Initial gains were easy; Peking could take advantage of Moscow's errors and mount modest programs having an impact far greater than their cost. (It should be noted, however, that Taipei also did well with limited aid programs in selected African states.) But the Russians have advantages that cannot easily be overcome: Soviet power and resources are vastly more extensive; despite its troubles with Eastern Europe, the Soviet Government in its quest for African "votes" has allies upon whose ideological commitment and technical skills it can generally count; and whatever the record of Russian interference in African internal affairs, Moscow's current ideological-political line would seem to be more compatible with that of most established African leaders than the Chinese line.

The Chinese Communists have an interest in keeping the revolutionary fires stoked. Their greatest opportunity for influence is in areas of Africa which are not yet self-governing or where independence seems most incomplete. In the aftermath of successful revolution—in the cold, grey dawn of consolidating power and nation-building—Chinese competitive advantages sharply decline. Not only are Chinese resources very limited. The Chinese revolutionary model has limited applicability for Africa, despite the relatively common timing of the Chinese experience and certain common socio-economic problems.

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3. One basic political problem looms ahead for both the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China. At what point will it be necessary or natural to encourage the establishment of more Communist parties? Today, there are only a few bona fide Communist parties in Africa and, without exception, the majority of their leaders appear to be inclined toward Moscow. As the importance of being able to count upon votes—to have disciplined supporters—in all parts of the world increases, both Moscow and Peking will be under greater pressure to create their own orthodox parties. It is entirely possible that rival factions will emerge almost simultaneously in a number of African states. Up to date, Soviet and Chinese Communists have managed to maintain cordial relations with governments which have taken a tough line toward their domestic Communists. If Russia and China get into a deadly struggle for the establishment and control of Communist parties throughout the African continent, it could have serious repercussions in their relations even with the leftist African states.

4. The overwhelming majority of African nations want to remain strictly neutral in the quarrel between the two Communist leaders. Their foreign policy is one of "positive neutrality," friendly relations with all—or almost all—nations. For a number of African states, this includes Russia, China and Jugoslavia. As noted earlier, the Africans want maximum aid and minimum interference. The leftist states in particular are thus deeply troubled by the Sino-Soviet rift; it threatens to add new complications to an already complex foreign-domestic situation. It is not easy to maintain "positive neutrality" when the neat international divisions of yesteryear have been fragmented. Moreover, many African states can now feel the heat of the Sino-Soviet dispute since it has been carried onto their own soil, and they can feel the increasing pressures to take sides, at least on some issues. This they will resist as long and as fully as possible. The most basic theme underlying African politics will continue to be "Africa for the Africans." Ironically, however, one by-product of the Sino-Soviet competition in Africa may be greater opportunities for the West to play a significant role in future African development. After the Russians and Chinese have slashed at each other for a while, the French, the British—and even the Belgians—may not look so bad to those newly emerging African states in quest of help.

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ON THE ECONOMIC CRISIS IN COMMUNIST CHINA

By Alexander Eckstein

COMMUNIST China's drive for major power status—an urge to narrow the gap between herself and the two superpowers—has been the central objective of her campaign for economic development. In pursuit of this goal, Chinese planners have concentrated on expanding as rapidly as possible the country's capacity to produce capital goods and military matériel. For this purpose, a mechanism for institutionalizing a high rate of involuntary saving and for channeling it into the desired lines of investment had to be fashioned.

Concretely, this meant that the different segments of the economy had to be brought under the immediate control of the planners and policy-makers, so as to enable them to mobilize and allocate resources at great speed and with maximum flexibility. Agrarian transformation, nationalization of banking, transport, industry and trade, centralization of fiscal administration, rationing, price and wage control, and a variety of other regulations were all intertwined and designed to assure this goal.

During its first ten years the Chinese Communist régime was singularly successful. It rapidly captured "the commanding heights" in the economy, restored it to working order and launched an industrialization program of vast proportions. Manufacturing plant capacity was expanded at a very fast pace and production rose about 14 to 18 percent annually between 1952 and 1959. As a result, the output of steel increased about tenfold, electric power almost sixfold, coal fivefold and cement fourfold. In contrast, manufactured consumer goods, such as cotton yarn, grew much less rapidly—that is, about two to two-and-a-half times between 1952 and 1959, still a very respectable rate.

This rapid advance was dramatically reversed in the aftermath of the Great Leap. The marked decline of agricultural production in 1959 was soon followed by stagnation and contraction in industry. Thus economic development was brought to a standstill and since 1960 Communist China has been in the throes of a depression. How can this dramatic reversal be explained? What are its background and economic history?

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II

In spite of eight years of rapid industrial growth accompanied by relatively non-violent collectivization, Chinese Communist policy-makers approached the end of their first Five Year Plan with some serious unresolved problems on their hands. They needed a development strategy that would provide a way out of the dilemmas posed by agricultural stagnation. Farm production was growing only slowly, possibly just sufficiently to keep pace with population growth. Moreover, the harvest was subject to sharp fluctuations in response to changing weather conditions. This in turn led to marked annual fluctuations in the rate of industrial growth.

Agriculture was clearly becoming the critical bottleneck in the further development of industry. A poor harvest would inevitably lead to domestic food shortages reflected either in rising prices or in tighter rations. This could, of course, be alleviated by imports of food; but such imports would have to be at the expense of capital goods needed for expansion of industry. In the absence of these imports, food shortages were bound to interfere with the provisioning of an expanding urban labor force. This was brought home forcefully by the fact that while urban population grew by about 30 percent between 1952 and 1957 (rural population increased by only 9 percent), total government collections of grain remained more or less stationary throughout this period. On this basis, it would seem that government agricultural policies not only failed in the field of production but also in the field of distribution; that is, collectivization, which was primarily designed to fortify official control over farm output and its disposal, apparently did not bring with it increases in what was collected from the farm. Contrary to the planners' scale of preferences, farm consumption probably increased while urban consumption declined. Thus, although production had been sacrificed for control, control itself did not seem to have been significantly strengthened.

Under Chinese conditions, agricultural stagnation and poor harvests have an almost immediate impact on industrial production as well. In as much as the bulk of Mainland China's exports were in the past agricultural, shortfalls in farm production thereby reduced the country's capacity to import capital goods for industrialization. At the same time these shortfalls cut into

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the domestic supplies of raw materials available for textile manufacture and food processing. Thus unless agricultural output could be raised, the growth of industrial capacity would be curtailed, and existing plants would be forced to operate below capacity. To these difficulties were added a rise in the rate of population growth and increasing pressure of population on the available land.

The pressures on agriculture were further aggravated by the fact that Soviet credits were largely exhausted and repayment of the accumulated debt had to begin in 1954–55. Previously, China had imported more from the Soviet Union than she exported—the deficit being financed by credits—but now the situation was reversed. In order to amortize the debt, an export surplus had to be maintained, which in turn meant stepped-up deliveries of agricultural products.

All of these problems converged in the course of 1957, in part due to a succession of two mediocre harvests (in 1956 and 1957) and in part due to strains, shortages and bottlenecks engendered by a sudden and marked increase in the level of investment and the quickening in the pace of collectivization between 1955 and 1956. The Chinese leadership now faced a disconcerting dilemma: to find a strategy which would permit and foster the simultaneous development of agriculture and industry, or to push one at the inevitable expense of the other. Yet it was unthinkable to divert investment resources from industry to agriculture with a consequent decline in the rate of industrial growth.

It was against this background that a new development strategy was evolved during 1958. In its reluctance to divert investment resources from industry to agriculture, it still resembled the Soviet model, but in other respects, and in its implementation, it represented not only a sharp departure from that model, but also from its specifically Chinese variant as incorporated in the first Five Year Plan.

At its core, the new strategy involved mass mobilization of underemployed rural labor on a scale not attempted before, even in China. This additional labor was to be used locally for three purposes: (1) labor-intensive projects such as irrigation, flood control and land reclamation; (2) increased agricultural production through greater applications of labor designed to raise unit yields by closer planting, more careful weeding and the like; and (3) rapid expansion of small-scale industry. All of this was to

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be accomplished without raising rural consumption, and since local labor would be used no transport costs need be incurred.

Of course, these were not entirely new measures. Mass labor projects are an ancient tradition in China and have only been perfected and modernized by the Communist régime. However, rural labor mobilization prior to 1958 was much less comprehensive and systematic than during the Great Leap Forward (1958–60). The same can be said for the development of small-scale industry, which has traditionally been a subsidiary occupation for the Chinese farmer, though mostly confined to weaving of textile cloth and other handicrafts. Now the Chinese planners viewed it as one of the principal means of increasing the rate of industrial growth. In effect, they decided upon the simultaneous development of two distinct industrial sectors: a modern, large-scale, capital-intensive sector and a small-scale, labor-intensive sector. In pursuit of this policy of technological dualism, or "walking on two legs," as it was officially termed, the expansion of small-scale industry was promoted in such fields as iron and steel, machine shops, fertilizer production, power generation and coal extraction, in addition to the more traditional textile and food-processing industries.

Small-scale industry was to be developed by using local raw materials and simple equipment manufactured locally. The output of these industries would be used to satisfy the rural demand for manufactured consumer goods and agricultural equipment. The rural sector would thus be pushed into involuntary and partial autarky—partial, because though taking nothing from the modern sector, it was expected to contribute substantially to it. The rural sector, then, would need to save enough of its current income not only to finance its own development but to contribute to the growth of the modern sector.

The success of this strategy was critically dependent upon the degree to which underemployed labor could in fact be mobilized; if so, whether this could be done without curtailing farm production on the one hand and raising farm consumption on the other; and finally, whether earthen dams or canals, built almost entirely by raw labor without equipment, would be adequate to cope with major floods or droughts. Available evidence suggests that the Chinese leadership genuinely believed that these problems could be overcome through institutional reforms combined with a far-reaching change in the attitudes of cadres and of the peasantry at large.

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As to the first, it became clear by early 1958 that the collectives (officially referred to as agricultural producers' coöperatives of the advanced type) were too small in size and too large in number to serve as adequate instruments for administering and controlling vast labor projects; there were then about 740,000 collectives averaging less than 200 households each. Communes, representing an amalgamation of close to 30 collectives with an average membership of about 4,330 households, proved much better suited to this purpose.

As for the need for changed attitudes, the Chinese policy-makers understood that better control and administration had to be coupled with adequate incentives. But reliance on material incentives was precluded if increases in farm production were to be set aside for financing investment in industry. The leaders therefore managed to convince themselves that psychic income could replace increases in real income, provided the attitudes of the rural cadres and particularly of the peasantry could be changed.

The attitude of the party leadership was epitomized by the key slogan of 1958: "Politics takes command." Beginning in late 1957, the impression was conveyed that policy-makers had adopted the principle of "where there's a will there's a way." They appeared to feel that during the period 1955–57 they had overestimated difficulties and underestimated the possible impact of "ideological remolding" on the economy.

In a sense what the Chinese policy-makers were saying was that ultimately economic development is a function of organization and attitudes as molded by ideology. No doubt these are important and within limits may compensate for lack of physical resources, capital and backward technology. However, part of the difficulty in late 1957 and in 1958 was that the Chinese leaders talked and acted as if the limitations on their resources were completely irrelevant. In doing so, the party was apparently strongly influenced by its perception of the lessons learned from the collectivization, the "hundred flowers" and the "rectification" campaigns.

Before mid-1955 the official approach to collectivization had been cautious and gradualist. There is considerable evidence of a debate within party councils at the time between those who wanted to maintain this go-slow approach and those who wanted to accelerate the pace. When Mao decisively sided with the latter

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group, the die was cast and collectivization was completed within a year and a half. Looked at from the vantage point of 1957, collectivization turned out to be surprisingly successful. Contrary to expectations, it encountered no active resistance from the peasantry, was carried out relatively smoothly and without the dire consequences *at the time* that were associated with collectivization in the Soviet Union. This experience no doubt greatly emboldened many elements of the leadership and the party as a whole; it led them to conclude that they had overestimated peasant resistance to change and had given too much weight to the counsel of the technicians and experts who constantly called attention to the constraints, obstacles and difficulties.

As a result, the expert was downgraded—a move reinforced by the discovery during the "hundred flowers" campaign that many intellectuals and professional groups were hostile and ideologically unreliable. This, in turn, prompted the party to embark upon the all-out "rectification" campaign, which stressed the need for greater reliance on the "masses" and on politically tested elements, even if these were technically less competent.

It is within this framework that the ambitious targets of the Great Leap were formulated and that maximum pressure was exerted on the cadres to fulfill and overfulfill them. These pressures, propelled by the notion that nothing was impossible, and coupled with the subordination of economic administration to local party control and the general downgrading of the expert, removed all of the independent checks previously built into the system of economic planning and management. Thus in 1958 the door was opened wide to self-generated delusion concerning production accomplishments in agriculture and industry.

To understand how these errors in judgment were made, one must perhaps reach back into Chinese Communist Party history. It seems quite possible—though it cannot be explicitly documented—that decisions at this time were strongly influenced by experience during the long civil war extending from 1927 to 1949. On many occasions in these years, small groups of Communist bands were isolated and had to shift for themselves with little or no contact with the Party Center. Under these circumstances, the leaders of these groups had to be given wide latitude and they, in turn, had to exercise initiative and judgment, which they did with notable success. Would not a similar approach be worth

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trying in 1957 to accomplish somewhat different tasks? And would not the fact that the régime was now at the seat of power, not in the wilderness, facilitate rather than hinder the effort?

Often Chinese Communist writings and major policy speeches suggest that Mao and his closest associates viewed the process of economic development as if it were a series of military campaigns; in their eyes economic development entailed a conquest of successive obstacles and fixed positions. After all, these leaders spent a major part of their life in guerrilla warfare which must have left its mark on their modes and habits of thought. Therefore in formulating economic objectives or policies they looked for ingredients and inputs which were essential for military success; they showed little understanding or appreciation of the measures necessary for economic growth.

III

On top of this came unfavorable weather. While officially all of the blame for the current agricultural crisis is placed on nature, it is clear even from the régime's own pronouncements that the prolonged neglect of agriculture—inadequate investment, poor production incentives, perpetual reorganization and disorganization of agrarian institutions, and a host of specific planning errors—was bound to have an effect sooner or later even if the weather had been favorable. In order to understand the dimensions and the impact of this crisis it is necessary to examine its character in greater detail.

The State Statistical Bureau stopped publishing annual production results in January 1960, after releasing the annual communiqué on plan fulfillment for the previous year. As a result, for 1960, 1961 and 1962 we do not even have official production claims. However, it has been officially admitted that production declined in recent years, with some statements hinting that it has dropped to 1957 or 1955 levels. Because of all this statistical confusion and secrecy, the last more or less reliable set of agricultural statistics is for 1957; since then, most of our information is based on qualitative and circumstantial evidence. The table on the next page represents an attempt to translate these indications into quantitative terms.

As far as hard information is concerned, data on population are perhaps just as scarce and unreliable as for farm production. If one accepts the official figures, population must have grown be-

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TOTAL AND PER CAPITA FOOD CROP PRODUCTION TRENDS, 1957–62

Year	*Food Crop Production Index*	*Population Growth Index, assuming an annual rate of population growth of:*			*Domestically Produced Food Crop Availability Per Capita, based on assumed annual population growth rate of:*		
		1.5%	2.0%	2.5%	1.5%	2.0%	2.5%
1957	100	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
1958	115	101.5	102.0	102.5	112.9	112.3	111.8
1959	91	103.0	104.0	105.1	87.9	87.9	86.2
1960	86	104.6	106.1	107.7	82.4	81.2	80.0
1961	90	106.1	108.2	110.4	84.8	83.2	81.5
1962	98	107.7	110.4	113.1	91.4	89.2	87.1

Sources: Food Crop Production Index based on production estimates of the U. S. agricultural attaché in Hong Kong.

tween 2 and 2.5 percent a year between 1952 and 1958. Given the depressed food situation and the resulting nutritional deficiencies since 1959, it certainly could not have grown at a higher rate and probably expanded more slowly than that.

Reliable information concerning the precise magnitude of the food crisis is not available. What evidence we have is based on reports of refugees in Hong Kong, of foreign visitors to China, some scattered reports in the Chinese press and the incontrovertible fact that China is importing grain from Canada, Australia and other countries.

The indices in the foregoing table suggest that food crop production reached its low point in 1960, when per capita availability of domestically produced grain declined by close to 20 percent as compared to 1957—and has been slowly recovering since. Apparently, food production in 1960 dropped even below 1959 levels not only because of another poor harvest, but also because hog-raising and vegetable-growing were collectivized that year with bad results.

In retrospect it is clear that the acute food crisis of recent years was brought about by a decline in the quality as well as the quantity of food. As might be expected, the incidence of nutritional diseases increased and apparently reached a peak in 1961. What effect this had on the death rate we do not know. The most that one can say is that, while the food crisis has been serious, there have been no indications of mass famine on a nationwide scale. Nevertheless, the situation in the winter of 1960–61 was so acute that even military rations had to be cut. Partly on this account and partly because the soldiers saw adversity all around them, affecting their relatives and friends as well as themselves, army

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morale and discipline seem to have been seriously undermined at that time. All this also led to considerable demoralization of local party cadres and of the local militia so that in some areas there were peasant uprisings accompanied by an almost complete disintegration of local administration and authority.

IV

Chinese agriculture was in a state of constant instability between 1949 and 1956. Following three years of turmoil accompanying land reform, the transformation from private landholding to almost complete collectivization was compressed into four short years extending from 1953 to 1956. Yet collectivization did not mark the end of this process. The introduction of the communes—at first slowly and cautiously at the end of 1957, and then at an unusually rapid pace in 1958—spelled not only instability, but upheaval in the countryside.

The precise origin of the communes, in conception and in practice, is rather obscure; but there is no question that they constitute an integral and essential element of the Great Leap. Central to it was the notion of the "mass line," release of the "spontaneous initiative of the masses," mass mobilization of labor and of the total energies of the people as a whole. In implementing this strategy, economic management was decentralized and the communes emerged as instruments of local control and decision-making. In effect, then, centralization at the top was replaced by centralization at the bottom.

What seems to have been intended was a far-reaching and completely revolutionary change in the forms of agricultural production and in the pattern of rural life—not far different from the *agrogorods* advocated by Khrushchev at one time. Both in a sense strove for the creation of agricultural cities in which the peasantry would be uprooted from the land and, in effect, proletarianized. Such measures, if successful, would not only greatly facilitate state control over the countryside, but could (it was hoped) lead to a restructuring of peasant attitudes, rendering them more pliable and amenable to the régime's objectives.

Not all of the regulations for these early model communes were implemented. For instance, dismantling of villages did not get very far. Other measures were not instituted to the same degree everywhere, although the basic outlines of the communes as they spread rapidly over China did not depart very much from the

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original plan. But many difficulties were encountered in 1958, primarily those revolving around the problems of incentive and of shifting resources (including labor) from place to place.

In this early phase, differentiated and incentive rewards were more and more replaced by an egalitarian wage system based on "each according to his need." This created a great deal of friction, and soon proved to have a negative effect on labor productivity. At the same time, the shifting of labor led to considerable disruption of agricultural production, so that by the end of 1958 and early 1959 the leadership was forced to begin its retreat from the early concept of the commune.

As the agricultural crisis deepened in the course of 1960, mass labor mobilization schemes were abandoned and the construction and special production units that had proliferated during the Great Leap were discontinued. The commune was further decentralized so that gradually the production team, composed of about 40 households, became the basic unit for the allocation of resources and other economic decisions. As part and parcel of this reversal, peasants were again allowed private garden plots where they might raise livestock and vegetables. In many cases even the communal mess halls were abandoned. By the end of 1961, the agrarian transformation of the Great Leap had run full circle. The commune had become little more than a unit of local government, so that in essence the forms of agricultural production, consumption and distribution were back to the collectivization stage of 1955–56.

The uncertainties caused by these experiments and constant shifting back and forth were bound to have a negative effect on incentives; indeed they may have been more damaging than the ills which each change was designed to cure. These constant changes, which have characterized Chinese agricultural policy since 1949, are a symptom of a continuous groping for an incentive system which would allow the régime to have its cake and eat it too—that is, to extract the utmost from the peasant's output without interfering with farm production. The ideal situation from the régime's standpoint would be to have stable consumption with steadily rising production. But, in fact, food supply per capita barely rose—if at all—during the first Five Year Plan.

Having been relatively successful in their drive to collectivize, and now desperate to break out of the vise of agricultural stagnation, the Chinese were apparently emboldened in 1958 to go be-

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yond tested forms of agricultural and economic organization under socialism. Thus they began to innovate (through communes, through decentralization and through mass mobilization), and in the process departed from the Russian model. Viewed from the vantage point of 1964, it is clear that when they embarked on radical innovation, they failed.

Consequently, while the Chinese carefully avoided the Soviet collectivization débâcle up to 1957, they fell after that into the same trap as their Soviet predecessors. But, while a sharp decline in Russian crop and livestock production between 1928 and 1932 did not arrest industrial growth, in China it led to an industrial standstill after 1959. Except during World War II, when vast areas of European Russia were overrun by German armies, the Soviets never experienced industrial stagnation of comparable proportions at any time after 1928. Finally, the Soviets were never forced to reverse radically and completely their order of planning priorities as the Chinese had to do in early 1962.

V

As one surveys Communist China's brief economic history, one is struck time and time again by how much harvest fluctuations and trends affect the level of economic activity in general. This relationship became particularly clear when in 1959 the sharp downturn in agricultural output, followed by a succession of several bad crops, led to a cumulative decline in industrial production and in national product as a whole. As the leadership became fully conscious of the depth of the agricultural and economic crisis, it finally closed the books on the Great Leap and the development strategy associated with it. This was coupled with a sober re-assessment and the enunciation of a new economic policy at the Ninth Plenary Session of the Eighth Central Committee in January 1961, when the food supply crisis was at its worst. The policy crystalized in the course of 1961 and was articulated as doctrine by Chou En-lai in his Report on Government Work at the National People's Congress in the spring of 1962.

The new line is based on the slogan that "agriculture is the foundation for the development of the national economy." This is coupled with a policy of "readjusting, consolidating, filling out and raising standards" in industry and all of the non-agricultural sectors. In concrete terms this has meant a complete turnabout in planning priorities, with agricultural development accorded high-

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est rank, and heavy industry relegated below the manufacture of consumer goods. As a result, the level of investment was curtailed and its composition was markedly altered.

The new policy also brought with it an upgrading of technical considerations and a greater reliance on material incentives in all segments of the economy. In industry this meant that greater attention was paid to quality, plant maintenance and costs.

Unfortunately, reliable and precise information on trends in industrial production, investment and employment is not available for recent years. Therefore we do not know the rates of change in industry between 1960 and 1963. Nevertheless, from official statements and the reports of travelers and refugees, it is possible to determine the direction of movement even if its extent cannot be accurately measured.

It is clear that the pace of industrial advance began to slow down significantly in 1960. At first this decline was confined to the food-processing and textile industries which had to cut back production because of the shortage of raw materials (*e.g.* cotton, tobacco) resulting from the agricultural crisis. It would appear that in 1960 the level of investment was still increasing although the rate (in relation to national product) probably declined. However, this situation changed markedly when the Great Leap was officially abandoned in 1961; thereafter there was a marked drop in production in most, if not all, branches of industry: in consumer goods industries because of continuing shortages of agricultural raw materials, and in producer goods industries because of shortages in demand engendered by investment cutbacks resulting from the agricultural crisis. The decline in heavy industry was also accelerated by the exodus of Soviet technicians in the fall of 1960, which delayed the completion of a number of plants. Also, some existing plants were closed, creating significant pockets of urban unemployment.

The net result of this stagnation is that much of the ground gained by industry during the Great Leap has been lost in the past three years. On the basis of qualitative indications, it would appear that for a number of industrial products, output fell back to 1958—and in quite a few cases even to 1957—levels. The principal exceptions to this are crude-oil extraction, which apparently continued to expand throughout all of these years, and certain branches of the chemical industry, particularly fertilizer production, which of course is closely tied to the "agriculture first"

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policy. More recently there has also been a growing emphasis on the manufacture of synthetic fibers in a gradual attempt to render the country's textile industry less dependent on agricultural raw materials.

In effect, then, since 1960 the Communist Chinese economy has exhibited many of the classical symptoms of a deep economic depression, quite uncharacteristic of Soviet-type economies. The Great Leap had induced a sharp rise in urban employment and migration to the cities; in the depression that followed, this swollen and partially unemployed population in turn complicated the problem of urban food supply at a time of falling agricultural production. A more or less forced backward migration to the villages was then called for, apparently with the thought not only of easing the urban food problem, but also of reducing the burden of collecting food in the countryside. By relying to a considerable extent upon grain imports to feed the remaining urban population, the régime could preserve—at least for the time being—its more favorable incentive system. The net effect of these measures is that in the last three years, China has in some respects reverted to a prewar pattern of agricultural trade. She has once more become a net importer of grain, using these imports to feed the cities and thus relieve the burden imposed on the peasant.

It now appears that the 1960–61 consumption year marked the low point of the depression. Since the 1962 harvest, there has been a significant improvement in the supply of food and agricultural raw materials, as well as some signs of a general economic recovery. Whether this recovery will continue and provide the basis for a cumulative upturn, it is too early to say. As always in China, the quality of the harvest in the next few years will be one of the decisive factors.

Is China's present economic stagnation temporary or is it a more chronic condition reflecting intractable problems? In attempting an answer, we should remember that the Chinese Communists mounted a program of economic development which carried them forward with a strong momentum for "ten great years," 1949–59. The rapid rate of economic growth attained justified itself and spurred on the party, the cadres and the people to increasing effort and sacrifice. To be sure, during the first half of that decade, economic expansion was speeded to a considerable extent by rehabilitation of war-devastated or disrupted plants, so that relatively modest inputs yielded sizable increments in out-

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put. Another favorable factor was the availability of Soviet credits until 1957 and of Soviet technical assistance until mid-1960.

In recent years, on the other hand, some uniquely unfavorable factors have been at work. In addition to a succession of three bad growing seasons, the sudden withdrawal of Soviet technicians in 1960 and the near cessation of complete plant deliveries following on its heels contributed greatly to the sharp curtailment and disruption of industrial production. These special conditions aside, the failure of the Great Leap itself seriously damaged morale and organization. The setback destroyed the image of invincibility and infallibility in which the régime had enveloped itself; the cadres were left confused and disillusioned and the people's confidence in the leadership was shaken. At the same time the institutional framework of the economy was weakened. This of course applies particularly to agricultural organization, patterns of land use and the whole incentive structure in agriculture. Last but not least, statistical services were profoundly disorganized and technical considerations were thrown to the wind.

These tendencies have, of course, been reversed since 1961–62, but the question remains how rapidly the damage can be repaired. If the leadership continues to pursue an "agriculture first" policy, if it can curb its ambitions for rapid industrialization, if it keeps the rate of investment at modest levels, and if it carefully nurtures a favorable incentive system in the countryside, it may gradually repair the damage done and bring the economy to the point where rapid industrialization is again feasible. It may be that the Chinese Communist leadership has set aside the third Five Year Plan period (1963–67) for this purpose.

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"THE GLORIOUS MILITARY THOUGHT OF COMRADE MAO TSE-TUNG"

By Samuel B. Griffith, II

IF such a debased capitalist phenomenon as a list of literary best-sellers were to be published in the press of the People's Republic of China, "The Selected Military Writings of Mao Tse-tung" would perennially appear at the top, for it is a conservative conjecture that since 1959 some 40,000,000 copies of the Chairman's martial essays have been circulated on the Mainland. This unparalleled popularity cannot be ascribed to such literary qualities as simplicity of expression or felicity of style. Frequently Mao's essays reveal the professional pedagogue at his worst: dogmatic, conceited and repetitious. Nevertheless, his military writings are basic study material in all ranks of the Peoples' Liberation Army (P.L.A.), the "hard core" Basic Militia and the Youth League.

It must have been something of a blow to the author's *amour-propre* to learn that, as of 1961, many of his soldiers were not sufficiently literate to read the essays, that some who could read them did not comprehend them, and that of those who comprehended them a large proportion promptly forgot what was in them.[1] However, these unpalatable revelations did not influence the members of the Party's Military Affairs Commission, or of the General Political Department of the P.L.A., to withdraw the Chairman's inspirational works from required reading lists. In fact, the Mainland press reveals that a nation-wide campaign to promote further intensive study of the martial canon according to Mao Tse-tung continues without respite.

It must be admitted that the Niagara of exhortations which flows through the Party organs is not entirely lacking in metaphorical originality. In one lengthy exposition, the Chairman's words are said to be as refreshing as "morning dew"; in another, as "brilliant as rays of sunshine" (Mao is frequently compared to the sun). Elsewhere they are more conservatively described as "glorious beacons" (illuminating the path for those straying in ideological darkness); "arrows" (which, one infers, speed unerringly to the target, Truth); "compasses" (to guide those

[1] As reported in the *Work Bulletin* edited by the Liberation Army's General Political Department, 1961.

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whose courses tend to deviate from that set by the helmsman). They remind Marshal Lin Piao, Minister of Defense and *pro tem* Chief of the Military Affairs Commission, of a "great Red Banner." And the Marshal is well aware, as are his nearly 3,000,000 subordinate officers and men in the P.L.A., that the characters emblazoned on the banner read: "Politics Is In Command."

II

In 1929, Mao Tse-tung, then Political Commissar of the Fourth Red Army, prepared some observations "on manifestations of various non-proletarian ideas in the Party organization in the Fourth Army." The document in which these appeared, one of Mao's early theoretical papers, was entitled, "On Correcting Mistaken Ideas in the Party,"[2] and its first major section dealt with "the purely military viewpoint."

In the first four paragraphs of this section, Mao expressed for the first time his views on the proper relationship of politics to military affairs. These concepts, which have not altered in the slightest degree since they were formulated, have been enshrined as theocratic dogma. Essentially they set forth, and in unequivocal language, what is today described as "The Glorious Military Thought of Comrade Mao Tse-tung."

ON THE PURELY MILITARY VIEWPOINT

The purely military viewpoint is very highly developed among a number of comrades in the Red Army. It manifests itself as follows:

1. These comrades regard military affairs and politics as opposed to each other and refuse to recognize that military affairs are only one means of accomplishing political tasks. Some even say, "If you are good militarily, naturally you are good politically; if you are not good militarily, you cannot be any good politically"—this is to go a step further and give military affairs a leading position over politics.

2. They think that the task of the Red Army, like that of the White Army, is merely to fight. They do not understand that the Chinese Red Army is an armed body for carrying out the political tasks of the revolution. Especially at present, the Red Army should certainly not confine itself to fighting; besides fighting to destroy the enemy's military strength, it should shoulder such important tasks as doing propaganda among the masses, organizing the masses, arming them, helping them to establish revolutionary political power and setting up Party organizations. The Red Army fights not merely for the sake of fighting but in order to conduct propaganda among the masses, arm them, and help them to establish revolutionary political power. Without

[2] "Selected Military Writings of Mao Tse-tung." Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1963, p. 51–52.

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these objectives, fighting loses its meaning and the Red Army loses the reason for its existence.

3. Hence, organizationally, these comrades subordinate the departments of the Red Army doing political work to those doing military work, and put forward the slogan, "Let Army Headquarters handle outside matters." If allowed to develop, this idea would involve the danger of estrangement from the masses, control of the government by the army and departure from proletarian leadership—it would be to take the path of warlordism like the Kuomintang army.

4. At the same time, in propaganda work they overlook the importance of propaganda teams. On the question of mass organization, they neglect the organizing of soldiers' committees in the army and the organizing of the local workers and peasants. As a result, both propaganda and organizational work are abandoned.

III

Whereas we do everything possible to take politics out of soldiers, the Chinese Communist Party does everything possible to put politics into them, and no member of the P.L.A. is ever allowed to forget that "the Party commands the gun." This concept is succinctly expressed in the slogan: "Be Red and Expert." For a soldier it is essential to be "Red," desirable to be "Expert."

Lin Piao's predecessor, Marshal P'eng Teh-huai, and his colleague, Senior General and P.L.A. Chief of Staff, Huang K'o-ch'eng, were accused of a number of serious ideological mistakes. Apparently the most egregious of these was to persist in the conviction that to create a modern army it was essential first to be expert. To use an American G.I. expression, they were not "with it." They were dismissed from office.

At the time the Party launched the militia movement ("Every Man a Soldier")—an operation to which the former Minister of Defense took exception—the P.L.A. was called upon to "shoulder such important tasks" as going to the masses to conduct propaganda, organizing them, recruiting a militia and training it. The primary object of this movement was, of course, not (as the Party asserted) to prepare to defend the homeland against "imperialist aggressors," but to broaden and deepen Party control over the masses. The movement served the useful purpose, too, of averting "the danger of estrangement from the masses" with the possible result that the P.L.A. might "depart" from the Party's dictatorial "proletarian leadership."

Even before the militia movement reached a crescendo, the

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Party had started a campaign to send civil functionaries "down" to lower levels. Shortly after P'eng Teh-huai and those identified with his policies were summarily dismissed, the campaign was extended to the P.L.A. under the slogan *Hsia Lien Tang Ping*—"Go Down to the Companies and Soldier." With this, politics went to the mess halls and comrade generals vied with one another in a spontaneous stampede to the kitchens.

Only relatively recently has Lin Piao been able to persuade the Party autarchs that generals might be more gainfully employed than by "encouraging" them periodically to perform such tasks as washing vegetables, picking chickens or cleaning latrines. This form of identification with the masses did, however, suggest to professionally oriented senior officers who imagined they had "iron rice bowls" that their bowls were still friable, and could be shattered by the Party at the least indication of militaristic intransigence.

While the *Hsia Lien* movement thus served a minatory purpose, it was also seen as a means of solving the "contradictions" which the Party believed would inevitably develop within the armed forces as a result of professionalization. We may infer from references to incipient "commandism" and to the "arrogant" behavior of unspecified senior officers (and their wives) that the Party had some reason to worry.

Still another, and more obscure, purpose may have been to remind "Russified" members of the officer corps in the army, air force and navy of the harsh realities of life in a P.L.A. which could not, without massive assistance, reasonably hope to attain great-power standards of weaponry or technical equipment for many years.

Unity within the army, and unity of the P.L.A. and the people, are two of Chairman Mao's "compasses." And so, pursuit of this elusive quality—which was, indeed, such a remarkable characteristic of the Eighth Route Army during the anti-Japanese war—persists. The revolutionary élan of 20 years ago must not only be recaptured, but raised to ever higher levels. If "contradictions" do not in fact exist, they will inevitably be manufactured. New slogans will be devised; new rectification campaigns launched. The revolutionary ferment must not be allowed to subside, for if this should occur it is remotely possible that some members of the armed forces would have time to think for themselves. This could lead to a very serious situation indeed.

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IV

Mao Tse-tung's strategic theories and tactical doctrines, as these are related to "National Revolutionary Wars," "Peoples' Wars" or "Insurgent Wars," are well known, but the elementary philosophical foundations on which they were erected are perhaps less familiar.[8]

Mao's first law of war is disarmingly simple: to preserve one's self and annihilate the enemy. Every action must be carefully designed to contribute directly to this end; one fights only when victory is certain.

Victory can be assured only if one has correctly solved the contradictions which exist between the objective (enemy, terrain, weather) situation, and the subjective (own) situation. A perfect solution will result in total victory.

How, then, does one select from a number of possible courses of action that which is most appropriate to existing objective conditions, and hence most economical and effective? Mao answers: By the process of knowing the enemy ("process" in this context suggests a continual refinement of knowledge). But the course of action which theoretically fits objective conditions perfectly may not be feasible, for the subjective situation may preclude its adoption. Therefore the process of knowing one's self is quite as important as that of knowing the enemy. Thus, Mao says, one "must always remember the words of Sun Wu Tzu"—*Chih Pi, Chih Chi; Pai Chan, Pai Sheng*—"Know the enemy, know yourself; one hundred battles, one hundred victories."

By his "conscious activity" man can manipulate both the objective and subjective situations. For example, under conditions as they exist in South Viet Nam, incumbent forces can be deprived of information while insurgent forces receive all the information they need. But it is not sufficient to deprive the enemy of information. He must also be deceived. These are preconditions which guarantee free exercise of the initiative, which in turn confers the advantage of strategic and tactical flexibility.

[8] The principal essays have been collected under the title: "Selected Military Works of Mao Tse-tung," published by The Foreign Languages Press, Peking, 1963. The most important of these are:

1. Problems of Strategy in China's Revolutionary War. December 1936
2. Problems of Strategy in Guerrilla War Against Japan. May 1938
3. On Protracted War. May 1938
4. Problems of War and Strategy. November 1938

Foreign language versions have been separately published in pamphlet form.

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The side to which this flexibility has accrued is able to create dynamic patterns to which the opponent must conform. Thus his antagonist is unable to act, and can only react. He has no control over the processes which generate a victorious situation.

It has been said that Chinese strategy is characterized by "caution." Mao does not use this word; he prefers "prudence," a term without connotations of hesitancy or vacillation.

These, very briefly, are some of the salient points Mao has consistently emphasized. They suggest a pattern more subtle, more refined and more indirect than that to which we are accustomed.

V

The Chairman has improved on Lenin's plagiarization of Clausewitz to the effect that war is simply politics in a violent form. Mao once stated the relationship this way: Politics is war without bloodshed; war is politics with bloodshed. He would agree that the two arts are opposite sides of a coin, or, in the more arresting metaphor of Tokugawa Ieyasu, "the two wheels, or wings, of statecraft." To carry this thought one step further: the Chairman sees armed combat as only one—and not necessarily the most important—segment of war.

Mao would no doubt modify General MacArthur's view that the object of war is victory. One need only ask if victory was the object of the Chinese aggression against India in the fall of 1962. In the Northeast Frontier Area the Chinese unilaterally liquidated the gains achieved by military success. The long-term results anticipated by Peking remain to manifest themselves.

The keystone of Mao's military thinking is that in war man is decisive. Says Liu Shao-ch'i, Chairman of the People's Republic: "We have the spiritual atomic bomb." This conviction is not entirely unfounded. The historical experience of the Chinese leadership has confirmed them in the belief that man's dedication, imagination, courage and perseverance—under the infallible guidance of the Communist Party—can prevail against material and technical superiority. They saw this belief justified in Cuba, North Viet Nam and Algeria. They expect to see it justified elsewhere.

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SCANDINAVIA'S PEACE-KEEPING FORCES FOR U.N.

By Per Haekkerup

IT is a major aim of the Danish Government and the Danish people to do everything within their power to strengthen the United Nations. Small countries have a vital stake in supporting the development of the United Nations so that it becomes an effective instrument of the international rule of law. Obviously, this is not an aim that can be achieved at once. But by helping to preserve and strengthen the United Nations as an effective instrument for peace in the current international situation, we can help in the longer run to bring about conditions which foster gradual progress toward the distant but all-important goal.

Such is the general background of the initiative taken by Denmark, together with Norway and Sweden, to set up separate national military forces which are to be kept in permanent readiness and which can be made available to the United Nations at short notice. Let me begin with a short account of the way in which this idea developed.

II

The deliberations go back to the Suez crisis in 1956. Previous international conflicts had shown that by bringing the United Nations into the picture—by creating a "U.N. presence"—it was possible to alleviate the tensions of a dangerous situation. During the Suez crisis we saw the United Nations intervene with military forces. By taking direct military action the organization succeeded in bringing the military conflict to an end and in keeping the peace. Since then, similar United Nations peace-keeping forces have been used in other areas, for instance in the Congo and Cyprus. In these cases the U.N. forces were provided by certain member countries which, in an acute situation and in response to U.N. requests, made military units available for peace-keeping activities.

The successful Suez experience suggested to us in the Nordic countries that it might be desirable to establish more permanent arrangements within the United Nations. It had now been accepted that the organization could ask member countries to

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make military forces available for peace-keeping operations in certain phases of certain crises. Might it not be preferable to avoid reliance on case-to-case improvisations but to go further and form a permanent international U.N. peace force, to be held at the disposal of the Secretary-General on the authority of the Security Council or the General Assembly? The question was discussed at a meeting of the Nordic foreign ministers in September 1958. But the decisive contribution to thinking on the subject was the report which Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld submitted to the 13th General Assembly in the autumn of 1958, in which he set out the basic principles of U.N. peace-keeping operations. In his view, it was hardly possible politically at that time to take further action within the United Nations. But in the summer of 1959 he approached a number of states, including the Scandinavian, asking us to take account in our military planning of the possibility of future contributions to the United Nations.

In these circumstances we decided to continue our deliberations on a purely national basis with a view to establishing national stand-by forces without involving the United Nations. Plainly, if the United Nations asked for our participation in a peace-keeping operation it would be essential, in order to react efficiently and speedily, that we should have prepared our contribution in advance. From 1960 to 1962 the Scandinavian defense ministers discussed technical details. The result was a plan to set up a Scandinavian force of about 4,000 men. When the plan was ready, we informed Secretary-General U Thant unofficially to that effect. In the summer of 1963 he made a speech in which he welcomed the Scandinavian initiative.

III

When we notify the United Nations officially of the establishment of the Scandinavian U.N. Force, we shall set out in detail the conditions for the use of it. The fundamental principles and considerations, which are in accordance with those originally outlined by Mr. Hammarskjöld, may be summed up as follows:

1. The force shall assist only in peace-keeping operations. This implies that there is no connection between the Scandinavian plan and the provision for enforcement measures contained in Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter which deals with measures against threats to peace, breaches of the peace and acts of ag-

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gression. Chapter VII provides for the establishment of an international security force composed of national military contingents. This force, under the command of a Military Staff Committee, is to carry out—if necessary by military means—the decisions of the Security Council for the maintenance or restoration of international peace and security. The idea underlying this provision was that it should be possible to back up right by might. In a realistic recognition of the facts of power, the competence to take such decisions was vested in the Security Council. Because of the cold war, the provisions of Chapter VII have not acquired practical significance. (There was, of course, the Korean operation which, however, was made possible only through special political circumstances.) Not inconceivably, improved political relations between the great powers could, at some future stage, make possible the creation of the enforcement machinery foreseen in Chapter VII. But in the present international situation it must be recognized that the provisions are of no practical interest.

The assumption that the Scandinavian stand-by forces can assist only in the implementation of peace-keeping measures also implies that these forces can never take part in offensive fighting. It is evident, however, that they must have the right to act in self-defense.

2. A lawfully adopted U.N. decision is required for the Scandinavian countries to make the earmarked forces available. This must take the form of a request either by the Security Council, by the General Assembly or by the Secretary-General acting on behalf of either of these bodies.

3. The country in which the forces are to be used shall have accepted the U.N. operation and our participation in it. This is necessary because we are dealing here with action to be taken under Chapter VI (pacific settlement of disputes). Apart from the scope of Chapter VII, the Charter contains no authority for any U.N. organ to impose the presence of an international executive organ on the territory of a member state. In keeping with this, when we responded to the U.N. request for a Danish contribution to the U.N. force in Cyprus, we made it a condition that our participation be accepted by the Government of Cyprus.

4. U.N. requests can be complied with only after an independent appraisal of the general situation. This implies that the action proposed in the given circumstances must be acceptable to the

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governments of the Scandinavian countries. This may sound very restrictive and it does, in fact, imply a limitation. It means that the United Nations will not have the right automatically to draw on the Scandinavian stand-by force. But it should be borne in mind that in the final analysis it is a question of asking 4,000 young men to risk their lives for a cause which, being an international issue, affects their own countries only indirectly. A democratic government must make sure that the people understand and support its actions. That is why we have found it necessary to make this reservation.

In deciding whether a U.N. request should be complied with, all relevant circumstances—including national military security considerations—will be taken into account. As far as Denmark and Norway are concerned, we shall also bear in mind our obligations toward our allies. But there can be no doubt that our basic attitude to any such requests will be a very positive one, in keeping with the general lines of our foreign policy in which support of the United Nations forms a decisive element.

5. The force will be placed under the exclusive control of the United Nations. The only modification here is that it will remain under national jurisdiction in matters of penal law.

IV

National components will be so organized as to enable the force as a whole to act as a self-contained unit. Each national contingent (in the case of Denmark it will consist of about 1,000 men) will likewise be able to operate as an independent unit when, for example, only one or two of the Scandinavian countries are asked to contribute to a U.N. force. Such was the case in the Cyprus operation, to which only Denmark and Sweden have so far been asked to contribute.

The characteristic feature of the plan is the advance earmarking of specific military forces. They will consist of units from the army, navy and air force, including staff officers, transport units, observers, etc. Most of the personnel will be conscript soldiers who have completed normal military service and who will be recruited on a voluntary basis. After a few weeks' special training they must be ready for call-up, equipment and transportation to any part of the world at very short notice. In return for this obligation they will receive a monthly compensation.

The cost of establishing and maintaining these forces will be

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borne by the individual Scandinavian countries up to the time when the Force is placed at the disposal of the United Nations. From that moment, the financial responsibility passes to the United Nations. In the case of Denmark, the costs are estimated at $3,000,000 for equipment, while the current expenses for pay, training, etc., will be $1,500,000 annually. These amounts will be kept outside the normal defense budget.

An essential aspect of the plan is that the forces can be dispatched to a critical area with the utmost speed. Prompt action will often be a prerequisite for the efficacy of a U.N. operation. The Scandinavian Force may be expected to reach the scene of action two or three days after receipt of the U.N. request. It was due to special circumstances at the time of the U.N. intervention in the Middle East in 1956 that the first Danish forces were able to land in Egypt 36 hours after receipt of the Secretary-General's request. But normally this will not be possible, which is why a special stand-by force is necessary.

The plan for establishing the permanent military stand-by force was recently approved by the Danish Folketing (parliament). At about the same time Denmark received an official request for a military contingent of about 1,000 men for the U.N. Force in Cyprus. In deciding to comply with this request, the Government did not, therefore, have to obtain separate parliamentary approval.

When the requisite authority has been obtained from all the Scandinavian parliaments, we shall approach the U.N. Secretariat to arrange the practical details.

V

In conclusion I would like—in the light of experience—to point out a few of the problems attending U.N. peace-keeping operations. In the past, such action has been taken in a wide variety of situations. However, certain general aspects of the political and technical problems involved should be considered with a view to future U.N. operations.

It is generally accepted that the purpose of peace-keeping operations is to prevent or to stop military conflict in order to pave the way for a negotiated settlement of a dispute. While the former aspect of this purpose has been achieved with impressive efficiency, it must be admitted that in most cases no solutions have been found to the underlying political conflicts. The

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causes of tension have not been removed and unsolved conflicts are accumulating. Concurrently with the military operations there should be a greater concentration on finding solutions to the political problems through the U.N. machinery.

Another matter requiring consideration may be termed "relations with local authorities." What impact may an international operation have on a national political situation? The problems arising out of the presence of a U.N. force in a country are essentially different from those caused by a force which, like the UNEF, merely has to stand guard over a frontier or armistice line between two or more countries. Whenever U.N. forces are present in a country with a certain mandate (*e.g.* to maintain law and order or to prevent civil war) they will be exercising powers which actually belong to that country's lawful government and derive from the concept of national sovereignty. The Congo operation showed how difficult it is, in practice, to avoid influencing internal developments. This is one of the political facts of life to which careful consideration should be given before an operation is initiated.

At a more technical level, an examination should be made of the need to have military expertise available in the U.N. Secretariat in connection with peace-keeping operations. From the point of view of military efficiency, it would certainly be useful to strengthen the personnel of the military advisory machinery in the Secretariat. It should be left to the discretion of the Secretary-General to decide when such a step will be politically feasible.

Another technical point is how to organize the top-level local command of U.N. operations. In looking ahead to future operations, it may be worth considering whether the local commander of operations should be given somewhat wider freedom of action within the framework of the instructions issued by the Secretary-General.

Finally, one important detail: Experience has shown, especially in the Congo, that an operation which involves elements of international conflict may easily make the United Nations a target for attacks by circles which feel that their interests are not receiving sufficient attention. This brings up the need for an efficient U.N. information service. Its facilities should be present from the beginning of the operation.

The steps now taken by the Scandinavian countries (in-

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cluding Finland recently) to improve the technical ability of the United Nations to preserve world peace in acute crises are only a modest beginning. Our initiative should be viewed in light of the fact that the existing political and financial situation of the United Nations does not permit any further action at the present time. In a wider perspective, this initiative reflects the realization that under the given limiting conditions the realistic method is to work toward the ideal goal through minor concrete steps.

In the longer view, the goal must be to set up a real international U.N. peace force on a permanent basis. The more countries indicate a willingness to set up, as a first step, national military stand-by forces to be held at the disposal of the United Nations, the greater will be the possibilities of reaching that goal. It will also (as suggested by Mr. Lester Pearson) be natural to coordinate the efforts of such willing countries and those of the United Nations. This might ultimately take the form of a systematic study of the experience gathered through previous operations and of how to institutionalize within the United Nations the political and military elements required for the implementation of such operations.

The fundamental common interest in preserving peace and strengthening the forces conducive to peace transcends all national and ideological frontiers. I am deeply convinced that action along the lines I have suggested here will serve this common goal.

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RECENT BOOKS ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

By Henry L. Roberts

with the assistance of William Diebold, Jr., Economics; Fritz Stern, Western Europe; Howard Linton, Asia; Richard H. Nolte, Middle East, North Africa; Joseph A. Ellis, Latin America; Pamela Day, Africa.

General: Political and Legal

POLITICAL POWER: USA/USSR. By Zbigniew Brzezinski and Samuel P. Huntington. New York: Viking, 1964, 461 p. $7.50.

In this work two leading students of Soviet and American politics have joined forces to make an ambitious comparative study of the two countries' political systems, with an eye to similarities and differences, strengths and weaknesses, and the prospects of increasing convergence. Their expectations are undramatic: both systems have been, for their respective purposes, quite successful, each is likely to evolve, but it seems unlikely that they will become increasingly similar, in role or purpose.

COMMUNISM AND COLONIALISM. By Walter Kolarz. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1964, 147 p. $4.95.

Posthumously published essays dealing, through a variety of specific instances and issues, with the dubious right of Soviet Communism to pose as "anti-colonial."

SHAPING THE FUTURE: FOREIGN POLICY IN AN AGE OF TRANSITION. By Robert R. Bowie. New York: Columbia University Press, 1964, 118 p. $3.50.

In these lectures the Director of the Center for International Affairs at Harvard concisely summarizes the principal requisites for a foreign policy, for success in achieving an Atlantic order and for organizing and managing foreign policy.

THE ATLANTIC COMMUNITY: PROGRESS AND PROSPECTS. Edited by Francis O. Wilcox and H. Field Haviland, Jr. New York: Praeger, 1963, 294 p. $6.00 (Paper, $2.25).

An enlightening though somewhat loose-jointed symposium by a number of distinguished and competent European and American contributors. It indicates what the Atlantic Community is not as well as what it is or might be.

THE POLITICS OF THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE. By Alvin J. Cottrell and James E. Dougherty. New York: Praeger, 1964, 264 p. $5.00 (Paper, $1.95).

A concise but useful political guide.

ATLANTIC CRISIS: AMERICAN DIPLOMACY CONFRONTS A RESURGENT EUROPE. By Robert Kleiman. New York: Norton, 1964, 158 p. $2.95.

An American journalist's informed and generally judicious account of the political aftermath of Britain's exclusion from the Common Market. General de Gaulle is the central figure of the piece. Prepared originally as a background paper for the Atlantic Study of the Council on Foreign Relations.

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NATIONALITY AND WEALTH: A STUDY IN WORLD GOVERNMENT. By Evan Luard. New York: Oxford University Press, 1964, 370 p. $6.75.

Arguing, with some persuasiveness, the inadequacy of the nation-state in the present international setting, Mr. Luard examines the possibilities for greatly increased actions on an international scale—with considerable emphasis on economic activities—that may reduce rather than exacerbate the inequalities existing between nations.

EXPECTANT PEOPLES: NATIONALISM AND DEVELOPMENT. Edited by K. H. Silvert. New York: Random House, 1963, 489 p. $6.95.

The pregnant theme of this excellent volume of studies by the American Universities Field Staff is the role and quality of nationalism in the developing countries. While the topic is developed thematically, all the essays deal with individual countries, in the Middle East, Latin America, Asia and Africa.

ACTION AND REACTION IN WORLD POLITICS. By Richard N. Rosecrance. Boston: Little, Brown, 1963, 314 p. $6.00.

An effort to provide an analysis of international relations based on the data and perspectives of the historical experience of the last two centuries. In contrast to a number of writers, the author places considerable weight on the importance of domestic changes in affecting the pattern of foreign affairs.

PROPAGANDA: TOWARDS DISARMAMENT IN THE WAR OF WORDS. By John B. Whitton and Arthur Larson. Dobbs Ferry (N.Y.): Oceana Publications (for the World Rule of Law Center, Duke University), 1964, 305 p. $8.50.

An analysis of "the rules, principles and remedies available to control propaganda of a kind that threatens the peace." Principal dangers are seen in warmongering, subversion and defamation.

INTERNATIONAL NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS AND ECONOMIC ENTITIES. By J. J. Lador-Lederer. Leyden: Sijthoff, 1963, 403 p. Gldrs. 38.50. (Dobbs Ferry, N.Y.: Oceana Publications, distributor, $13.25.)

A study of the activities of non-State organizations and their impact on international relations and law.

THE COMING OF THE WHIRLWIND. By Constantine Brown. Chicago: Regnery, 1964, 381 p. $4.95.

A half-century of memoirs by a long-time correspondent and journalist, dealing in considerable measure with foreign affairs.

FOREIGN AFFAIRS BIBLIOGRAPHY. By Henry L. Roberts and Others. New York: Bowker (for the Council on Foreign Relations), 1964, 752 p. $20.00.

An extensive annotated bibliography of books published during the decade 1952–1962 in international affairs, contemporary history and related fields. Based mainly on notes appearing in *Foreign Affairs*, this volume also contains several thousand additional titles.

General: Military, Technical and Scientific

COMMUNISM AND REVOLUTION: THE STRATEGIC USES OF POLITICAL VIOLENCE. Edited by Cyril E. Black and Thomas P. Thornton. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964, 467 p. $10.00.

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A substantial symposium by a number of knowledgeable authors on the "Communist experience in influencing political change by violent methods." The treatment is both historical and regional.

INTERNAL WAR: PROBLEMS AND APPROACHES. Edited by Harry Eckstein. New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1964, 339 p. $6.50.

A symposium of essays, some of them very theoretically oriented, on the theme of domestic violence, rebellion, revolution.

THE SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTION AND WORLD POLITICS. By Caryl P. Haskins. New York: Harper and Row (for the Council on Foreign Relations), 1964, 115 p. $3.50.

In these lectures Dr. Haskins, a biologist and President of the Carnegie Institution of Washington, offers a panoramic review of the impact of science and technology upon contemporary human societies, including the new and "intermediate" nations, and upon the relations between societies.

ARMS AND STABILITY IN EUROPE. By Alastair Buchan and Philip Windsor. New York: Praeger (for the Institute for Strategic Studies, London), 1963, 236 p. $5.00.

A discussion of the present confrontation, and future prospects for lessening tensions, between NATO and the Warsaw Pact countries.

AMERICAN MILITARY FORCES ABROAD. By George Stambuk. Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1963, 252 p. $6.75.

An effort to study the impact on the Western state system and on the "sovereign territorial state," of American military forces in peacetime in foreign territory.

PROBLEME DER INTERNATIONALEN ABRÜSTUNG. By Hermann Volle and Claus-Jürgen Duisberg. Frankfurt/Main: Metzner, 1964, 2 v. DM. 96.

An extended analysis, with selected but voluminous documents, on efforts at disarmament and security in the U.N. from 1945 to 1961.

AIR POWER OVER EUROPE, 1944–1945. By John Herington. Canberra: Australian War Memorial, 1963, 539 p. (Sydney: Angus and Robertson, 35/.)

The history of Australian airmen with the R.A.F. against Germany, with emphasis on achievements in land and sea campaigns and with statistics based on corrected wartime compilations. The concluding chapters concern repatriation and experiences of evaders and prisoners of war. This is a volume in the official series "Australia in the War of 1939–1945."

THE FINAL CAMPAIGNS. By Gavin Long. Canberra: Australian War Memorial, 1963, 667 p. (Sydney: Angus and Robertson, 35/.)

The concluding volume of the army series, "Australia in the War of 1939–1945," covers the campaigns from Bougainville and Australian New Guinea, with descriptions of plans for after the cease-fire.

General: Economic and Social

THE ECONOMICS OF TAKE-OFF INTO SUSTAINED GROWTH. Edited by W. W. Rostow. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1963, 481 p. $14.95.

Walt Rostow's idea of a "take-off" in economic development has rapidly passed into common use, but the specialists have been skeptical. Historians have asked whether there was evidence to support the generalizations, theorists have com-

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plained of a lack of precision about the interrelation of parts of the process, and ordinary students have wondered whether Rostow's scheme actually explained anything. In this important volume, papers by leading authorities are followed by a long summary of ten days' discussion. The results are mixed, but on the whole the historical papers tend to cast doubt on the validity of the scheme for some major countries. In his own paper and in answering the critics, Rostow restates his views with some refinements and elaboration.

THE DOLLAR IN WORLD AFFAIRS: AN ESSAY IN INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL POLICY. By Henry G. Aubrey. New York: Harper and Row (for the Council on Foreign Relations), 1964, 295 p. $5.50.

Although written with highly technical competence, this is not a technical study. In examining the central issues of United States foreign financial policy, Dr. Aubrey stresses their relation to foreign policy as a whole. He puts American balance-of-payments difficulties in a long perspective and suggests some of the possibilities for living with future deficits. Exploring the implications of the position of the dollar as a reserve currency, he sees it as a financial instrument that serves the common objectives of the Western world, and not just those of the United States.

THE UNITED STATES BALANCE OF PAYMENTS IN 1968. By Walter S. Salant and Others. Washington: Brookings Institution, 1963, 298 p. $5.00 (Paper, $2.95).

Six first-rate economists do several things in this study. Projecting trends in the balance of payments to 1968, they come to rather optimistic conclusions about the elimination of the deficit. Their analysis includes work on the Common Market, foreign aid and defense expenditures abroad. Finally, the authors put forward an interesting proposal for international monetary reform.

THE DOLLAR CRISIS: THE UNITED STATES BALANCE OF PAYMENTS AND DOLLAR STABILITY. By Nasrollah S. Fatemi, Thibaut de Saint Phalle and Grace M. Keeffe. New York: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 1964, 317 p. (New York University Press, distributor, $8.95).

Much more pessimistic about the future course of the U.S. balance of payments than Salant and his colleagues, and more alarmed than Aubrey, these authors recommend a series of fairly drastic measures affecting investment, aid and military spending abroad.

FOREIGN AID AND FOREIGN POLICY. By Edward S. Mason. New York: Harper and Row (for the Council on Foreign Relations), 1964, 118 p. $3.50.

In his Elihu Root lectures at the Council on Foreign Relations one of our most experienced experts on aid and development gives balanced answers to such central questions about the relation of foreign aid to foreign policy as: What is a reasonable division between military and economic aid? In what circumstances can foreign aid make a major contribution to economic development? Can economic aid contribute to desirable political development?

FOREIGN AID AND FOREIGN POLICY. By Herbert Feis. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1964, 246 p. $5.00.

This balanced, reflective commentary on the political and economic aspects of foreign aid, by one with long experience of foreign economic policy, is of particular value at a time when shallow views and drastic proposals are more common.

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THE POLITICAL ROLE OF LABOR IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES. By Bruce H. Millen. Washington: Brookings Institution, 1963, 148 p. $3.50.

The analysis in this book is excellent and its examples, from many countries, interesting. The conclusions are modest and stress the need to accept the fact that the American ideal of apolitical unions is largely irrelevant to underdeveloped countries. Mr. Millen is a State Department official with experience as a labor attaché.

NATIONAL LABOR MOVEMENTS IN THE POSTWAR WORLD. Edited by Everett M. Kassalow. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1963, 256 p. $6.95.

Unions in underdeveloped countries get a good bit of attention in this collection but there are also essays on Norway, Japan, Belgium and France, international labor organizations, ideological issues and Communist tactics. The scope and approach of the essays vary greatly but there is much of interest.

THE CRITICAL DECADE. By Henry S. Reuss. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1964, 227 p. $5.50.

The progressive Democratic Representative from Wisconsin gives a comprehensive, forthright and well-informed statement of his views on the central issues of foreign and domestic economic policy, the organization of free world coöperation and the reform of Congress. He is especially concerned to get the United States out of a too-narrow attachment to the Common Market which he feels has "mesmerized" past policy.

INTERNATIONAL MANUAL ON THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY. Edited by Henry Alfred Kurt Junckerstorff assisted by Clement S. Mihanovich. St. Louis: St. Louis University Press, 1963, 521 p. $12.50.

A practical guide, compiled by European and American authors, on the objectives and initial success of the Common Market.

THE POPULATION CRISIS AND THE USE OF WORLD RESOURCES. Edited by Stuart Mudd. The Hague: W. Junk, 1964, 562, p. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, distributor, $7.95).

This large volume represents the combined efforts of the World Academy of Art and Science and a group of Stanford University students in bringing together important statements by many authorities.

HUMAN FERTILITY AND POPULATION PROBLEMS. Edited by Roy O. Greep. Cambridge: Schenkman Publishing Co., 1963, 278 p. $7.45 (Paper, $2.65).

The papers and remarks of authorities participating in a 1963 conference on problems relating to the "unprecedented multiplication of the human species." The conference was sponsored by the American Academy of Arts and Sciences.

The United States

POWER, FREEDOM, AND DIPLOMACY. By Paul Seabury. New York: Random House, 1963, 424 p. $6.25.

In this very able study the author's purpose is to "define and analyze the sources of American conduct in world affairs and the manner in which American interests, conduct, and purposes fit into the broader patterns of world politics." Thoughtful throughout, the treatment is organized by a number of well-selected general themes.

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DULLES OVER SUEZ: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF HIS DIPLOMACY. By Herman Finer. Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1964, 538 p. $7.50.

An extended and harsh indictment, only conventionally charitable, of John Foster Dulles' role in the 1956 Suez crisis. Basing his quite detailed narrative in part on a great many interviews with persons involved, Mr. Finer finds U.S. policy deficient before, during and after the crisis, particularly in undercutting France and England in an area of their vital interest and in failing to react with sufficient strength against Nasser and the U.S.S.R.

THE IDEAS OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY. By Michael Donelan. London: Chapman, 1963, 272 p. 30/.

A British review of the leading ideas and viewpoints affecting U.S. foreign policy between 1945 and 1962. At times interesting in providing an outside perspective, it is not very persuasive in its central discussion of the leading concepts and convictions that developed in the course of the cold war with the Communist powers.

THE UNITED STATES IN WORLD AFFAIRS, 1963. By Richard P. Stebbins. New York: Harper and Row (for the Council on Foreign Relations), 1964, 400 p. $6.95.

The nuclear test-ban treaty and the repercussions of President Kennedy's assassination dominate this authoritative account of American foreign relations in the year just past. Also subjected to critical analysis are the rifts in the Atlantic and Communist worlds, the developing conflicts in Africa, the slowdown in the Alliance for Progress and the financial problems of the United Nations.

DOCUMENTS ON AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS, 1963. Edited by Richard P. Stebbins with the assistance of Elaine P. Adam. New York: Harper and Row (for the Council on Foreign Relations), 1964, 480 p. $7.50.

A well-selected compendium of the major state papers reflecting the progress of American world relations in 1963. Invaluable as a permanent reference source, this standard collection also serves as a documentary appendix to the parallel volume, "The United States in World Affairs."

PROPAGANDA AND THE COLD WAR: A PRINCETON UNIVERSITY SYMPOSIUM. Edited by John Boardman Whitton. Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1963, 119 p. $3.50.

These papers dealing chiefly with American propaganda efforts, achievements and shortcomings in the setting of the cold war present quite diverse views.

AMERICAN PHILANTHROPY ABROAD. By Merle Curti. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1963, 651 p. $12.50.

A substantial history, by a leading American historian, of nongovernmental programs for relief and technical aid abroad from the days of the Greek revolution and the Irish famine to the present.

AMERICAN BUSINESS AND PUBLIC POLICY. By Raymond A. Bauer and Others. New York: Atherton Press, 1963, 499 p. $8.95.

An examination, based on extensive interviews and polls, of the politics of the foreign trade issue from 1952 to 1962. The authors are centrally concerned with businessmen's attitudes, pressure groups, the Congressional process and the role of communications throughout.

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THE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT. By John M. Swomley, Jr. Boston: Beacon Press, 1964, 266 p. $6.00.

A sounding of the alarm against the danger of military predominance in American life by an author who describes himself frankly as "a participant in the struggle to prevent the adoption of peacetime conscription and other steps toward military control."

CAN AMERICAN DEMOCRACY SURVIVE COLD WAR? By Harry Howe Ransom. Garden City: Doubleday, 1963, 270 p. $4.50.

This book arises from the author's expressed concern "that in periods of obsessive fear or true national emergency, radical changes will occur in our institutions —in the name of national security—that will severely damage the democratic framework." He argues that these dangers can be averted by "organizational foresight."

CORDELL HULL: 1933–44. By Julius W. Pratt. New York: Cooper Square Publishers, 1964, 2 v. $15.00.

This contribution to the ongoing series, "The American Secretaries of State and Their Diplomacy" (Vols. XII and XIII), is a quite comprehensive, though somewhat flat appraisal of Hull's 12 years in office.

ASSURING FREEDOM TO THE FREE: A CENTURY OF EMANCIPATION IN THE USA. Edited by Arnold M. Rose. Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1964, 306 p. $6.95.

A collection of lectures in celebration of the centenary of the Emancipation Proclamation and dealing with a variety of topics relating to the vicissitudes of the Negro in America.

ONCE A MARINE: THE MEMOIRS OF GENERAL A. A. VANDEGRIFT. As Told to Robert B. Asprey. New York: Norton, 1964, 338 p. $6.95.

Memoirs, centrally of the Second World War, by the former Commandant of the U.S. Marine Corps.

The Western Hemisphere

WHAT'S PAST IS PROLOGUE: THE MEMOIRS OF THE RIGHT HONOURABLE VINCENT MASSEY. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1964, 540 p. $7.50.

This is an important contribution by the distinguished Canadian public servant who for many years served his country and the Commonwealth. His last official assignment was as Governor-General of Canada, from which he retired in 1959.

THE MILITARY AND SOCIETY IN LATIN AMERICA. By John J. Johnson. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1964, 308 p. $7.00.

A respected Latin Americanist thoughtfully examines the growth and development of the military in Spanish and Portuguese America and its changing nature in a society which has seen the emergence of new forces. The author indicates that the role of the military, increasingly influenced by urban middle sectors, will continue to be important in unstable Latin American societies and no longer will necessarily be identified with the traditional power structure.

LES PROBLÈMES STRUCTURELS DES RELATIONS ÉCONOMIQUES INTERNATIONALES DE L'AMÉRIQUE LATINE. By Raul Sosa-Rodriguez. Geneva: Droz, 1963, 252 p.

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A statistical study of Latin America's twentieth-century pattern of foreign trade and commerce which concludes that rapid industrialization—despite economic imbalance, declining values of traditional exports, currency and financing difficulties—remains the goal for Latin American nations.

THE CONFLICT BETWEEN CHURCH AND STATE IN LATIN AMERICA. Edited by Frederick B. Pike. New York: Knopf, 1964, 239 p. $2.50 (Paper).

This collection of academic studies traces the political, social and economic relationships between church and state in Latin America from the colonial beginnings to the present. Of particular interest are those writings on recent church action dealing with social justice.

HANDBOOK OF LATIN AMERICAN STUDIES, NO. 25. Edited by Earl J. Pariseau. Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1963, 427 p. $17.50.

This is the most recent addition to this invaluable, annotated bibliographical series on Latin American politics, thought and culture, prepared in the Hispanic Foundation, Library of Congress.

THE CARIBBEAN: VENEZUELAN DEVELOPMENT, A CASE HISTORY. Edited by A. Curtis Wilgus. Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1963, 301 p. $7.50.

An uneven collection of papers dealing with Venezuela, resulting from the annual Caribbean Conference held in December 1962 at the University of Florida.

INTERVENTION AND DOLLAR DIPLOMACY IN THE CARIBBEAN, 1900–1921. By Dana G. Munro. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964, 553 p. $12.00.

A scholarly examination of United States foreign policy toward Central America which contends that concern for North American security, and not business interests, guided U.S. actions during the early twentieth century. This study by a noted Latin Americanist details the political developments in the Caribbean which shaped the policy of the Roosevelt, Taft and Wilson Administrations.

SUGAR AND SOCIETY IN THE CARIBBEAN. By Ramiro Guerra y Sánchez. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1964, 218 p. $5.00.

With a useful background provided by Sidney W. Mintz, this translation of a classic study on the Cuban sugar industry by a noted Cuban historian remains as valuable today as when first published in 1927. This is a scholarly examination of the impact which the changing nature of the sugar industry and increasing United States involvement had upon Cuba between 1898 and 1927.

PETRÓLEO: HORA CERO. By Harries-Clichy Peterson and Tomás Unger. Lima: Distribuidora Inca, 1964, 368 p. Soles 20.

This factual and statistical study of the Peruvian oil industry, written by a Peruvian and a North American, concludes that political factors have outweighed economic considerations and have hindered the development of the oil industry in Peru.

ARGENTINA AND THE UNITED STATES, 1810–1960. By Harold F. Peterson. Albany: State University of New York, 1964, 627 p. (New York: University Publishers, distributor, $10.00).

This scholarly diplomatic survey provides insights into the differing character-

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istics of North America and Argentina. Most valuable is the discussion of Argentina's difficulty in resolving such traditional issues as centralism *vs.* federalism, public *vs.* private ownership, the relationship of Buenos Aires to the provinces, all of which have "complicated Argentina's search for a pattern of foreign relations that would rally all elements of the population" and have "deeply confused the tone of modern Argentine nationalism."

Western Europe

CABINET REFORM IN BRITAIN, 1914–1963. By Hans Daalder. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1963, 381 p. $8.00.

A Dutch political scientist carefully analyzes the changes, actual and proposed, in Britain's Cabinet, particularly in light of war and defense needs.

PATRONAGE IN BRITISH GOVERNMENT. By Peter G. Richards. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1963, 284 p. $5.75.

A critical and interesting assessment of the continuing importance of governmental patronage in Britain.

THE NEW LOOK: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF THE FORTIES AND FIFTIES IN BRITAIN. By Harry Hopkins. Boston: Houghton, 1964, 512 p. $7.50.

A perceptive and entertaining inquiry into England's social revolution since the war. The often subtle manifestations of this process are recorded and analyzed.

INDIAN IMMIGRANTS IN BRITAIN. By Rashmi Desai. New York: Oxford University Press (for the Institute of Race Relations), 1963, 154 p. $3.40.

An Indian anthropologist examines the fascinating life of his compatriot-immigrants in Britain.

FEDERALISM IN THE COMMONWEALTH. Edited by William S. Livingston. New York: Oxford University Press (for the Hansard Society), 1963, 237 p. $4.80. (London: Cassell, 30/.)

Critical bibliographical essays by 11 scholars on different aspects of federalism in Commonwealth countries.

LE RÉFÉRENDUM DU 8 AVRIL 1962. Edited by François Goguel. Paris: Colin, 1963, 221 p. Fr. 25.

France's well-known political scientist edits a comprehensive and valuable study of all aspects of de Gaulle's referendum on Algerian independence, when only the extreme right urged a negative vote.

ANALYSES DE PRESSE. By Francine Batailler and Others. Paris: Presses Universitaires, 1963, 236 p. Fr. 15.

Four sociological essays on contemporary French journals, including a particularly interesting one on "The Ideology of the *Canard Enchaîné*."

L'ALSACE: DESTIN ET VOLONTÉ. By Pierre Pflimlin and René Uhrich. Paris: Calmann-Lévy, 1963, 262 p. Fr. 8.70.

A brief, useful survey of Alsatian life, past and present.

ADENAUER: A CRITICAL BIOGRAPHY. By Charles Wighton. New York: Coward-McCann, 1964, 389 p. $5.75.

A familiar story critically retold. The book deals chiefly with the 14-year

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chancellorship, and the subtitle of the original English edition, "democratic dictator," epitomizes the author's main contention.

DEUTSCHLANDS STAATLICHE EXISTENZ IM WIDERSTREIT POLITISCHER UND RECHTLICHER GESICHTSPUNKTE 1945–1963. By Rudolf Schuster. Munich: Oldenbourg, 1963, 308 p. DM. 36.

A scholarly inquiry into the political and especially the legal aspects of the present division of Germany.

THE REICHSTAG FIRE. By Fritz Tobias. New York: Putnam, 1964, 348 p. $5.95.

A thorough reconstruction of the events connected with the Reichstag fire. The author argues plausibly that van der Lubbe could have done the deed without accomplices—contrary to the assertions of Nazis and anti-Nazis at the time and of historians since then.

DAS GESICHT DES DRITTEN REICHES: PROFILE EINER TOTALITÄREN HERRSCHAFT. By Joachim C. Fest. Munich: Piper, 1963, 513 p. DM. 22.

A series of biographical essays about Nazi leaders who together made up "the face of the Third Reich." The emphasis is on the unique psychological and the common historical elements in each case.

SPIESSER-IDEOLOGIE: VON DER ZERSTÖRUNG DES DEUTSCHEN GEISTES IM 19. UND 20. JAHRHUNDERT. By Hermann Glaser. Freiburg: Rombach, 1964, 280 p. DM. 14.80.

Breezy essays on 200 years of petty bourgeois taste and thought in Germany, with the persuasive thesis that the Third Reich drew heavily upon this legacy.

DNVP: RIGHT-WING OPPOSITION IN THE WEIMAR REPUBLIC, 1918–1924. By Lewis Hertzman. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1963, 263 p. $5.00.

A scholarly study, based on some new sources, of Germany's largest right-wing party and of its unfortunate role in the early life of the Weimar Republic.

THE KAISER AND HIS COURT: THE DIARIES, NOTE BOOKS AND LETTERS OF ADMIRAL GEORG ALEXANDER VON MÜLLER, CHIEF OF THE NAVAL CABINET, 1914–1918. Edited by Walter Görlitz. New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1964, 430 p. $6.95.

An exceptionally important document illuminating Germany's disastrous leadership in the war. Incompetently translated.

THE DEFENSE OF BERLIN. By Jean Edward Smith. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1963, 431 p. $6.95.

A lucid and critical review of American policy concerning Berlin, from its wartime beginnings to the aftermath of the wall. The author was formerly a U.S. officer, stationed in Berlin.

SWITZERLAND PRESENT AND FUTURE: A SMALL COUNTRY REEXAMINES ITSELF. Edited by Théo Chopard. Berne: New Helvetic Society, 1963, 216 p.

Distinguished citizens of Switzerland interpret various facets of their country's life and wonder what the Swiss response to the new Europe should be. A thoughtful symposium.

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THE UNITED NATIONS AND PORTUGAL: A STUDY OF ANTI-COLONIALISM. By Franco Nogueira. London: Sidgwick and Jackson, 1963, 188 p. 25/.

A lucid exposition and a defense of Portugal's attitude toward U.N. concern with her African territories. By a leading Portuguese statesman.

Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union

ON DEALING WITH THE COMMUNIST WORLD. By George F. Kennan. New York: Harper and Row (for the Council on Foreign Relations), 1964, 57 p. $3.00.

In these lectures, entitled "The Rationale of Coexistence," "East-West Trade" and "Polycentrism and Western Policy," Mr. Kennan wrestles with the continuing problem of dealing with the Communist world and with the need, as he sees it, to surmount a number of traditional clichés and stereotypes which inhibit our ability to perceive, and act upon, the factor of change.

FROM PURGE TO COEXISTENCE: ESSAYS ON STALIN'S AND KHRUSHCHEV'S RUSSIA. By David J. Dallin. Chicago: Regnery, 1964, 289 p. $6.95.

A posthumously published collection of the late author's essays on a variety of Soviet themes. The book includes a bibliography of his writings.

SOVIET FOREIGN PROPAGANDA. By Frederick C. Barghoorn. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964, 329 p. $6.00.

In his latest study Professor Barghoorn deals in a conscientious and scholarly manner with the purposes, themes, techniques and organization of the formidable Soviet propaganda operations. Helpful as a review of the subject, though written prior to the recent shifts in Soviet-American and Soviet-Chinese relations.

SOVIET PARTISANS IN WORLD WAR II. Edited by John A. Armstrong. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1964, 792 p. $12.50.

This very substantial volume is the outcome of a group of postwar studies devoted to an analysis of the Soviet partisan movement. In his introduction the editor provides a broad and excellent view of Soviet partisan operations. Other sections comprise studies on organization and control, morale, psychological warfare and a series of regional case studies. In addition to Mr. Armstrong, the contributors are Kurt DeWitt, Earl Ziemke, Alexander Dallin, Ralph Mavrogordato, Wilhelm Moll and Gerhard L. Weinberg.

SOVIET AGRICULTURAL AND PEASANT AFFAIRS. Edited by Roy D. Laird. Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1963, 335 p. $7.00.

A symposium, based on papers presented at a conference held in 1962 and dealing with various aspects of Russia's perennial agricultural problems—administration, incentives, output, agronomy and the politics of agriculture.

THE USSR AND THE UN'S ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL ACTIVITIES. By Harold Karan Jacobson. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1963, 309 p. $6.95.

This monograph on Soviet policies respecting the economic and social activities of the U.N. suggests the positive utility of the "institutionalization of conflict" in this direction.

THE COMMUNIST FOREIGN TRADE SYSTEM. By Frederic L. Pryor. Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1963, 296 p. $7.50.

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A satisfactory study of both the national and international aspects of the Communist-bloc trade system.

EASTERN EUROPE IN THE SIXTIES. Edited by Stephen Fischer-Galati. New York: Praeger, 1963, 239 p. $6.00 (Paper, $2.25).

A cross-country survey, by nine authors, on the social situation, economy and political prospects of contemporary Eastern Europe.

HUNGARIAN NATIONAL INCOME AND PRODUCT IN 1955. By Thad Paul Alton and Associates. New York: Columbia University Press, 1963, 254 p. $5.00.

This volume, part of a larger study on the structure and growth of the economies of East Central Europe, analyzes the size, composition, sources and uses of the Hungarian national income as of 1955.

POLAND: BRIDGE FOR THE ABYSS? By Richard Hiscocks. New York: Oxford University Press, 1963, 359 p. $6.75.

After a somewhat superfluous excursion into Marxism and its adaptation in Eastern Europe, Professor Hiscocks surveys the course of events in Poland since 1945. His argument that Poland can serve as a "bridge" between the Communist world and the West is not entirely convincing.

NACHBAR POLEN. By Hansjakob Stehle. Frankfurt/Main: Fischer, 1963, 416 p. DM. 9.80.

An able report on post-1956 Poland, by a journalist on the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung,* including a most interesting and perceptive account of contemporary German-Polish relations and their chance for improvement.

STATE AND LAW: SOVIET AND YUGOSLAV THEORY. By Ivo Lapenna. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1964, 135 p. $5.00.

A monograph on Jugoslav and Soviet interpretations of the state and law and the difficulty of reconciling Marxist theory with actual practice.

The Middle East

POPULATION AND SOCIETY IN THE ARAB EAST. By Gabriel Baer. New York: Praeger, 1964, 275 p. $7.50.

This careful and thoroughgoing study of Arab society belongs on the short list of important books about the present-day Middle East. The author shows that, great and rapid change notwithstanding, old traditions and social patterns continue and that amalgamation of a new Arab society has yet to be completed.

THE MIDDLE EAST AND THE WEST. By Bernard Lewis. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1964, 160 p. $3.75.

A brief illumination of Middle Eastern society and its reactions to the West, by a leading British orientalist and historian.

PEOPLE AND POLICY IN THE MIDDLE EAST. By Max Weston Thornburg. New York: Norton, 1964, 249 p. $5.00.

Based on the author's 20 years of experience in the Middle East as an engineer, adviser and administrator, this is a perceptive and readable "inquiry into the behavior of people in the process of change."

DEVELOPMENTAL REVOLUTION: NORTH AFRICA, MIDDLE EAST, SOUTH ASIA. Edited by William R. Polk. Washington: Middle East Institute, 1963, 269 p. $4.00.

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Consisting of papers presented by a variety of authorities at the Middle East Institute's seventeenth annual conference in 1963, this volume surveys the social pressures for development and discusses methods, resources and ways of payment.

THE COMMONWEALTH AND SUEZ: A DOCUMENTARY SURVEY. Edited by James Eayrs. New York: Oxford University Press, 1964, 483 p. $10.10.

Successive phases of the 1956–57 Suez crisis as viewed by eight Commonwealth countries. Selected statements and speeches are supplemented by a well-written commentary.

EASTERN ARABIAN FRONTIERS. By J. B. Kelly. New York: Praeger, 1964, 319 p. $8.50.

An able study of the Buraimi dispute—in detail, and in historical and political perspective.

THE GOVERNMENT OF THE STATE OF ISRAEL. By Joseph Badi. New York: Twayne, 1963, 307 p. $5.00.

A straightforward account of Israel's political structure.

IRAQ UNDER GENERAL NURI. By Waldemar J. Gallman. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1964, 241 p. $5.95.

A revealing memoir, rather flattering to the murdered Prime Minister, by the U.S. Ambassador to Iraq at the time of Kassim's revolt in 1958.

South and Southeast Asia

THE MONSOON LANDS OF ASIA. By R. R. Rawson. Chicago: Aldine Publishing Co., 1963, 256 p. $6.00.

A geographic survey of the area from Pakistan to Japan, sustaining nearly half the world's population, by a senior lecturer at the London School of Economics. Many maps and illustrations.

THE MAKINGS OF A JUST SOCIETY. By Chester Bowles. Delhi: University of Delhi, 1963, 120 p.

Four lectures, delivered in December 1963, on economic and political development in Asia, Africa and Latin America, with emphasis on India. One of them compares such development in China and in India.

THE CHINA-INDIA BORDER. By Alastair Lamb. New York: Oxford University Press (for the Royal Institute of International Affairs), 1964, 192 p. $2.00 (Paper).

A succinct, scholarly treatise on the evolution of the Sino-Indian boundary controversy, based on published and unpublished materials, including available British official records in the India Office Library archives.

PEKING VERSUS DELHI. By George N. Patterson. New York: Praeger, 1964, 310 p. $7.50.

The author, a missionary turned journalist with long residence in Asia, gives the history of rivalry between China and India from their "emergence" (1947–49) to their "estrangement" (1959–61) in order to analyze the origin and cause of their critically important conflict.

WORKERS, FACTORIES, AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN INDIA. By Richard D. Lambert. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963, 247 p. $5.50.

This close study of the workers in five factories in Poona tells much about the

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make-up of the labor force and is especially interesting for the light it throws on the interplay between factories and the "traditional society."

PORTUGUESE RULE IN GOA, 1510–1961. By R. P. Rao. New York: Asia Publishing House, 1963, 242 p. (New York: Taplinger, distributor, 1964, $8.75.)

The Goan scene in its "natural all-India setting" from Portuguese occupation to the controversial use of force by India to bring the people officially into the Union.

THE STRATEGY OF ECONOMIC PLANNING: A CASE STUDY OF PAKISTAN. By Mahbub ul Haq. New York: Oxford University Press, 1964, 266 p. $3.15 (Paper).

A well-organized, analytical and frank study of planning in Pakistan, with evaluation and appraisal of its first two five-year plans (1955/60–1961/65), and with a "blueprint" for the third. Mr. Haq, who was actively associated with the work for three years, also discusses long-term growth.

THE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF SOUTHEAST ASIA. Edited by C. D. Cowan. New York: Praeger, 1964, 192 p. $8.50.

THE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF CHINA AND JAPAN. Edited by C. D. Cowan. New York: Praeger, 1964, 255 p. $8.50.

These companion volumes, with contributions by top experts and with almost identical introductions by Mr. Cowan, contain a total of 17 papers on various aspects of the economic history of Asia, mostly in pre-World War II times. They were originally presented at a study conference in July 1961, at London's School of Oriental and African Studies.

SIHANOUK SPEAKS. By John P. Armstrong. New York: Walker, 1964, 161 p. $4.95.

Drawing primarily on the words of Cambodia's abdicated King, now Chief of State, the former Co-Director of the Rangoon-Hopkins Center for Southeast Asian Studies provides the reasons for Sihanouk's policies and dealings in international affairs.

DIEN BIEN PHU. By Colonel Pierre Langlais. Paris: Éditions France-Empire, 1963, 264 p. Fr. 14.70.

A moving and informative account of a great defeat, told with restraint by the commander of the paratroops.

FROM COLONIALISM TO COMMUNISM. By Hoang Van Chi. New York: Praeger, 1964, 252 p. $6.50.

A description of the Communist seizure of control of the patriotic anti-colonial movement in Viet Nam and the establishment of a Communist régime through measures applicable in other South Asian countries. Mr. Hoang himself participated in many of the events.

COMMUNISM IN NORTH VIETNAM. By P. J. Honey. Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1963, 207 p. $4.95.

A lecturer at the University of London, a leading expert in his field, examines North Viet Nam's internal problems, power élite, party leadership and political aspirations in light of its dilemma in choosing sides in the Sino-Soviet dispute. The effects of the deterioration of economic and international relations between North Viet Nam and Soviet Russia are also discussed.

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SOUTH VIETNAM: NATION UNDER STRESS. By Robert Scigliano. Boston: Houghton, 1963, 227 p. $3.50.

A political history of South Viet Nam since 1954 by a Michigan State University expert, and member of the University's Viet Nam Advisory Group with three years' recent residence in that country. Unfortunately, it was completed before the assassination in 1963 of Ngo Dinh Diem and the overthrow of his government; a 12-page loose supplement describes those events and implications for the future.

THE NEW EMERGING FORCES. Edited by George Modelski. Canberra: Australian National University, Department of International Relations, 1963, 131 p.

Sixteen documents, some in extract form, to illustrate Sukarno's fight for "independence, social justice, and peace." Mr. Modelski's aim is to show that destruction of the old "imperialist-colonial" order is indeed the central plank of Indonesian doctrine.

The Far East and Pacific Ocean

CONTEMPORARY CHINA. V. 1961–1962. Edited by E. Stuart Kirby. New York: Oxford University Press; Hong Kong University Press, 1963, 350 p. $6.00.

As in earlier volumes of this highly regarded series, this contains papers and discussions (largely economic, reflecting the downfall of the "Great Leap Forward"), selected documents, chronology and bibliography (mainly of Chinese-language sources). Only the valuable statistics section is lacking, because of scarcity of reliable information from the China Mainland.

MAJOR DOCTRINES OF COMMUNIST CHINA. Edited by John Wilson Lewis. New York: Norton, 1964, 343 p. $6.00 (Paper, $3.25).

Selections from the China Mainland press to show the development of the Chinese Communist Party from its formation in 1921, its structure, operation and leadership, and its principal domestic and international strategies and techniques. Professor Lewis, of Cornell University, spent three years of research in Taiwan and Hong Kong.

MASS PERSUASION IN COMMUNIST CHINA. By Frederick T. C. Yu. New York: Praeger, 1964, 186 p. $5.00.

The author, professor and Director of Research at Columbia University's School of Journalism, uses Communist publications to show how the leaders of Mainland China have been developed and are using the "mass socialization of minds" as an instrument of power and a method of control. He predicts even greater success for the device, and finds it "a chilling thought."

THE UNITED STATES AND THE FAR EASTERN CRISIS OF 1933–1938. By Dorothy Borg. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1964, 674 p. $12.50.

A thoroughly documented, scholarly work, based on official and personal archives as well as published sources, to present in detail the aims of the United States and their implementation during a critical period in its foreign relations. By a research associate at the Columbia University East Asian Institute.

THE CHINESE INFLATION, 1937–1949. By Shun-hsin Chou. New York: Columbia University Press, 1963, 319 p. $8.50.

A Pittsburgh University professor traces, against a background of related historical development, the process of the runaway postwar inflation in China, with emphasis on its economic and social effects and as a prime factor causing the

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downfall of the Nationalist government. Professor Chou was once associated with the Central Bank of China.

CHINA AND THE HELPING HAND, 1937–1945. By Arthur N. Young. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963, 502 p. $10.00.

A high government adviser, with nearly two decades of service in China, writes on self-help and foreign aid during the crucial war years, relying heavily on his own personal papers and other archival records. He also gives his analysis of the reasons for China's fall to the Communists.

AN AFRICAN STUDENT IN CHINA. By Emmanuel John Hevi. New York: Praeger, 1963, 220 p. $4.95.

A disillusioned Ghanaian records his experience with humor as well as acerbity.

FORMOSA TODAY. Edited by Mark Mancall. New York: Praeger, 1964, 171 p. $5.75.

The personal observations of 12 persons of varying scholarly ability on the history, politics and economic and military aspects in Taiwan as of the beginning of 1963. Most of the essays originally appeared in *China Quarterly*.

ASIAN REVOLUTIONARY: THE LIFE OF SEN KATAYAMA. By Hyman Kublin. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964, 370 p. $9.00.

The first detailed study, and the least biased, of the "father of Asian Communism" who, over a period of 50 years, proceeded from Christian Socialism to revolutionary Communism to become a member of the Executive Committee and Praesidium of the Communist International. Professor Kublin, of Brooklyn College, relies heavily on Japanese-language sources, including unpublished personal papers and records in the collections of Katayama's descendants.

JAPAN'S NEW MIDDLE CLASS. By Ezra F. Vogel. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1963, 299 p. $6.50.

The results of field work conducted in Japan from 1958–1960 by trained social scientists to show the emergence of the white-collar worker and the increased importance of his status in the postwar period.

KOREA: THE LIMITED WAR. By David Rees. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1964, 511 p. $10.00.

A detailed history of the Korean situation since the partition in 1945, based on official and semi-official documents, by a free-lance writer for the *Guardian* and the *Spectator*. Emphasis is on the reasons for the U.S. decision to fight a war of containment—a war which, says Mr. Rees, quoting Henry Kissinger, "reflects an attempt to *affect* the opponent's will, not to *crush* it."

Africa

FOREIGN TRADE AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA: A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE. By S. Daniel Neumark. Stanford: Stanford University, Food Research Institute, 1964, 222 p. $6.95.

The historical impact of foreign trade on the internal development of African countries is analyzed, with emphasis given to a problem seen as of key importance to industrial development: the size of the domestic market.

L'AVÈNEMENT DE L'AFRIQUE NOIRE DU XIXe SIÈCLE À NOS JOURS. By Henri Brunschwig. Paris: Colin, 1963, 247 p. Fr. 18.

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A somewhat tendentious survey of European and African contacts from the nineteenth century, with a brief exposition on the growth of nationalist sentiment and ideology.

NEW NATIONS. By Lucy Mair. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963, 235 p. $4.50.

Miss Mair, a social anthropologist, uses "the extension of social relationships" as her frame of reference and discusses "society" in the developing countries. Examples are drawn from the Near and Far East as well as from Africa.

GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS IN NORTHERN AFRICA. By I. William Zartman. New York: Praeger, 1963, 205 p. $5.00 (Paper, $1.95).

A competent comparative survey of contemporary political practices and problems in eight countries of northern Africa, from Morocco to Somalia.

LE CONFLIT FRANCO-MAROCAIN, 1943–1956. By Stéphane Bernard. Brussels: Institut de Sociologie de l'Université Libre de Bruxelles, 1963, 3 v. Belgian Fr. 900.

Part of a series of case studies of international conflicts sponsored by the European Center of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, these volumes are a careful history and analysis of the Franco-Moroccan "decolonization" dispute by an experienced Belgian administrator and scholar.

MOROCCO: PROBLEMS OF NEW POWER. By I. William Zartman. New York: Atherton Press, 1964, 276 p. $7.95.

The author makes the decision-making process and the resolution of five major issues an effective vehicle for his exploration of modern Moroccan government and politics.

PROBLÈMES DE L'ALGÉRIE INDÉPENDANTE. Presented by François Perroux. Paris: Presses Universitaires, 1963, 207 p. Fr. 12.

Essays dealing variously with education, agrarian reform, economic development and other current issues.

FIVE AFRICAN STATES: RESPONSES TO DIVERSITY. Edited by Gwendolen M. Carter. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1963, 643 p. $10.00.

Five political scientists adhere to the same format in analyzing the Congo, Dahomey, the Cameroun Federal Republic, the Rhodesias and Nyasaland and South Africa. The articles on the French-speaking countries are particularly useful.

LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN WEST AFRICA. By Ronald Wraith. New York: Praeger, 1964, 184 p. $4.50.

A lecturer at the University of Ibadan renews his contribution to the study of local government in English-speaking West Africa in a survey of developments over the past ten years.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF NIGERIAN FOREIGN POLICY. By Claude S. Phillips, Jr. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1964, 154 p. $5.00.

The formation and implementation of foreign policy in Africa's most populous state from the period preceding the Federal election of 1959 to mid-1963 is analyzed in terms of pressures and issues.

ON AFRICAN SOCIALISM. By Léopold Sédar Senghor. New York: Praeger, 1964, 173 p. $4.95 (Paper, $1.95).

Three essays, two of which have appeared previously in English, give insight

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into the political philosophy of a distinguished statesman and poet, the President of Senegal.

ONE-PARTY GOVERNMENT IN THE IVORY COAST. By Aristide R. Zolberg. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964, 374 p. $7.50.

The need for unity in a political entity affected by ethnic cleavages is analyzed with special reference to the role of the single party and the directions of political change.

LE RÔLE PROÉMINENT DU SECRÉTAIRE GÉNÉRAL DANS L'OPÉRATION DES NATIONS UNIES AU CONGO. By Fernand Van Langenhove. Brussels: Institut Royal des Relations Internationales, 1964, 260 p.

The growth in the role of the Secretary-General of the United Nations through the involvement of the U.N. in the Congo is lucidly and authoritatively treated by the former Permanent Representative of Belgium to the United Nations.

HISTOIRE ET SOCIOLOGIE POLITIQUES DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE DU CONGO (BRAZZAVILLE). By Jean-Michel Wagret. Paris: Librairie Générale de Droit, 1963, 250 p. Fr. 30.25.

An excellent study of the historical background and political forces in Congo (Brazzaville).

THE SOMALI DISPUTE. By John Drysdale. New York: Praeger, 1964, 183 p. $4.95.

A new series on world affairs opens with a discussion of the problems of the Somali peoples, by a former adviser to the Prime Minister of Somalia.

EAST AFRICA: THE SEARCH FOR UNITY—KENYA, TANGANYIKA, UGANDA, AND ZANZIBAR. By A. J. Hughes. Baltimore: Penguin, 1963, 277 p. $1.25 (Paper).

An analysis of East Africa's political development and of the tendencies toward federation through 1961, with a concluding chapter on events of 1962.

RUANDA-URUNDI, 1884–1919. By William Roger Louis. New York: Oxford University Press, 1964, 290 p. $6.10.

A fascinating and detailed administrative and diplomatic history of Ruanda-Urundi to the end of World War I.

CANEVILLE: THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF A SOUTH AFRICAN TOWN. By Pierre L. Van den Berghe. Middletown (Conn.): Wesleyan University Press, 1964, 276 p. $6.95.

A sugar company town in Natal is the focus for a sociological examination of interracial patterns and attitudes.

AFRICANS ON THE LAND. By Montague Yudelman. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1964, 288 p. $6.50.

A well-documented study, with special reference to Southern Rhodesia, of the vital problem of increasing African agricultural productivity.

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SOURCE MATERIAL

By Donald Wasson

I. DOCUMENTS

Documents may be procured from the following: *United States:* Gov't Printing Office, Superintendent of Documents, Washington 25, D.C. *Great Britain:* British Information Services, Sales Section, 845 3rd Ave., New York 22. *United Nations, International Court of Justice:* United Nations, Sales Section, N.Y.; *United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Org., Food and Agric. Org.:* Columbia University Press, Int. Documents Service, 2960 Broadway, New York 27. *Int. Labor Office:* 1262 New Hampshire Ave., Washington 6, D.C. *European Coal and Steel Community, Economic Community, Euratom:* 808 Farragut Bldg., Washington 6, D. C. Washington imprints are Government Printing Office, and Congressional documents, unless otherwise noted, are for the 88th Congress, 2nd Sess. London imprints are Her Majesty's Stationery Office, and New York imprints are United Nations, unless otherwise noted.

Africa

Africa's tobacco industry. Washington, Foreign Agricultural Service, 1963. 118 p. (Foreign Agricultural Report, 23.) 75¢.

Kenya Independence Conference, 1963. London, 1963. 25 p. (Cmnd. 2156.) 1s.6d.

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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